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ABSTRACT
How does international migration affect political parties’ electoral strategies in the migrant
sending countries? And what is the effect of these electoral strategies on migrant and non-migrant
families’ electoral choices? These are the two research questions that motivate this project. This
dissertation argues that citizens’ involvement in international migration has implications not only
for their political behavior, but also for overall electoral dynamics in the sending countries.
My main contention is that international migration helps political parties to decide who to
target during elections. By electoral targeting, I refer to those practices commonly used to get
more votes, including: clientelism, home visits and the distribution of promotion and advertising
materials. Because exposure to migration fosters political disengagement from domestic politics and
makes migrant families more inclined to stay home on election day, these migration-exposed voters
are more likely to be electoral targets than similar non-migration-exposed ones. Using individual-
level data from Mexico’s 2000 and 2006 Presidential elections, results indicate that migration-
exposed voters tend to be electoral targets. Moreover, while the incumbent party is one of the
key participants in this targeting of migration-exposed voters, opposition parties also engage in the
electoral targeting of these voters.
Additionally, I claim that political parties are effective in getting migrant as well as non-migrant
families’ votes on election day. This happens due to political parties’ capacity to adapt to the needs
of voters and to use varied electoral tactics. Empirically, results indicate that electoral targeting
is generally effective among both migrant and non-migrant families. That is, electoral targeting
increases in most cases the predicted probability of getting votes from targeted migration and
non-migration-exposed voters. These findings also rely on data from Mexico’s 2000 and 2006
Presidential elections; and therefore present that Fox and Calderon’s victories, in 2000 and 2006
respectively, were in part driven by this electoral targeting. In sum, this dissertation is essential to
understanding not only political parties’ electoral behavior in response to international migration,
but also why migration-exposed and non-migration-exposed voters make certain electoral choices
that contribute toward particular electoral outcomes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
International migration is a worldwide phenomenon of impressive dimensions. According to the
World Bank, more than 215 million people lived outside their countries of birth in 2013, and
remittance flows to developing countries totaled around $401 billion in 2012, an increase of 5.3%
over the previous year. Most importantly, this upward trend is neither recent nor likely to decline
in the upcoming future. That is, between 1960 and 2000, the estimated number of international
migrants experienced a marginal increase of about 80% (The World Bank, 2014), and factors such
as demographic pressures, climate change, economic disparities, and globalization will continue to
encourage the movement of people across borders.
This transfer of population across international frontiers has significant economic and political
implications in both origin and destination countries. And yet, understanding the political impact
for the sending communities of international migrants is a project still in its infant stages. Hence,
this dissertation focuses on the consequences that aspects associated to international migration such
as the loss of residents to other countries and the substantial inflow of remittances from abroad
have for the workings of politics back home. Put differently, given the growing importance of this
international phenomenon and the relatively lack of comprehension about what it means politically
for the origin countries, expanding our knowledge in this matter is paramount.
Moreover, this study addresses the effect of this international process on home country elections
and raises two research questions: First, how does international migration affect the electoral
strategies of political parties back home? That is, given the presence of migration-exposed voters
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in the electorate, are political parties more likely to electorally target these voters than similar
non-migration-exposed ones? And second, how do these electoral strategies affect vote choices?
In other words, once political parties have implemented their electoral tactics, how do migration
and non-migration-exposed citizens vote? Chapter 2 provides evidence on why these questions are
essential to expand the existing research agenda.
I develop my theory about the workings of electoral targeting and its effectiveness in Chapter
3. First, I argue that international migration helps political parties to decide who to target during
elections. Moreover, I claim that because of migrant families’ political disengagement from domestic
politics and their inclination to stay home on election day, migration-exposed voters are more likely
to be targets of electoral strategies than similar non-migration-exposed ones. Then, I claim that
these electoral strategies are successful in getting both migrant and non-migrant families votes on
election day due to political parties’ capacity to adapt to the needs of voters and to use different
electoral strategies.
To be clear, by migration-exposed voters or members of migrant families, I mean those citizens
involved in or exposed to international migration processes such as return migrants, members of
households who have relatives living in foreign countries and those who receive remittances from
family members residing abroad. By electoral strategies, I refer to those practices commonly used
to get more votes during elections, including: clientelism, home visits and the distribution of
promotion and advertising materials. I label ‘clientelism’ - or the contingent exchange of goods
and/or favors in return for electoral support (Scott, 1969, 1972; Fox, 1994; Hicken, 2011) - and
‘home visits’ as non-programmatic electoral targeting and the sending of promotion materials as
programmatic electoral targeting.1 The reason for this distinction is that clientelism and home visits
are more ‘questionable’ electoral tactics that often include coercion and intimidation, while sending
advertising materials is a pretty legitimate practice that usually emphasizes electoral promises or
political programs. Finally, effective electoral targeting implies that these practices either increase
the likelihood of a targeted voter casting the ballot in favor of the targeting party or contribute on
the whole toward that party’s winning chances (e.g., by making opposition supporters stay home).
While this theory on the workings of electoral targeting applies generally to any country where
1 See Kitschelt (2000); Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007); Kitschelt et al. (2010) for some works that describe the
distinction between programmatic and non-programmatic politics.
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international migration is substantial and electoral targeting widespread, I use data from Mexico’s
2000 and 2006 presidential elections for this dissertation’s empirical tests. Various reasons support
this case selection. One straightforward motive is the importance of international migration in
Mexico. For instance, in 2000 the estimated number of Mexicans living abroad was about nine
and half million (The World Bank, 2014) and, of course, this figure hardly accounts for illegal
immigration. In terms of remittances, the corridor Mexico-US is one of the largest in the world and
in 2011, Mexicans transferred $22.2 billion (or about 2% of Mexico’s GDP) across this border (The
World Bank, 2011). In addition, the existing literature on international migration mostly relies on
Mexico for the theory building and empirical evidence. Thus, making a contribution on not only
how international migration affects Mexican political parties’s electoral strategies but also on the
effectiveness of these practices on vote choices is essential for knowledge building in this research
area. In this respect, I focus on the strategic behavior of the three main political forces in Mexico:
Partido Revolucionario Institutional - PRI, Partido de Accio´n Nacional - PAN and Partido de la
Revolucio´n Democra´tica - PRD. Lastly, the Mexico’s 2000 and 2006 presidential elections datasets
are highly adequate to evaluate this study’s theoretical predictions since they provide detailed
information on political parties and voters’ electoral behavior.
Building on this empirical approach, Chapter 4 analyzes who the electoral targets are during
the 2000 electoral contest, while Chapter 5 conducts the same assessment for the 2006 elections. In
other words, the objective of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 is to establish whether or not members of
migrant families are more likely electoral targets than similar non-migrant ones during, respectively,
the 2000 and 2006 Mexican presidential elections. The main take away point from these chapters is
that migration-exposed voters tend to be electoral targets; and that while the incumbent is one of
the key participants in this targeting of migration-exposed voters, key opposition contenders also
engage in the electoral targeting of these voters to a certain extent. In Chapter 6, I compare the
effectiveness of these practices among migration and non-migration-exposed voters to conclude that
these strategies are generally effective for both types of citizens. The only notable exception is that
electoral targeting does not seem to increase the chances of getting more votes from remittance
recipients, although this assertion relies on small differences when comparing targeted and non-
targeted voters. Lastly, Chapter 7 emphasizes this dissertation’s major contributions, as well as its
implications and provides directions for future work.
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In sum, this study is essential to understand not only political parties’ electoral behavior in
response to international migration, but also the contribution of migrant families to home country
electoral results. That is, this analysis explains the extent to which political parties (both incum-
bent and opposition) react to the presence of migrant families in their electorates and mobilize
these migration-exposed voters to win elections. It also addresses if political parties succeed in
this targeting endeavor or, if on the contrary, migration-exposed voters react negatively to these
practices and decide not to comply with political parties’ dictates. In addition, this dissertation
expands the literature on distributive politics and elections. Essentially, it suggests that exposure
to migration assists political parties in identifying their electoral targets and in deciding the mix
of targeted swing and core voters that most likely gives them an electoral victory. Obviously, this
connection has further implications for democratic accountability. In particular, if international
migration helps political parties to employ these strategies effectively, political contenders have in-
centives to keep using these strategies in future electoral contests. However, conditioning the vote
on the exchanges of goods/favors and on coercion mechanisms as opposed to performance in office
and policy programs has widely recognized negative consequences for the workings of democracy
and the quality of political institutions (e.g., Stokes, 2005; Kitschelt et al., 2010).
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter has two objectives. First, it analyzes existing research on the relationship between
international migration and domestic politics back home. In particular, given that the connection
between migration and politics affects a wide variety of phenomena such as exchange rate regime
selection (Singer, 2010), public goods provisions (Adida and Girod, 2011; Aparicio and Meseguer,
2012a; Duquetter-Rury, 2014), government financing (Kochi and Ponce-Rodriguez, 2011; Singer,
2012), regime stability (Su, 2009; Wright, 2010; Ahmed, 2010, 2012; Escriba-Folch, Meseguer and
Wright, 2012) and institutional quality/corruption (Sultan, 1993; Kapur and McHale, 2005; Li and
McHale, 2009; Docquier et al., 2011; Tyburski, 2012; Abdih et al., 2012; Ahmed, 2013; Tyburski,
2014); this chapter focuses on those works that causally connect international migration and home
country elections. More precisely, it details the causal mechanisms that explain why this interna-
tional process affects political behavior and electoral outcomes back home.
Second, this chapter presents why further work is necessary in this area. Essentially, existing
research is deficient for two related reasons. On the one hand, while most works emphasize that
international migration fosters different political behavior patterns for migration-exposed citizens
and migration-rich communities, it is unclear how this phenomenon affects the electoral strategies of
political parties. That is, current analyses focus by and large on the voter (demand side of elections)
and the associated electoral outcome, but provide little empirical evidence about political parties’
electoral strategies toward those involved in migration processes (supply side of elections). On the
other, the empirical link between the actions of political parties and subsequent migrant families’
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electoral decisions is non-existent. As a result, it is not really clear why migrant families make
certain electoral choices (i.e., whether political parties’ actions determine voting decisions or not).
In this chapter, I provide evidence for these assertions.
2.1 International Migration and Home Country Elections
When analyzing the political consequences of international migration, existing research often posits
a causal relationship between this international phenomenon and home country elections. This
connection applies to works looking at political behavior and turnout as well as those analyzing vote
choices and electoral outcomes. In addition, some scholars study how international migration affects
politicians’ behavior while in office, which obviously also has implications for future elections.1 I
address these three key sets of contributions in this section.
2.1.1 International Migration, Political Behavior and Electoral Turnout
Two explanations connect international migration with a variety of political actions as well as
with the decision of whether to vote or not: one emphasizes the effect of social remittances and the
other highlights the political disengagement that occurs among citizens exposed to this international
phenomenon. Interestingly, they predict opposite outcomes but reach related conclusions.
The first mechanism states that international migration fosters democratic diffusion back home
by providing contact with the political practices and democratic values of other countries (e.g.,
Levitt, 1998; De la Garza and Hazam, 2003; De la Garza and Yetim, 2003; Kapur and McHale,
2005; Perez-Armendariz and Crow, 2010; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011).2 In other words, social
remittances are those “ideas, behaviors, identities and social capital that flow from receiving to
sending country communities” (Levitt, 1998, page 927). Thus, given that in most destination
countries political participation is key for having a well-functioning democracy, social remittances
should encourage higher political involvement and turnout among those directly (migrants) and
1 See O’Mahony, 2013; Nyblade and O’Mahony, 2014 for two works that look at how international remittances
increase according to the timing of home country elections. The reason for not including these works in the main
discussion of this chapter is that while they connect migration and home country elections, they focus on the behavior
of migrants living abroad as opposed to the behavior those migration-exposed citizens in the country origin.
2 De la Garza and Yetim, 2003 argue that exposure to the US political institutions and processes leads to different
views of democracy between Mexicans and Mexican Americans. In this regard, the results indicate that, for instance,
Mexicans define democracy in terms of ‘equality’ whereas Mexican Americans describe it as ‘liberty’.
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indirectly (family members left behind) exposed to these ideas.
The second mechanism posits that the reliance on the transnational community to secure in-
dividuals’ well-being decreases the incentives to know about national politics and participate in
elections (Goodman and Hiskey, 2008; Bravo, 2008, 2009). Put differently, when one’s welfare and
comfort depend on those living abroad and improve due to monetary remittances sent from a dif-
ferent country, home politics and elections take a secondary role. Of course, this line of reasoning
contradicts traditional models of political participation, which suggest that higher socioeconomic
status increases political involvement (Verba et al., 1993; Brady, Verba and Scholzman, 1995; Bravo,
2009; Dionne, Inman and Montinola, 2014). Yet, by bringing the international dimension into the
theory of political participation, these authors claim that involvement in migration does not lead to
higher turnout but instead weakens the connection with national politics and reduces the incentive
to vote.
Despite the different reasoning, these works deliver a similar message: international migration
decreases electoral turnout (Goodman and Hiskey, 2008; Bravo, 2008, 2009) but increases partic-
ipation in non-electoral activities such as civic organizations, protests and accountability requests
(Perez-Armendariz, 2009; Perez-Armendariz and Crow, 2010; Batista and Vicente, 2011). Put
differently, empirical results suggest that both mechanisms could be at play with political disen-
gagement depressing turnout but social remittances encouraging higher participation in a wide
variety of non-electoral activities. For example, Bravo (2009) finds support for the existence of
political disengagement among migration-exposed voters since these citizens (i.e., those individuals
who have close family living in the US, receive remittances, have lived in the US or have intentions
to leave) not only know and talk less about politics but are also less likely to have voted in the 2006
Mexican presidential elections.3 Similarly, using a combination of municipal- and individual-level
data4, Goodman and Hiskey (2008) show that high migration levels decrease political participation
(i.e., voter turnout) and make those who remain back home i) less likely to view formal politics as
an effective mechanism to satisfy daily needs (i.e., less likely to think politics in general and voting
in particular are important) but ii) more likely to participate in non-political community organiza-
3 This lower information about politics implies things such as the name of state governor, location of parties on
the left-right scale, number of chambers in Congress.
4 These authors capture high migration municipalities by using an index (CONAPO index of migration) which
includes the share of households that i) receive remittances, ii) have family members living in the US, and iii) return
migrants.
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tions (e.g., religious, sports, neighborhood associations). Also, while Burgess (Manuscript) studies
how migrant households in Mexico are disengaged from elections but involved in more non-electoral
activities (i.e., civic organizations) in order to make demands on public officials through these non-
electoral channels (i.e., societal accountability)5, Hiskey and Cordova (2012) show that a migrant
connection (e.g., family members abroad or receiving remittances) also translates into higher civic
engagement (local committees and town hall meetings) in different Latin American countries. And
along the same lines but from a different continent, Dionne, Inman and Montinola (2014) show that
remittance recipients in 20 sub-Saharan countries are less likely to get electorally engaged and vote,
but more likely to contact government officials, join demonstrations and participate in protests.
On the other hand, the social remittances mechanisms affects a variety of political actions.
For instance, Perez-Armendariz (2009) and Perez-Armendariz and Crow (2010), using municipal-
and individual-level data from Mexico, support the notion that international migration acts as a
process of democratic transmission, however, indicate some interesting and contrasting patterns.
While return migrants experience a change in attitudes, the friends and family members of migrants
report behavioral changes.6 Perez-Armendariz and Crow (2010) explain these results by arguing
that the stronger diffusion (i.e., change in behavior) happens among those who remain abroad and
their family members back home since these migrants are those who stay longer, and experience
a process of deeper integration into the host society.7 Interestingly, these authors also find that
monetary remittances (i.e., individuals’ total annual amounts) have no effect on political attitudes
or behaviors. Relatedly, Batista and Vicente (2011) rely on the ‘experience abroad of international
migrants’ to study its effects on government accountability. They conduct an original survey in
Cape Verde and find that i) international migration - especially migration to countries where
corruption levels are lower than back home - have a positive impact on return migration’s demands
to improve political accountability (measured as whether or not respondents sent a postcard which
5 The rest of the chapters in this book focus on the involvement of the diaspora in activities, such as campaign
financing, lobbying for external political rights, political party activism, participation in advisory councils, mobilizing
collective remittances, etc. See also in this respect (Burgess, 2012, 2014).
6 Individual political activities include participation in any of the following actions during the last three years prior
to the survey: signed a complaint, wrote a letter to the editor, called into a political radio, or TV program, wrote
the president or another elected authority, etc. On the other hand, political attitudes include: tolerance, satisfaction
with democracy, and evaluations of government respect for rights.
7 See Perez-Armendariz (2014) for a recent comparison of how those living abroad and return migrants contribute
to the dispersion of social remittances. She actually finds that those living abroad play a greater role in the diffusion
of beliefs and behavior back home such as participation in organizations, individual involvement in politics, attitudes
toward corruption practices and tolerant opinions.
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offer the opportunity of making the results of the survey on perceptions of corruption publicly
available to the media), but that ii) remittances (share of recipient households per locality) have
no effect on these demands (i.e., send the postcard).8 Finally, Chauvet and Mercier (2011) rely
on the ‘transmission of norms’ that migrants experience abroad to analyze their participation
and democratic attitudes once back in Mali. They report that the stock of return migrants in a
given municipality increased political participation in the 1999, 2002 and 2004 local and national
elections. Quite surprisingly, this effect is mainly present when those migrants return home from
African countries that experienced democratization as opposed to more established non-African
democracies. They also find that return migrants from out-of-Africa tend to have a lower preference
for democracy and higher distrust in the Malian democratic system.
In general, one can conclude that the existing evidence supports the presence of both mech-
anisms but with interesting contrasts: international migration and the associated political disen-
gagement cause lower electoral turnout among migrant families (with one exception - Chauvet and
Mercier, 2011 and the particular case of return migrants), but social remittances translate into
higher participation rates in a wide variety of non-electoral activities.
2.1.2 International Migration, Vote Choices and Electoral Outcomes
International migration also affects the party of choice (e.g., incumbent versus opposition). A
variety of works agree on this claim but offer different causal mechanisms, diverging explanations
and ultimately contrasting results.
The first mechanism focuses on the economic benefits of remittances, which mean more votes
for the incumbent. Germano (2010, 2013) argues that remittances act as safety nets and make
recipients less vulnerable to economic instability and more optimistic about the economic situation
than similar non-recipients. Empirically, he shows that remittance recipients in the Mexican state of
Michoacan are less likely to have voted or, alternatively if they voted, more likely to have voted for
the incumbent party (PAN) in the 2006 presidential elections. Morgan, Hartlyn and Espinal (2011)
8 For a related study, see Careja and Emmenegger (2011) who analyze the political opinions of Central and Eastern
European return migrants from other more established European democracies, and find systematic differences with
respect to higher engagement in international politics (e.g., trust international institutions and participation in EU
elections) and satisfaction with democracy back home. Interestingly, Careja and Emmenegger (2011) do not find
an effect among those who return from other European newly established democracies. Across all migrants (i.e.,
those who return from established and new democracies), they also do not find differences in trust in the national
government, interest in domestic politics and intention to participate in national elections.
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offer a related argument in a different setting. They find that remittances increase the chances of
voting for the incumbent party in the Dominican Republic since these flows limit recipients’ need
to alter the status quo.9 And relatedly, using data from 20 Latin American countries, Bravo (2012)
shows how remittances increase presidential approval and voting intentions for the incumbent via
the improvement in household and country’s economic assessments.
The second mechanism claims that international migration and remittances weaken clientelism,
which means higher support for opposition parties. The majority of these works focus on Mexico
and highlight the positive effect of international migration on votes against the dominant incumbent
party PRI. Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Weingast (2003) explain that the greater internationaliza-
tion (i.e., international trade, people residing in the US, and remittances) of some Mexican munic-
ipalities gave citizens in these localities a credible exit option from the PRI’s centrally distributed
spoils system. The empirical analysis from 1995 Mexican local elections data indicates that i) more
international municipalities were more likely to have an opposition governing party (i.e., PAN or
PRD), and ii) the PRI punished these municipalities by providing less governmental funds. A
number of works have continued this tradition. Merino (2005) claims that remittances constitute a
“reservation wage” that allow these citizens to become independent from PRI clientelistic networks
and vote for the opposition in Mexican municipal elections. Pfutze (2012) finds that migration in-
creases the probability of an opposition party winning a municipal election against the PRI for the
first time, while Pfutze (2014) develops a voting model with clientelistic transfers that accounts for
social and monetary remittances. The logic in Pfutze (2014) is quite simple: remittances increase
the amount that needs to be paid to clientelistic-engaged voters, but given budget constraints the
party can no longer keep the same number of voters under this relationship. As a result, he shows
that international migration (i.e., the proportion of remittance-receiving households) meant lower
turnout for the clientelistic and incumbent PRI in those municipalities continuously ruled by the
PRI in the early 2000s. Finally, and adding some geographic variation10, Ahmed (2011) argues that
remittances decrease the incumbents’ ability to buy electoral support and finds that, conditional on
9 Note that these authors also call into attention the political character of historical emigration in the Dominican
Republic and the ties of these emigrants with the traditional political parties, which encourages stability of the party
system in this country.
10 Also a similar approach but looking at non-democratic regimes, Escriba-Folch, Meseguer and Wright (2012)
find, in a sample of 137 autocracies from 91 countries, that remittances increase the chances of democratic transition
in party-based dictatorships given that voters become less dependent of patronage networks and more supportive of
opposition parties.
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dissatisfaction with the ruling government, remittance recipients are less likely to have intentions
to vote for the incumbent party in 18 Latin American countries.11
The third mechanism focuses on the self-selection of migrants and the resulting electoral benefits
for the incumbent. That is, in opposition to the previous works and pointing out the limitations
of these cross-sectional studies to show causal relations, Bravo (2008) claims that those who leave
Mexico tend to be anti-PRI voters which actually causes the re-shaping of local electorates in favor
of the PRI. He then shows in a differences-in-differences analysis that out-migration helped the
incumbent party by increasing PRI’s security (municipal vote share) in office during the 1990’s.
In sum, while for some authors the economic benefits of remittances and the selectivity of
migrants favor the incumbent party, for others international migration makes it harder for the
incumbent party to buy votes and win elections.
2.1.3 International Migration and Political Parties’ Behavior
Although not directly looking at elections, it is important to mention two additional sets of contribu-
tions because they connect international migration and political parties’ behavior. Put differently,
even though the electoral connection is mostly absent from these analyses, it is straightforward to
think that the analyzed behavior has direct electoral implications.
First, Su (2009) claims that remittances signal to the PRI who the likely swing voters are and
so this party attempts to win those voters back by providing them with materialistic incentives.
The main logic is that remittances provide an alternative source of income to finance needs instead
of relying on PRI’s clientelistic exchanges. Household data from Mexico in 1998 indicate that
remittance recipient households are more likely to receive PROCAMPO (e.g., Programa de Apoyos
Directos al Campo - Mexico’s governmental private transfer for direct rural support) transfers than
non-recipients. Similarly, Gonzalez-Acosta (2009) shows evidence that, in the Dominican Republic,
higher income and remittances do not exclude participation in this type of practices: out of 331
survey respondents: 77 participated in clientelistic exchanges, and 25 were remittance recipients.
And second, a variety of works look at the strategic allocation of collective remittances, partic-
11 This author, however, does not directly test if remittance recipients are the targets of clientelism, although
explains that strategic calculations might lead to target those voters who are poorer. Cross-country panel data from
121 countries over the period 1976-2009, also supports the theoretical claim that remittances lower the incumbent’s
electoral vote share.
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ularly the 3x1 program in Mexico (Aparicio and Meseguer, 2012a,b,c). This program matches the
resources that US Hometown Associations send back to Mexico with municipal, state and federal
funds in order to implement much-needed public projects (e.g., public and social infrastructure).
Yet, Aparicio and Meseguer (2012a,b,c) find that instead of purely needs-based allocation reasons,
political interests are the key determinants in the distribution process since PAN strongholds (or the
incumbent party during 2002-2007) and less competitive localities (i.e., determined by vote shares
electoral results) are the main beneficiaries of these projects. In other words, the incumbent party
uses collective remittances as a mechanism to reward core supporters/municipalities and ensure
their loyal votes in future elections.12
2.2 What is missing?
Existing research is deficient for two related reasons. First, answers regarding political parties’
electoral strategies toward those involved in migration processes (or migrant families) are mostly
missing. That is, current analyses focus by and large on the voters (demand side of elections), their
political behavior and the associated electoral outcome, but provide little empirical evidence about
political parties’ electoral strategies toward those involved in migration processes (supply side of
elections). Moreover, while analyzing the strategic allocation of collective remittances (Aparicio
and Meseguer, 2012a,b,c) and government programs (Su, 2009) are important contributions, one
might wonder how political parties complement these actions with other strategies as election day
approaches.
Second, the empirical link between political parties’ behavior and subsequent migrant families’
electoral decisions is non-existent. This absence leaves us wondering if migrant families vote in
a certain way because i) they have not been the targets of electoral strategies (e.g., clientelistic
exchanges and visits), ii) they have been the targets and these targets are effective, or iii) they have
been the targets but these targets are ineffective.13
12 See Duquetter-Rury (2014) for an additional study of the Mexican 3x1 program and its consequences on access
to public goods, such as sanitation, drainage and water on the receiving communities.
13 This criticism applies especially to the works analyzing electoral turnout since they are voter-centered approaches
where the actions of political parties are absent from the analysis. As a result, various explanations are plausible as
to why migration-exposed citizens are more likely to stay home on election day. One reason is that political parties
do not target migrant families with electoral strategies and because of their political disengagement and the absence
of a party telling them who to vote for, the clear alternative is abstention. The second option is that political parties
do target these voters but are ineffective in getting their votes if, for instance, social remittances lead to the rejection
12
For instance, one could claim that these citizens are not the subjects of electoral targeting
and choose ‘freely’ to stay home or vote for the opposition (not targets). But it could also be
that incumbent targets are no longer effective in buying opposition supporters votes (ineffective
targeting), or that migration-exposed voters are electoral targets and these actions are precisely the
ones driving their electoral choices: i.e., opposition/incumbent targets drive opposition/incumbent
vote choices (effective targeting). Stated otherwise, even if we take as a fact that migration benefits
the opposition (or the incumbent), we still want to know if the opposition (or the incumbent) i)
mobilizes their migration-exposed supporters and succeeds, ii) mobilizes them but does not succeed,
or iii) migration makes such electoral practices unnecessary: i.e., political parties anticipate that
migration and remittances make those exchanges ineffective and refrain from using them with these
citizens.
2.3 Why this approach?
Considering the involvement of political parties and its effect on migrant families’ electoral deci-
sions is essential for various reasons. Most notably, and as previously mentioned, answers to how
international migration affects political parties’ electoral strategies back home are mostly missing,
of these practices or the migration option makes these exchanges with political parties less binding and abstention
more appealing. And one can even claim that political parties target migrant families and are effective in getting
opposition supporters to stay home and therefore maximize their winning chances. Undoubtedly, exploring these
alternatives is necessary to better understand existing findings.
A similar logic applies to the works looking at the choice between incumbent and opposition. As before, different
explanations can connect migrant families’ economic status and more votes for the incumbent. One reason is that
political parties do not target remittance recipients given that their better economic situation will make clientelistic
exchanges (e.g., food or other material goods) less valuable for these voters. The other is that the incumbent party
ensures electoral victory by mobilizing precisely those voters with a positive evaluation of the government. That is,
the incumbent party rely on effective targets to get remittance recipients’ votes since they might just need an extra
incentive to vote for the candidate who is doing a good job at running the country. In addition, the opposition could
be losing their traditional core supporters because their targets are ineffective if, as previously mentioned, remittance
recipients’ better economic situation makes these practices worthless.
The works that claim that international migration favors the opposition certainly incorporate political parties’
strategic behavior into their theoretical frameworks. However, it is still unclear why international migration favors
the challenger party. The reasons for this lack of clarity are twofold. First, most of these works rely on state or
municipal-level data (although see Ahmed (2011) for an exception), which hinders connecting individuals’ electoral
decisions with electoral outcomes. Second, it is necessary to address the multiple alternatives available. Following
previous reasoning, one option is that political parties do not target migrant families given their improved economic
situation. These voters can then “freely” choose to vote for the opposition. Another plausible alternative is that the
incumbent targets these migration-exposed voters but the exchanges are ineffective due to the benefits of remittances
and the lower dependence on the party to ensure welfare. And yet, it might also be the case that opposition parties
target migrant families and are effective if, for example, these citizens tend to concentrate among their supporters (as
Bravo, 2008 suggests) and ideological affinity is all that matters. In short, the empirical link between these strategies
of political parties and subsequent migrant families’ electoral decisions is necessary.
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and as a result, it is not clear why migration-exposed citizens make certain electoral decisions.
In addition, this approach emphasizes the fact that different explanations (e.g., effective tar-
geting, not targeted) lead to the same outcomes. For instance, although a priori the effect of
international migration on lower turnout is a negative consequence of migration, we might want to
reevaluate this assessment if the abstention decision follows from ineffective clientelism. That is,
one thing is that migrant families do not care enough about elections to go out and vote, while a
different one is that these voters do not respond to the questionable electoral strategies of political
parties. Therefore, establishing why we observe a certain outcome is critical.
Likewise, exploring the alternative channels can help to understand the somewhat puzzling find-
ing that migration-exposed citizens commonly decide not to vote, but are otherwise more politically
(i.e., non-electorally active) involved citizens. For example, if abstention is higher among targeted
than similar non-targeted migrant families, international migration might be encouraging, on the
one hand, politically active citizens in a wide variety of activities, but on the other, lower turnout
due to negative reactions to political parties’ electoral strategies, such as clientelism. Consequently,
exploring these different options is paramount.
Furthermore, this approach answers the extent to which political parties (both incumbent and
opposition) respond to the presence of migration-exposed voters in their electorate and use different
electoral strategies to get their votes and win elections. Thus, this analysis also expands our
understanding in three key areas: First, whether or not international migration weakens clientelism
and other forms of political mobilization (at least at the individual level). For instance, if targeted
migrant and non-migrant families are as likely to vote for the clientelistic party everything else
equal, international migration is not weakening clientelism. On the contrary, if targeted migrant
families are less likely to vote for that party than targeted non-migrant families ceteris paribus,
migration could be the factor behind the ineffectiveness of such exchanges and therefore weakening
those electoral practices. Likewise, building on the idea that international migration re-shapes
electorates and favors the incumbent (Bravo, 2008), it is important to explore if the incumbent
targets migrant families or if, given their tendency to favor the opposition (as Bravo, 2008 suggests),
the incumbent party does not mobilize these votes.
Second, this analysis aims to offer some common ground to the contrasting claims that migration
favors the incumbent or the opposition. In particular, after considering political parties’ strategic
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behavior, it is possible to establish the conditions that make migrant families more likely to vote
for the incumbent or the opposition.
And third, it is possible to connect individuals’ voting decisions with certain electoral outcomes
at the aggregate level. This offers some clarification to the works that argue for international
migration favoring a particular electoral result. That is, existing empirical analyses mostly rely on
state or municipal-level data (although see Ahmed, 2011 for an exception) that make it impossible
to know if results are due to migrant families’ behavior or the overall effect of migration in these
geographic units (e.g., economic spill over effects of remittances).
In sum, given the widespread use of clientelism and other mobilization strategies in the home
country of international migrants, this dissertation proposes to start with political parties’ strategic
activities and then, analyze their effect on voting choices (i.e., abstention, incumbent, opposition).
Put differently, it raises two related research questions: First, how does international migration af-
fect the electoral strategies of political parties back home? That is, given the presence of migration-
exposed voters in the electorate, are political parties more likely to electorally target these voters
than similar non-migration-exposed ones? And second, how do these electoral strategies affect vote
choices? Or, once political parties have implemented their electoral tactics, how do migration and
non-migration-exposed citizens vote? This approach therefore helps to understand not only the
extent to which political parties (both incumbent and opposition) rely on getting migrant fami-
lies’ votes to win elections but also why migrant families make certain electoral decisions. This
dissertation provides such theoretical and empirical analysis.
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Chapter 3
Explaining Electoral Targeting and its
Effectiveness
This chapter develops a theory that connects political parties’ electoral strategies with voter’s
choices. In doing so, it addresses two questions. The first question asks: who do political parties
target? More precisely, are migrant families more likely to be electoral targets than similar non-
migrant ones? To answer this question, this chapter builds on the literature about political parties’
strategies and explains why political parties take migration exposure into account when designing
their actions. I argue that because of migrant families’ political disengagement from domestic
politics, these families are more likely to be electoral targets than non-migrant ones, ceteris paribus.
The second question asks: are these electoral strategies effective in influencing vote choices?
Or most importantly, given political parties’ electoral behavior, how do migrant and non-migrant
families vote? Answering this question requires considering what drives the behavior of the actors
involved. That is, political parties maximize their wining chances and target voters when antici-
pating the effectiveness of their actions. Migrant families then respond favorably when perceiving
a benefit from such practices. Thus, I claim that these electoral strategies are successful in getting
both migrant and non-migrant families’ votes due to political parties capacity to adapt to the needs
of voters and to use different electoral strategies. Figure 3.1 depicts the connection between these
two questions, i.e., the process that relates political parties’ electoral strategies with citizens’ vote
choices (for both migration and non-migration exposed ones).
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3.1 First Question: Who do political parties target?
In order to explain the connection between targeting and international migration, it is first necessary
to discuss some essential aspects of the workings of this electoral process. In this respect, existing
research on distributive politics makes two points clear: first, political parties are strategic when
allocating resources across constituencies and voters; and second, political parties rely on local
networks to implement their strategies. Both logics are essential to comprehend electoral targeting.
With respect to the first point, answers on the strategic behavior of political parties commonly
highlight the key role of economic resources and political identity.1 Interestingly, while consensus
generally exists that poor voters tend be electoral targets (e.g., Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes, 2004;
Jensen and Justesen, 2014), scholars disagree as to whether the core or the swing voters are the
main beneficiaries of distributive practices (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987;
Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Golden and Min, 2013).
Recent developments however suggest that political parties do not focus on just one set of
voters (core vs. swing), but instead combine a variety of strategies in order to appeal to different
types of citizens and win elections. This progress is clear in the works that analyze core and
swing districts and municipalities. That is, despite extensive research and disagreement over the
role of swing and core constituencies in the allocation of resources (e.g., Ward and John, 1999;
Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002, see Golden and Min, 2013 for a complete inventory of these works),
recent contributions indicate that political parties diversify their strategies and appeal to different
ideologies by using, for example, different government benefits and types of goods (e.g., Diaz-
Cayeros, Estevez and Magaloni, 2007; Albertus, 2013).
A parallel evolution is present in the works that take individuals as the unit of analysis. Per-
haps unsurprisingly, they also reach similar conclusions. For instance, some authors claim that
ideologically weakly opposed (i.e., swing voters) and poorer voters are the main targets of clien-
telism or vote buying strategies (Stokes, 2005; Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes, 2004), while others
argue that knowing political identity and tendency to abstain is essential because political parties
mostly get involved in turnout buying, or in making sure core supporters at risk of abstention vote
1 See also Finan and Schechter (2012) for a work that shows how the personal characteristic of being a reciprocal
individual also increases the chances of being a target.
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on election day (Nichter, 2008). Survey data from Argentina support the idea that political parties
favor turnout buying of core supporters over vote buying of swing voters. However, Nichter (2008)
also suggests that, even if the empirical analysis is mostly consistent with turnout buying, political
parties employ different tactics, including not only some vote buying, but also rewarding loyalists
- or targeting those supporters with inclinations to vote - and double persuasion - or appealing
to those who favor the opposition and are not inclined to vote. Along these lines, Dunning and
Stokes (2008) argue that, in order to succeed at the polls, political parties participate in both
turnout buying or electoral mobilization of those core supporters who are inclined to abstain and
vote buying or persuasion of opposition supporters who have every intention to vote. Relatedly,
Stokes et al. (2013) find support to the logic of heterogeneous targeting by showing that whereas
loyalists are key targets some swing voters also factor in strategic calculations. And Gans-Morse,
Mazzuca and Nicther (2014) propose a formal model where political machines, influenced by the
contextual factors such as compulsory voting, ballot secrecy, and political polarization, combine
different strategies (i.e., turnout buying of core supporters, and vote buying, abstention buying and
double persuasion of opposition supporters).
In brief, the message that emerges from works looking at individuals as well as those analyzing
districts is that political parties while certainly paying attention to their core and loyal supporters,
they also implement other strategies that appeal to a wider set of voters (Hicken, 2011).
With respect to the second point about local networks, political parties’ reliance on these
connections goes beyond the simple need of human resources to implement leaders’ strategies across
the country. On the contrary, local workers (i.e., brokers, bosses, middlemen) are crucial working
parts of the political machine (Scott, 1969, 1972). That is, on the one hand, political brokers act as
problem-solvers of every day concerns through the provision of goods (e.g., food, appliances) and
services (e.g., childcare, counseling) to numerous voters (Auyero, 2000; Szwarcberg, 2012b). On the
other, this delivery function allows them to acquire valuable information not only with respect to
what certain voters need and would exchange for political support on election day, but also about
individuals’ political preferences, tendency to turn out to vote, and political behavior (Gonzalez-
Ocantos et al., 2012; Lehoucq, 2007; Wang and Kurzman, 2007; Stokes et al., 2013; Szwarcberg,
2012a). Altogether, this means that local workers hold influential positions within the community
and acquire precious knowledge that is unreachable for those at the top of the political ladder.
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These points are instrumental to understanding why international migration plays a role in
shaping political parties’ strategies. I develop this theory in the following section.
3.1.1 Political Parties’ Strategies and International Migrant Families
I argue that international migration helps political parties to decide who to target during elections.
By electoral targeting I mean commonly used strategies, including: clientelism, home visits, and
advertising materials. Moreover, I claim that because of migrant families’ political disengagement
from domestic politics and their lack of motivation to turn out to vote on election day, migrant
families are more likely to be the targets than similar non-migrant ones. In this section, I provide
the reasoning for why we expect this relationship between international migration and political
parties’ behavior. I develop the logic by addressing three key points: first, why migrant and non-
migrant families are different; second, why these differences provide useful information to political
parties; and third, why this electoral targeting is different for the incumbent and opposition parties.
Migrant and Non-Migrant Families are Different
Migration fosters differences between families involved in this international phenomenon (i.e.,
have someone living abroad, receive remittances, are return migrants) and those who are not. This
differentiation applies to the family structure, economic situation and political behavior. Quite
simply, one of the common characteristics of migrant families is that they do not have the same
makeup as the rest of neighbors since the head of household, and in certain cases even children,
are living in a different country. In addition, economic assistance from abroad (i.e., remittances)
usually accompanies the absence of family members. That is, given the lack of local opportunities,
one of the main drivers of migration is the goal to find a job, get an income and provide for family
needs back home. As a result, international migration and remittances flows happen most of the
time jointly. It is moreover not uncommon for those family members left behind to experience a
substantial improvement in living standards and economic stability (e.g., Kapur, 2004; Kapur and
McHale, 2005). As Kapur (2004) (page 11) states: “households that receive remittances rapidly
attain standards of living greater than those who do not have family members working abroad.” In
other words, migration differentiates between those who have access to external sources of income -
or remittances - and those who do not. It is also not surprising that, especially in rural and smaller
19
communities, income inequalities2, better housing conditions, and different consumption patterns
make the distinction between remittance recipients and non-recipients very noticeable (Barham and
Boucher, 1998; Kapur, 2004; Mohapatra, Joseph and Ratha, 2012; Adams and Cuecuecha, 2010;
Germano, 2010).3
Together with these structural and economic differences, migrant families also differ from non-
migrant ones in their political involvement. In his seminal work, Hirschman (1978) explains that,
during the big European out-migration waves in the 19th and early 20th centuries, those citizens
who chose to ‘exit’ were “obviously dissatisfied in some way with the country and society they
were leaving” (page 102) and disaffected from the existing political situation.4 Needless to say,
far from being a phenomenon of the past, political disengagement is still very present in current
migratory processes and among migrant families. This happens for various reasons. One is that
migrant families depend economically more on those living abroad than on the national economy
and domestic politicians to ensure welfare, which fosters disconnection from the local or national
political environment. Another cause is that some migrant family members left behind have also
intentions to leave (i.e., exercise the ‘exit’ option) and so do not care that much about the political
environment or the situation back home. And even, it is certainly not unusual for return migrants to
depart on numerous occasions and after spending some time in their home country, which arguably
also hinders involvement in politics. Obviously, a combination of these motives is also probable:
political disaffection is present among those who migrate in the first place, and remittances and the
possibility of leaving and joining family members abroad reinforce political disengagement among
those left behind. In any case, this reasoning means that international migration and political
disengagement/disaffection from national politics go hand-in-hand. In fact, as shown in the previous
chapter, existing research shows that this political disengagement translates into lower turnout and
less political information, such as the location of political parties on the left-right ideological scale
(e.g., Goodman and Hiskey, 2008; Bravo, 2008, 2009; Germano, 2010).
2 The effect of remittances on higher income inequality has however been contested by McKenzie and Rapoport
(2007).
3 Mohapatra, Joseph and Ratha (2012), for instance, find that remittance-receiving households in the Burkina
Faso and Ghana, have houses built of concrete rather than mud, specially if these transfers come from high-income
OECD countries. Atienza (2004) and Hidalgo (2004) also highlight differences in consumption patterns among those
who have access to remittances and those who do not, since recipients can afford imported goods and follow the
consumption practices of developed countries.
4 See Hirschman (1970) for a longer and detailed description of the exit, voice and loyalty option.
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Political Parties’ Responses to Migration
Political parties are aware of the presence of migrant and non-migrant families in their commu-
nities. Either because the distinction is quite perceivable to the community at large or because,
as earlier explained, political parties use local networks to acquire detailed information on con-
stituents’ political and economic characteristics (e.g., Stokes, 2005; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012;
Szwarcberg, 2012a), it is safe to assume that political contenders can identify migration-exposed
voters. The relevant follow-up question is then why this information is useful to political parties.
I claim that knowing not only who the migration-exposed voters are but also why they are
different helps political parties to design their electoral strategies and decide who to target during
elections. In particular, the family structure and economic distinctions provide incentives for po-
litical parties to tailor the goods/favors offered to these migration-exposed citizens in exchange for
political support. Indeed, this adaptation to voters’ needs is not an uncommon practice for political
parties (e.g., Stokes, 2005; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012). In addition, migrant households’ polit-
ical disengagement informs politicians that these voters are quite likely to stay home on election
day. That is, even if migrant families favor some political groups over others, they commonly lack
motivation to turn out to vote. This tendency of migration-exposed voters to abstain is essential to
understanding electoral targeting, which - as above emphasized - also factors in political ideology.
Consequently, I use both political orientation and inclination to abstain to explain why political
parties target migration-exposed voters.
To start, one of the main objectives of political parties is to ensure that party supporters (i.e.,
those voters that identify or favor a particular party) turn out to vote on election day. Counting
on the support of sympathizers is essential to win elections but not always a certainty since the
lack of time, the costs of getting to the polls, and even the absence of motivation about the
elections can prevent people from voting. In this respect, migrant families belong to that set of
voters with higher chances of abstaining due to their political disaffection from national politics
and insufficient motivation to get involved in elections. Nonetheless, political parties deal with
this potential abstention by using local networks that identify those voters at risk as well as by
implementing different activities (e.g., home visits, clientelistic exchanges) during the electoral
campaign. In other words, political parties develop identification and mobilization strategies to
avoid losing the votes of those who identify or favor the party but do not feel inclined to vote.
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Thus, given that migrant families fall into the category of possible abstainers, political parties have
incentives to make these party supporters the targets of their electoral actions. That is, migration-
exposed voters or members of migrant families that identify/favor a particular party are more likely
to be subject to turnout buying or electoral mobilization than similar non-migration exposed ones.
Their political disengagement and the associated risk of staying home during elections are key to
understanding why.
But electorates do not only include supporters with and without intentions to abstain. Instead,
political parties also have to deal with non-supporters. Put differently, while making sure that
party identifiers vote is crucial, political parties need to appeal to other types of voters, i.e., non-
party supporters, in order to maximize the chances of winning the election (even if this is done
in a lower degree, as previously described Hicken, 2011; Golden and Min, 2013). The obvious
question is therefore who among those non-supporters should the party target. A priori one can
argue that politicians should not invest electoral resources in encouraging turnout among those
migrant families that identify with the contender party. After all, given that these voters favor
the contender but have intentions to stay home, it seems an ideal scenario for the party under
consideration. Moreover, targeting non-supporting migrant families requires not only convincing
these citizens to vote but also to change party orientation, i.e., double persuasion. Of course, this
strategy is quite costly and not as likely to be successful in affecting vote choices.
Nonetheless, this initial logic misses the fact that political parties can compete for the same set
of voters, or that strategic interaction between parties occurs during elections. Two main reasons
encourage this competition for certain votes. First, even if one party has no initial motivation to
target those non-supporters with intentions to stay home, the contender party faces the opposite
incentive and willingly participates in the mobilization of these voters: for example, an opposition
party mobilizes migrant family voters that identity with this opposition party. This action of
course means more votes toward the contender party and, potentially, an eventual electoral loss for
the incumbent. In other words, the incumbent now faces an electorate with mobilized opposition
supporters who originally had no intentions to vote. This implies that, due to the mobilization
activities of the competing parties (or party), it is no longer necessary for the incumbent to convince
these voters to vote and change the party but only to change the vote choice. For this reason, it
is plausible to argue that a competition for these voters emerges, i.e., a party targets as well non-
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party supporters with intentions to stay home (i.e., non-party supporter migrant families), when
a contending party mobilizes them. And second, the idea of political disengagement and lower
political knowledge among migrant families also explains why among mobilized non-supporters,
migrant families are as well the chosen targets. That is, among the pool of mobilized voters who do
not support the party, migrant families - because of their political disaffection - are the easier-to-buy
types. In fact, this logic aligns with the traditional work on party switchers according to which the
least informed voters and those with a certain degree of exposure to the political campaign are the
most persuadable (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944; Converse, 1962). The reasoning is quite
simply that political disaffection lowers attachment to political parties and thus facilities persuasion
to change political sides. This means that because lower political information and involvement are
common effects of political disengagement, political parties perceive migrant families as those who
might easily switch parties, if persuaded to do so.
In sum, given non-party supporters (voters that do not identify/favor the party and indifferent
voters), migration-exposed voters or members of migrant families are also more likely to be electoral
targets than similar non-migration exposed ones, when the contender party (or parties) participates
in their electoral mobilization. Stated otherwise, migrant families are also more likely to be subject
to vote buying or electoral persuasion when mobilized by an electoral contender/s.
Incumbent versus Opposition Parties Behavior
Incumbent and opposition parties develop different electoral strategies because they have access
to different means. In particular, incumbency status allows the diversion of public funds for electoral
purposes, the use of public officials as party workers and even the exchange of public jobs for
electoral support. The result is that incumbent and opposition parties commonly have different
resources during elections (Hicken, 2007, 2011; Szwarcberg, 2013a,b) and so reach different number
of voters.
Building on this reasoning and the previously-discussed idea that politicians aim to appeal to
varied voters, I expect the incumbent party to be able to implement a more diversified strategy (or
strategic mix) through not only the targeting of loyal or party supporters with intentions to stay
home (turnout buying/electoral mobilization) but also reaching some mobilized opposition-inclined
citizens (vote buying/electoral persuasion). This happens because the access to extra resources
gives the incumbent an advantage to fund more electoral exchanges and pay party workers that
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identify supporters and non-supporters with and without intentions to vote. Additionally, the
incumbent can use these workers to deliver the necessary goods, favors and home visits that win
votes for the party. On the contrary, I anticipate that the opposition, by having access to fewer
resources, participates in these actions to a lower extent and hence mostly prioritizes making sure
that their supporters with the risk of staying home vote on election day (turnout buying/electoral
mobilization).
In sum, putting together the logic about how political parties respond to migration-exposed voters
and the differences between incumbent and opposition parties, I hypothesize as follows:
H1: Incumbent Targeting of Party Supporters: The incumbent party is systematically more
likely to electorally target migrant families that favor the incumbent (i.e., electoral mobilization or
turnout buying) than similar non-migrant families with the same political orientation.
H2: Opposition Targeting of Party Supporters: The opposition parties are systematically more
likely to electorally target migrant families who are non-incumbent supporters (i.e., mobilization
or turnout buying) than similar non-migrant families with the same political orientation.
H3: Incumbent Targeting of Non-Party Supporters: The incumbent party is systematically
more likely to electorally target migrant families that do not favor the incumbent (i.e., persuasion
or vote buying) than similar non-migrant families with the same political orientation. This happens
when the opposition mobilizes migration-exposed voters.
In Figure 3.2, I present how this chapter expands the existing electoral strategies (Nichter, 2008) to
incorporate incumbent and opposition parties as well as the distinction between migrant families
as those with no intentions to vote and non-migrant families as those inclined to vote. Further,
this figure also depicts this chapter’s hypotheses: i) the incumbent targeting of party sympathizing
migrant families (H1), ii) the opposition targeting of party sympathizing migrant families (H2),
and iii) the incumbent targeting of non-sympathizing migrant families, when mobilized by the
opposition (H3)(hence the dashed line).
Of course, these hypotheses go against some other commonly mentioned reasons in the literature,
essentially: the income and the social remittances effects associated to migration. These imply that
given the better socioeconomic status and the potential distaste for certain electoral tactics, political
parties should be less likely to target migrant families than similar non-migration exposed ones.
However, I claim that because of parties’ capacity to adapt to migrant families’ needs and to use
different electoral strategies (i.e., home visits and clientelism), experiencing less targeting is not the
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most likely outcome for migrant families. I address this point in further detail in the next section.
3.2 Second Question: Are Electoral Strategies Effective?
While numerous works analyze who the targets of electoral strategies are (e.g., certain individuals,
municipalities, districts), relatively less answers exist as to whether or not these actions work and
deliver the intended outcome. Of course, one can claim that political parties anticipate if certain
electoral tactics (e.g., vote buying, clientelism) are going to be successful and therefore employ them
only under certain circumstances, such as with those voters who are willing to get involved in quid-
pro-quo exchanges (Lyne, 2008) or when policy proposals lack credibility and thus electoral impact
(e.g., Keefer, 2007; Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008; Robinson and Verdier, 2013). Moreover, it is then
perhaps not surprising that empirical analysis mostly find actions such as clientelism, vote buying
and other mobilization strategies to be effective in driving electoral behavior (e.g., Wantchekon,
2003; Vicente and Wantchekon, 2009; Vicente, 2008, although see Lindberg and Morrison (2008) for
an exception). For example, Vicente (2008) and Kramon (2009) find that experiencing a clientelistic
offer has a positive effect on turnout in African countries, while Carreras and Irepoglu (2013) obtain
similar results in Latin America. Likewise, Bratton (2008) reports that incumbent’s actions increase
individuals’ likelihood of choosing that party at the polls.
Building on this line of work, the objective of this second part of the dissertation is to compare
the effectiveness of electoral targeting for migrant and non-migrant families. More precisely, it
aims to establish the extent to which exposure to international migration makes electoral targeting
effective or ineffective (or relatively less effective) among migrant families in comparison with similar
non-migration-exposed ones. Effective electoral targeting means, quite simply, that these practices
should increase the likelihood of a targeted voter casting the ballot in favor of the targeting party.
Alternatively, it can also refer to the targeting that affects electoral choices in such a way that
makes the targeting party more likely to win the contest. An example of this would be when the
incumbent targets oppositions supporters to stay home on election day (i.e., abstention buying)
and succeeds in such endeavor. Undoubtedly, other examples and combinations of electoral choices
exist, and I will discuss these in detail in Chapter 6.
Overall, this approach allows expanding the recent literature on those individual characteristics
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that affect clientelism acceptance and rejection such as education levels, socioeconomic status and
reciprocity traits (Vicente, 2008; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012; Gonzalez Ocantos, Kiewiet de Jonge and
Nickerson, 2014). The next section explains why electoral targeting should be effective among both
migration and non-migration-exposed voters, but focus in particular on the effectiveness of these
tactics among members of migrant families.
3.2.1 International Migration and the Effectiveness of Electoral Strategies
I argue that electoral strategies are successful in getting migrant families’ votes on election day
due to political parties’ capacity to adapt to the needs of voters and to use different electoral
strategies. This claim relies on two simple assumptions about the behavior of political parties and
voters: on the one hand, political parties target certain voters when anticipating the effectiveness
of their actions and, most importantly, tailor their practices in order to ensure success. And on the
other, voters respond favorably when perceiving a benefit from such practices (or a potential cost
from not doing so). Put differently, while the previous section explained political parties’ decision
about whom to target, this section addresses political parties’ selection of tactics and goods that
effectively deliver targeted voters on election day.
In this section, I expand this logic and explain: first, how political parties adapt to migrant
families’ characteristics and requirements, second, why these families see as beneficial this exchange
relationship with political contenders.
Political Parties’ Adaptation
Political parties are successful in getting migrant families’ votes on election day because they
adapt to these families’ characteristics. This adaptation to voters’ needs is a common practice for
political parties (e.g., Stokes, 2005; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012) and relies on both the workings
of local networks and the exiting differences between migrant and non-migrant families. I also claim
that political contenders can adapt in two different ways, which adds flexibility to their electoral
strategies and increases their chances of success: one is through the use of varied electoral tactics
(e.g., clientelism, home visits, advertising), and the other is by offering different goods to a diverse
set of voters.
With respect to the first option, the combination of multiple practices is not only a well-known
exercise of political parties (e.g., Hicken, 2011; Golden and Min, 2013) but also has clear implications
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for migration-exposed citizens. For example, if remittances improve the economic situation of their
recipients and make certain clientelistic exchanges less attractive for these voters, no good reason
suggests that political parties cannot remind these citizens of the importance of voting through,
for example, a home visit. Moreover, this chapter argues that when having two equally rich/poor
citizens (regardless of whether those resources come from abroad or not), the migration-exposed
one is more likely to be an electoral target (e.g., to receive a home visit) because of his/her risk of
staying home. As a result, the most effective way of getting migrant families’ votes might not be
through the offering of basic clientelistic goods with no extra value, but instead, by appealing to
these voters’ lack of motivation to vote. In this respect, home visits can act as friendly reminders
of why participation is important and even why a particular candidate is the right electoral choice.
Or, of course, they can work as intimidation mechanisms that threaten those not willing to show
electoral support with some negative repercussions (e.g., lack of access to public services, social
exclusion).
With respect to the second adaptation option, it is also plausible to argue that political parties
offer tailored goods to migrant families. After all, political parties can use local networks to collect
personal information on what people need and then tailor their exchanges accordingly (e.g., Hicken,
2011; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012; Stokes et al., 2013). Moreover, considering also the idea that
clientelistic exchanges work at their best and deliver more votes when based on a long-term relation-
ships (Hicken, 2011), political parties have incentives to maintain their connections with key voters
even if that means changing what they offer as voters’ circumstances vary. Exposure and involve-
ment in international migration is a useful and clear example here. For instance, taking as a fact
that international migrants provide for the basic needs (i.e., food and clothing) of family members
left behind through remittances flows, political parties can still offer to these voters other appealing
options, such as political or economic favors and goods targeted at migrant populations.5 In this re-
spect, favors could be in the form of business permits, speeding up regulation processes or ensuring
contracts/customers for those migrant families that set up a new business back home.6 Existing
research, in fact, shows the connection between remittances and entrepreneurial activities (e.g.,
5 Albertus (2013), for instance, addresses how the good (land transfers vs. rural investments) varies depending
on politicians’ incentives.
6 In contexts with many return migrants who might have been disconnected from national politics for a while,
this tactic could prove beneficial in initiating the type of long-term relationship upon which clientelism relies.
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Sultan, 1993; Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007; Dustmann and Kirchkamp,
2002; Guarnizo, 2003). Of course, these are just some examples of potential exchanges, but the
general logic holds: political parties adapt their exchanged goods/favors in order to maintain the
electoral connection with their migration-exposed voters.
Migrant Families’ Responses
The obvious follow-up question is why these migration-exposed families see as beneficial the
exchange relationship with political parties and hence respond favorably (i.e., according to what
the political party intended) to those practices. In particular, given the above mentioned options
available to political parties, it is important to analyze what the expected behavior for migrant
families is in each case.
First, in the event of receiving a tailored good or favor, the logic is quite straightforward: these
provisions offer migrant families material benefits, and in certain cases, they even allow access to
favors/services that only political parties can distribute (e.g., business permits, political favors).
The obvious electoral answer is then to correspond the political party at the polls.
And second, in the case of home visits, it is easy to see why targeted migration-exposed voters
have incentives to behave according to political parties’ dictates. This favorable response applies to
both friendly and those visits involving some form of intimidation. In the latter case, a simple fear of
the negative consequences of staying home can motivate voters enough to go to the polls on election
day. In the former situation of friendly interactions, I posit that targeted migration-exposed voters
also have incentives to follow the party’s indications for two main reasons. One is that remittances
make it easier for these families to afford the costs of getting to the polling station. That is, while
for some voters the lack of incentives to vote might be economic, remittances facilitate the costs
associated with voting. Thus, when mobilized, these voters will turn out to vote. The other reason
is that, to an extent, targeted voters do not want to jeopardize the fact that having a ‘in good
terms’ relationship with political parties can bring benefits in the future, such as goods and favors.
Put differently, even if during these elections a voter did not receive any goods or favors, that does
not mean that these exchanges can not happen in upcoming electoral contests. As a result, targeted
voters have motivation to remain loyal and within the preferential networks of political parties.
For these reasons, I expect electoral targeting to be effective among migration-exposed voters.7
7 Certainly, one could ask to what extent targeted voters might have incentives to turnout to vote but cast the
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Of course, it is also plausible for voters to experience different electoral tactics at once, but in
that case, the previous logic still applies. That is, either because the exchanged goods/favors
bring migrant families economic gains or because these migration-exposed voters just need extra
motivation to turn out to vote, electoral targeting should be effective among these voters.
3.2.2 Competing Arguments
The logic presented in the previous sections goes against some other commonly mentioned reasons
in the literature such as the income and the social remittances effects.
Briefly, the existing research on migration argues that this international phenomenon creates
an income effect because of the provision of economic resources such as remittances and savings
(e.g., finances brought back home by return migrants). This effect matters because it decreases the
value obtained from exchanging the vote for material goods or participating in clientelism. As a
result, a variety of authors explain that migration (especially remittances) makes more costly for
the incumbent government to buy electoral support using clientelistic exchanges and citizens more
independent from these practices (e.g., Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Weingast, 2003; Merino, 2005;
Pfutze, 2012, 2014; Ahmed, 2011). Moreover, this research connects with the broader literature
on clientelism and the finding that socioeconomic status determines who benefits from clientelistic
exchanges (poor voters) (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes, 2004; Stokes, 2005) as well as who is more
likely to reject these practices on moral and resource-efficiency grounds (non-poor voters) (Weitz-
Shapiro, 2012). Altogether, this reasoning implies that political parties might refrain from using
electoral mobilization strategies with migrant families (i.e., migrant families less likely to experience
electoral targeting) if they anticipate their potential ineffectiveness among these relatively better-off
voters.
Additionally, the social remittances effect means that international migration provides exposure
to how politics work in other countries. Social remittances are therefore those “ideas and behav-
iors” that flow from destination to origin countries (Levitt, 1998). Consequently, if we apply this
ballot for a different party than the one that attempted to get their support. In this respect, I propose two main
reasons for why that might not be the case. One is the fact that when a political party offers something of sufficient
value and that brings economic benefits, most individuals would be compelled to return the favor. After all, if this
reciprocity mechanism was not working, electoral targeting would not be such a widespread practice. And second,
turnout buying is a prominent electoral strategy and so it is those voters who are already party supporters that are
the targets. Thus, the voting decision is not as much about which party to choose but instead about whether or not
to turn out to vote.
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mechanisms to electoral targeting and the fact that migrants go mostly to countries where strategies
such as clientelism are less pervasive, one could claim that migrant families can develop negative
attitudes toward these practices. Indeed, this disapproving position implies that these voters should
be less likely to respond favorably to these “problematic” electoral tactics. Accordingly, if political
activists get to know migration-exposed citizens (not that unlikely given local networks) and their
distaste for these “questionable” strategies, political parties should not target these voters.
In a nutshell, the income and social remittances effects entail that if political parties anticipate
that targeting is not effective among migration-exposed voters, migrant families will be less likely
targets than similar non-migration exposed ones. However, in the event that this anticipation does
not occur, targeting should have no effect on electoral turnout or vote choice among this set of
voters. Put differently, these effects mean that migration-exposed voters are not going to comply
with the targeting party’s dictates.
Despite these reasons, I take a different stance on the matter by arguing that political parties
should still target migrant families and that these targeted voters will be responsive to the parties’
appeals. In particular, the income effect and the fact that migrant families might be able to
provide for basic needs overlooks political parties’ capacity to adapt to voters’ needs by using
varied exchanges and mobilization methods. Similarly, the social remittances effect might not
be that relevant when voters receive material benefits from political parties. On the contrary,
ideas such as ‘things work differently back home’ or even ‘politics are the same everywhere’ might
justify why these voters also get involved in political networks and try to get as much as possible
from them. In any case, whether or not electoral targeting is effective among migration and non-
migration-exposed voters is ultimately an empirical question that chapter 6 will address.
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3.3 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Electoral Process: Political Parties’ Actions and Voters’ Choices
Figure 3.2: Who do political parties Target?
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Chapter 4
Electoral Targeting in Mexico’s 2000
Presidential Election
On July 2nd 2000, Mexican voters elected PAN’s (Partido de Accio´n Nacional) candidate - Vicente
Fox - to the Presidency. This result meant the end to the world’s oldest one-party regime, after over
seventy years of PRI’s (Partido Revolucionario Institutional) presidential governance. This outcome
was of course surprising to most Mexicans. And multiple factors contributed toward making this
an unexpected result: the relatively good economic conditions and incumbent’s popularity, the
uncertainty surrounding the oppositions’ potential performance at the highest level of office, as
well as their failure to unite against the incumbent PRI (Lawson, 2004; Dominguez and Lawson,
2004; Magaloni, 2006).
This chapter has one clear objective: establish whether or not migrant families were more likely
electoral targets than similar non-migrant ones during the 2000 Mexican presidential elections.1
Understanding the connection between politicians’ strategies and international migration in these
historical elections is paramount for a few reason: i) the lack of knowledge on the extent to which
incumbent (PRI) and opposition parties (PAN and PRD) engaged in vote buying, coercion and
other mobilization strategies of migration-exposed voters in order to win those elections, ii) the
existing claim that international migration contributed favorably toward this phase of “Mexican
democratization” (at least by favoring the opposition’s victory at the municipal level)(e.g., Pfutze,
1 This chapter is a modified version of work presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting
2014, Chicago, IL.
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2012), and iii) the relatively less attention that Mexican presidential elections have received in
current research on migration. This chapter therefore analyzes what role the incumbent and the
opposition parties played in attempting to influence migrant families’ electoral choices. Undoubt-
edly, this is a necessary first step to understand why migrant families voted in a particular way in
these key elections and hence how they contributed to the PAN’s significant victory.2
4.1 International Migration and Electoral Strategies in 2000
As described in the previous chapter, the argument put forward in this dissertation is that because
of their political disaffection, migrant families are more likely to be electoral targets. In the context
of the 2000 Mexican presidential elections, I look at three different types of electoral strategies: i)
clientelism, which implies the exchange of goods and favors in return for electoral support, ii) home
visits, which plausibly range from a friendly visit that simply encourages voters to go to the polls to
a more intimidating situation where political activists remind dwellers why, for example, they have
a public job or receive certain government benefits, and iii) advertising materials, which commonly
aim to influence recipients’ votes by emphasizing the main message and the electoral promises of
a particular candidate. I expect that when political parties want to mobilize a given set of voters,
they use all the resources and means they have to make that happen. Thus, I speculate that the
positive relationship between electoral targeting and migration status should apply to these three
electoral strategies. However, I also acknowledge that differences exist among the three tactics,
which influence some coding decisions I address in the next section.
As for migration-exposed voters, I look at return migrants as well as those respondents with close
relatives living in the United States. Although involvement in international migration is certainly
different for those who have spent some time abroad and those who simply have a family member
living in another country, I posit that the disengagement or disaffection from national politics
affects both types. In the first place, I expect return migrants to experience disengagement from
politics because migration is in many cases temporary but so is the period of staying back home.
That is, migrants go abroad for a few months, return home, and leave again afterwards, which
arguably hinders involvement in politics. In the second place, political disaffection also applies to
2 See Magaloni (2006) and Greene (2007) for a detailed analysis of these elections and the unexpected results.
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those with close family living abroad because i) the vast majority receive monetary remittances
that make them both less dependent on the national economic situation and less responsive to
domestic politics, and ii) given that “migration fosters more migration” those left behind might
also have intentions to leave and reunite with migrants already abroad, which quite possibly also
lowers the need to get involved politically back home.
As for the political contenders in these elections, it is clear that the incumbent and long-term
governing party PRI was in a better position to reach a larger number of voters and implement a
winning strategy. Essentially, the PRI’s electoral strength over all those years relied on controlling
not only the national government and thus the access to highly centralized fiscal resources but
also on having a complex set of networks and organizations that mobilize voters before elections
(Magaloni, 2006). In fact, as Magaloni (2006) explains, one of the reasons behind the PRI prolonged
success was the existing threat to potential party splitters of losing the access to “government spoils
and profitable state contracts” (page 46), which were key to win elections. The opposition parties,
on the contrary, faced limitations on both fronts, that is, scant electoral resources and sparse local
and social networks, which impeded mobilizing voters across ample territory and hence achieving
victory at the national level. Simply put, the PAN and PRD were in all respects ‘resource-poor’
parties (Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2007).
Nonetheless, and despite this PRI domination, the 2000 elections were more of a ‘fair market
for votes’ for few related reasons, as Greene (2007) explains: First, in comparison with previous
elections, the PRI had fewer resources because of the privatization of state-owned enterprises and a
reduction in the number of federal employes. This obviously meant less diverted funds for electoral
purposes and fewer jobs to exchange for political support. Second, the Federal Electoral Institute
(IFE) imposed new campaign regulations that attempted to foster more fair elections, including:
public funds to all parties, limits to private funding, and audits to resources’ origins. And third,
Vicente Fox - the PAN candidate - was highly successful in marshaling independent campaign
donations under the workings of the so-called ‘Amigos de Fox’ organization. This fundraising
capacity of an opposition candidate had no precedent in Mexican elections. Accordingly, although
of course asymmetries continued between incumbent and opposition parties and the new electoral
rules were far from being perfectly enforced, it is reasonable to expect that the PRI was not the
only one mobilizing voters. Put differently, even if the PRI was the main campaign player in 2000,
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the opposition (especially the PAN) also got involved in a decent share of electoral targeting during
these elections. Hence, and building on the hypotheses of the previous chapter, I adapt them to
the context of the 2000 Mexican presidential elections as follows:
H1: PRI Targeting of PRI Supporters: The incumbent PRI is systematically more likely to elec-
torally target migrant families that favor this party than similar non-migrant families with the
same political orientation (i.e., electoral mobilization or turnout buying).
H2: Opposition Targeting (PAN and PRD) of Opposition Supporters: The opposition parties
(PAN and PRD) are systematically more likely to electorally target migrant families who are
non-incumbent supporters (PAN supporters and PRD supporters, respectively) than similar non-
migrant families with the same political orientation (i.e., electoral mobilization or turnout buying).
H3: PRI Targeting of non-PRI Supporters: Among non-PRI supporters, the PRI is systematically
more likely to electorally target migrant families that do not favor the incumbent than similar
non-migrant families with the same political orientation, when these voters are mobilized by the
opposition (i.e., persuasion or vote buying).
Of course, given the 2000 context and the fact that the PAN was especially successful in procuring
funds for electoral purposes, one can expect the incumbent PRI to respond particularly to the this
contender’s mobilization strategies. In other words, it is straightforward to especify hypothesis 3 -
or the PRI targeting of non-PRI supporters - as the PRI targeting of mostly PAN-supporters.
4.2 Data and Methodology
I test the previous hypotheses using survey data from the Mexico 2000 Post-Electoral Study (i.e.,
after the 2000 presidential elections) (Lawson et al., 2000).3 This post-electoral sample has 1200
respondents and is representative of 18 year old or older Mexicans.
Dependent Variables
From this dataset, I use three different questions to create my electoral targeting variables. The
first question inquires whether or not ‘during the elections, the respondent received advertising ma-
terials or letters from the political parties or presidential candidates, and from whom’ (advertising
3 The author wishes to thank Miguel Basan˜ez, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domı´nguez, Federico
Este´vez, Joseph Klesner, Chappell Lawson (Principal Investigator), Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro
Moreno, and Alejandro Poire´. Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-9905703)
and Reforma newspaper. Available online at: http://web.mit.edu/polisci/faculty/C.Lawson.html.
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materials), the second question asks if ‘a political party representative visited their home during
the electoral campaign, and which party’ (home visits), and the third if ‘in the last few weeks of
the campaign, the respondent received a gift or assistance from a political party, and which party’
(clientelism).
I use these three questions to create two different measures of electoral targeting. On the
one hand, a non-programmatic target happens when either of the two questions about home visit
and clientelism receives a positive answer. Combining both actions in a single indicator vari-
able as opposed to use them independently or in an additive index is helpful for various reasons.
First, respondents tend to under-report involvement in clientelism due to social desirability bias
(Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012) and so any analysis based on this question alone would lead to
doubtful results. Second, in addition to home visits being an electoral strategy commonly used to
get more votes, I expect the ‘visit’ question to be less subject to bias, given that there is no reference
to exchanged goods or favors, and to capture some unreported clientelism since it means interaction
with political parties during elections. In sum, this variable is quite adequate to measure whether
or not a respondent was subject to non-programmatic targeting.
On the other hand, I use responses to the question about receiving advertising materials as a
separate indicator variable (i.e., 1 for affirmative answers, 0 for negative ones) that measures this
programmatic targeting. The reason for not including advertising materials together with home
visits and clientelism is because these activities are inherently different. That is, clientelism and
home visits are more ‘questionable’ electoral tactics that often include coercion and intimidation,
while sending advertising materials is a pretty legitimate practice that usually emphasizes electoral
promises and candidates’ key messages. That is why an alternative way to differentiate these
practices is by referring to them as non-programmatic (visits and clientelism) and programmatic
targeting (advertising). Moreover, one could expect clientelism and home visits to be more resource-
demanding and therefore more selective, but the opposite holds for sending political advertisements
to voters. Consequently, using different variables is also beneficial to perform a more nuanced
analysis of the strategic decision-making process under study.
Additionally, given that these three questions allow exploring which political parties approached
respondents, I take this information into account for both types of targeting. Obviously, identifying
the party is key to understanding the ideological alignment between the targeting party and the
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voter (e.g., incumbent targeting incumbent supporters). This variation results in different indicator
variables that capture whether the respondent was a party’s target or not: PRI/Incumbent target,
PAN target and PRD target for programmatic targeting; and PRI advertising, PAN advertising
and PRD advertising for non-programmatic targeting.
Independent Variables
I use two different questions to capture migration-exposed citizens or members of migrant
families: i) those who report having close relatives living in the US (family US ), and ii) those have
visited the US for a period longer than three months (return migrants).4 In both instances, the
two resulting variables take the value of 1 when the respondent falls into the migration category
and 0 when the response is negative. Although no question inquires about remittances, we could
expect that most respondents with family in the US receive this financial help since the correlation
between these two factors is commonly very high (Bravo, 2008; Pfutze, 2014).
In addition, I use a variety of questions to capture respondents’ political orientation. First, I
measure past electoral behavior with a question that directly reports this electoral choice for the
previous presidential elections of 1994, including: voted PRI last elections, voted PAN last elections,
and voted PRD last elections. Each of these variables takes the value of 1 when a respondent voted
for a particular party, and 0 when they voted for another party or for no party. And second, I use
a question that addresses self-identification with an existing political party as: “priista” (PRI ID
or Incumbent ID), “panista” (PAN ID), or “perredista” (PRI ID). Each of these variables takes
the value of 1 when a respondent identifies with a particular party, and 0 when they favor other
party or no party at all and so qualify as ‘indifferent voters’. All these variables are essential to
analyze if political parties’ strategies are conditional on these political characteristics and therefore
necessary for this chapter’s hypothesis test.
Control Variables
Finally, I control for those confounding factors that affect migration status and the dependent
variable, mainly: age, gender, wealth (as the sum of whether the respondent has at home a total of
six items), and education level (ranging from 0- No education to 4- University degree or more). I
4 More precisely, the question asks if the respondent has visited the US and if yes, how long in total he/she spent
there. This time abroad is even reported as 18 years for one of the respondents and varies substantially across the
rest. Ideally, this question would also address if the respondent has intentions to stay for good or not, which would
connect easily with the political disengagement reasoning. However, such information is not available in this dataset.
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also include the type of place (rural, urban or mixed), given that the size of the location could affect
the workings of political networks and political parties’ ability to know who the migrant families
are.
In alternative specifications, I include the following additional controls: evaluation of the na-
tional economic situation (coded as 2- for those who report improvement in the situation, 1- sit-
uation is the same, and 0- the situation is worse in the last 12 months)5, paid employment (1- if
employed and 0 otherwise), frequency of church attendance (coded from 0- Never to 4- More than
once a week), frequency of political talk (0-Never to 4- Daily), risk acceptance attitudes (‘no risk,
no gain’ question where affirmative responses take the value of 1 and negative ones the value of 0),
and geographical location (North, South, Center, Center-West and Mexico City Area). Different
reasons motivate considering these variables: i) evaluation of the economic situation and paid em-
ployment account for those reasons that encourage migration as well as the possibility that political
parties perceive those unemployed as valuable targets, ii) church attendance measures respondents’
social connectivity which arguably relates positively with the facility to migrate and exposure to
political networks, iii) political talk not only relates to political disengagement but also incorporates
the notion that people who tend to talk more about politics are possibly part of political networks
and thus more likely targets, iv) risk acceptance is an important and unobserved characteristic
that relates with migration and attitudes toward electoral targeting. In particular, migrants are
risk acceptant in the sense that they are willing to leave home and venture into a foreign country
(sometimes illegally) in the search of better economic opportunities. Bravo (2008) actually shows
the relationship between risk acceptance attitudes and being a Mexican migrant. Moreover, risk
aversion - usually in connection with economic resources - translates into preferences for the im-
mediacy of clientelistic exchanges as opposed to the promise of a policy program for the future
(e.g., Desposato, 2007; Hicken, 2011; Stokes et al., 2013). Thus, risk acceptant/aversion attitudes
can affect migration, involvement in political networks and targeting. Finally, geographic location
takes into account the existing predisposition of certain areas to be migrant-rich as well as to favor
a particular party in their local workings and at the polls. The appendix summarizes descriptive
statistics for these variables.
5 Of course, this variable can also be affected by the migration process and the fact that, for instance, receiving
remittances improves recipients economic situation. See in this respect for example (Germano, 2013). Thus, a reason
for not including this variables as part of the initial analysis is because it is post-treatment to the migration process.
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4.3 Empirical Results
This section answers whether or not migrant families are the targets of electoral strategies. As
previously noted, I look at two types of migration-exposed citizens: return migrants and those with
close relatives living in the US; as well as at two different electoral strategies: non-programmatic
targeting (home visits and clientelism) and programmatic targeting (electoral advertising). A first
look at the distribution of these practices indicates that 63% of return migrants were not the targets
of home visits/clientelism while 36% were. On the other hand, 56% of return migrants received
electoral advertising but 43% did not. Similarly, 60% of those respondents with family in the
US were not the targets of home visits/clientelism while 40% were, but 63% of these respondents
received political advertising materials and 36% did not. In all cases, PRI tactics reached a larger
share of the respondents than the opposition ones and the PRD was the least active in this respect
(even not a single return migrant was subject to PRD non-programmatic targeting). This is not
surprising given the PRI’s long-term incumbency status in these elections. Due to the binary nature
of these dependent variables (i.e., electoral target or not as well as party variation of those targets), I
use logistic regressions for the empirical analysis.6 Further, this analysis proceeds by looking at the
PRI’s strategic behavior in response to migration status, PRI supporters and non-PRI supporters
(i.e., PAN and PRD supporters), as well as the opposition’s strategic behavior (both PAN and
PRD) in response to migration status, PAN/PRD supporters and non-PAN/non-PRD supporters.
4.3.1 Return Migrants
Non-Programmatic Targeting: Home Visits and Clientelism
Table 4.1 takes a first look at the extent to which being a return migrant predicts electoral
targeting (home visits and clientelism), when controlling for other relevant factors such as wealth
and age. This table indicates that being a return migrant reports a positive relationship with being
a target, including a PRI and a PAN target.7 However, these relationships are not statistically
significant, suggesting that no big differences exist between return and non-return migrants. As for
6 An alternative way to analyze this electoral targeting is using a multinomial approach. However, because
some respondents are the targets of different parties, this complicates the creation of different categories within the
dependent variable. A logistic regression analysis makes the coding of the dependent variable more straightforward.
7 This analysis does not include PRD targeting because not a single return migrant was subject to PRD non-
programmatic targeting
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the other predictors, being a woman and living in an urban area are both positive and marginally
significant predictors of a PRI target, while higher wealth leads to more PAN targets. Although this
last result is somewhat unexpected given existing findings that connect poorer voters with more
clientelism (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes, 2004; Stokes, 2005; Nichter, 2008), it is important to
note that this result could be picking up the right-wing PAN party’s tendency to approach richer,
conservative potential supporters. Additionally, this chapter analyzes not only clientelism but also
home visits, which could be less responsive to voters’ low socioeconomic status.
Yet, as hypothesized in this chapter, not all return migrants are the same and political parties
use political orientation in their strategic calculation on whom to target. Therefore, I incorpo-
rate respondents’ variation with respect to their past electoral behavior as well as current party
identification into the analysis (Tables 4.2 - 4.11).
To start, I explore respondent’s identification with the incumbent party. As previously ex-
plained, ‘PRI last elections’ captures those who voted for the PRI in the presidential elections of
1994 as opposed to having voted for other party or no party at all (results in table 4.2), and likewise,
PRI ID identifies incumbent supporters whereas not having a PRI ID means opposition supporters
and indifferent voters (results in table 4.4). With respect to past electoral behavior, the analysis
indicates that having voted for the PRI in the past (and not being a return migrant) reports a pos-
itive and statistically significant relationship with experiencing a PRI target (Model 2). No other
relationship is worth highlighting in this table 4.2. With regards to party ID, results show that be-
ing a return migrant and having a PRI ID report a positive and statistically significant relationship
with being a PRI target, and that a PRI identity also increases the chances of a PRI target (Model
2). Both of these regression terms are statistically significant. They also provide some preliminary
evidence that the PRI targets return migrants who are supporters. On the contrary, results are not
statistically significant to explain opposition targets when considering return migrant status and
incumbent identity (for both past behavior and current identification) (Models 3 in tables 4.2 and
4.4). Put differently, the opposition party PAN is not strategically targeting return migrants when
taking into account incumbent identification. Moreover, a further analysis also confirms these not
statistically significant results for the connection between being a return migrant and experiencing
opposition targeting. That is, tables 4.6 and 4.8 analyze the effect that having voted for the PAN
in the past or holding current PAN ID have on return migrants’ likelihood of experiencing PAN
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targets.8 As these tables show, however, the PAN is not systematically more likely to target return
migrants, even when they are PAN sympathizers. Thus far, regression results suggest that the PRI
responds to return migration status and PRI orientation to implement their electoral targets, while
the opposing PAN does not.
Building on these results, and in order to establish a better comparison between return and
non-return migrants, I report predicted probabilities (with 95% confidence intervals). I calculate
these probabilities using of course the distinction between return migrant and non-return migrant
as well as whether or not a respondent has a particular political ID. In addition, I take all other
variables at their means with the exception of the ‘size of the place’ variable for which I implement
two different estimations: i) one that employs the mixed areas (as opposed to rural and urban
areas) as the reference category (i.e., referred to as ‘mixed areas’ in tables), and ii) another that
gives these categories values from 1 to 3 according to size (1-rural, 2-mixed, 3-urban) and then uses
the mean value to calculate the corresponding probability (i.e., referred to as ‘mean size of place’
in tables). The following points are worth emphasizing:
First, given PRI inclination, the incumbent PRI is more likely to target return migrants than
similar non-return migrants. This relationship holds when either looking at past electoral behavior
or current PRI identity (Tables 4.3 and 4.5, respectively): for example, a return migrant that voted
for the PRI in the past had a 0.41 chances of being a PRI target (0.57 with current PRI ID), while
a non-return migrant who also voted for the PRI had only 0.23 chances (0.27 with current PRI
ID). Of course, this previous result also translates into return migrants having a higher predicted
probability of being PRI targets when they did not vote for the opposition parties PAN (Table
4.7) or PRD (Table 4.11) in the previous elections as well as when they do not identify with these
opposition parties (Tables 4.9 and 4.11). In this respect, results considering PAN identification are
especially stronger, which suggest that the PRI strategically distinguishes between return and non-
return migrants that identify with either the PRI or the PAN. For example, the PRI targets return
migrants that do not identify with the PAN with a predicted probability of 0.33 while similar non-
return migrants that also do not identify with this opposition party with predicted probability of
0.19. In addition, given overall non-PRI inclination (i.e., non-PRI last elections and non-PRI ID) or
opposition and indifferent identity, the incumbent PRI party does not differentiate between return
8 This analyses does not include the PRD because no return migrant was targeted by the PRD in this dataset.
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and non-return migrants since their respective predicted probability are nearly the same, as shown
in tables 4.3 and 4.5. In short, the incumbent PRI targets return migrants that are supporters (i.e.,
voted PRI last elections, PRI ID, no voted PAN/PRD last elections, non PAN/PRD ID) but does
not make strong distinctions between these two types of voters when they are non-supporters.
And how about the behavior of opposition parties? Given PRI orientation, non-return migrants
have a higher probability of being opposition targets than return migrants, but overall these dif-
ferences are not substantial (especially when taking into account past electoral behavior)(Tables
4.3 and 4.5, respectively). Additionally, given PAN orientation, return migrants have higher pre-
dicted probability of being PAN targets, but again PAN targeting is not that different for return
and non-return migrants. Certainly, this follows from the lack of statistically significant results for
PAN targets in Tables 4.6 and 4.8.
In sum, the main takeaway point for this section is that the incumbent PRI tends to target
return migrants that identify with this party, which is consistent with H1 or turnout buying of
PRI supporters. The same analysis, however, does not lead to similar conclusions with respect
to the PAN’s behavior. Put differently, this opposition party is not more likely to participate in
the turnout buying of return migrants who are PAN supporters, as suggested in H2. Accordingly,
given the absence of opposition’s mobilizing behavior of return migrants, there is no reason for the
incumbent to respond by vote-buying non-PRI supporters return migrants, as discussed in H3.
Programmatic Targeting: Advertising Materials
Table 4.12 shows the relationship between being a return migrant and receiving promotional
and advertising materials from different political parties. As before, this analysis controls for
other relevant factors such as wealth and education. This table indicates that being a return
migrant reports a negative relationship with receiving promotion materials from any of the parties.
These relationships are however not statistically significant. As for the other predictors, higher
education increases the chances of receiving PRI promotion materials (Model 2), while being a
women makes less likely receiving letters/advertisements from any the opposition parties (Models
3-4). Interestingly, higher wealth also relates with more mailed advertisements, regardless of the
political party (Models 1-4). This last result suggests that, contrary to clientelism, political parties
direct this advertising strategy towards richer and more well-off voters.
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In addition, I incorporate respondents’ variation with respect to their past electoral behavior as
well as current party identification. First, tables 4.13 and 4.15 explore voters’ identification with
the incumbent party. The main result in these tables is that having an incumbent orientation (and
not being return migrant) reports a negative and statistically significant relationship with receiving
advertising materials from the opposition parties (Models 3-4), while this political identity and the
distinction between return and non-return migrant barely predicts receiving PRI advertisements
(Model 2). This applies to both past electoral behavior and present political orientation. On the
other hand, tables 4.17 takes into account those who either voted for the opposition in previous
elections or identify with any of the opposition parties to explain receiving opposition promotion
materials. Interestingly, table 4.17 reports that having voted for the PAN last elections/PRD last
elections or having PAN orientation/PRD orientation (and not being a return migrant) increase the
chances of receiving PAN advertising materials/PRD advertising materials. In short, these regres-
sion analyses indicate the opposition parties send advertising materials mainly to their supporters
who are not return migrants.
Building on these results, and in order to establish a better comparison between return and
non-return migrants and their respective political ideologies, I report predicted probabilities (with
95% confidence intervals) for electoral advertising. I calculate these predicted probabilities using
the same methodology as before. Essentially, the following points are worth emphasizing:
First, given PRI orientation (either voted PRI last elections or have current PRI ID), non-
return migrants have higher probability of receiving PRI materials than return migrants, although
the difference between these two types of respondents is not very large (e.g., 0.38 and 0.46 for
return migrant and non-return migrants, respectively, when looking at PRI last election results).
On the flip side, given non-PRI orientation or opposition and indifferent identity, the incumbent
PRI party also does not distinguish between return and non-return migrants since their respective
predicted probabilities are fairly similar (e.g., 0.41 and 0.40 for return migrant and non-return
migrants, respectively, when looking at non-PRI ID results). Tables 4.14 and 4.16 report these
predicted probabilities. In brief, the incumbent does not consider return migration status when
deciding who should receive their advertising materials. In fact, this lack of findings for return
migrants and the incumbent advertising suggests that this political party by having more resources
prints more materials and hence is not that selective about who receives them (i.e., those with and
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without intentions to vote).
Second, given also PRI orientation, the opposition parties - both PAN and PRD - send adver-
tising materials to non-return migrants than to similar return migrants with a higher probability,
especially when the analyses uses PRI ID for the political inclination. For example, given PRI ID,
the PAN sends promotion materials to return migrants with a 0.06 probability but to non-return
migrants with 0.23, and likewise, the PRD sends promotion materials to return migrants with a
0.06 probability but to non-return migrants with 0.13. Tables 4.14 and 4.16 report these predicted
probabilities. Additionally, given non-PRI identity or opposition identity (either PAN or PRD),
non-return migrants have also a higher predicted probability of receiving PAN and PRD advertising
materials. For example, given non-PRI identity, PAN sends advertising to non-return migrants with
a 0.29 probability and to return migrants with 0.25; and the PRD sends advertising to non-return
migrants with a 0.21 probability and to return migrants with 0.17. Table 4.18 shows similar results
when looking at effect of PAN ID and PRD ID on receiving advertisements from these opposition
parties. Yet, the differences between return and non-return migrants are quite small, and the PRD
sends materials primarily to mostly PRD supporters regardless of their migration status.
Overall, the main findings across these different results are: i) the PRI targets without distin-
guishing strongly between return and non-return migrants and their respective political ideology,
and ii) the opposition parties (PAN and PRD) are more active in sending advertising materials to
supporters, but the differences in the predicted probabilities of return and non-return migrants are
not very substantial, especially when both types share the same opposition identity (i.e., PAN ID
and PRD ID). In other words, these patterns are not supportive of hypotheses 1-3. Nonetheless,
this behavior suggests that advertising and promotion materials might be a useful strategy for the
resource-rich incumbent and the resource-poor opposition parties to appeal to both those voters
with (i.e., non-return migrants) and without (i.e., return migrants) intentions to vote. I will get
back to this point in the discussion section of this chapter.
4.3.2 Family Abroad
Non-Programmatic Targeting: Home Visits and Clientelism
Table 4.19 takes a first look at the extent to which having close relatives in the US predicts non-
programmatic targeting (home visits and clientelism), when controlling for other relevant factors
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such as wealth and age. This table indicates that being part of a migrant family reports a positive
and statistically significant relationship with being a PRI (Model 2) and a PAN (Model 3) target
but a negative relationship with being a PRD target (Model 4). The positive and statistically
significant relationship is also present for experiencing overall any targeting (Model 1). This is not
surprising given that in these elections the PRI and PAN participated in these activities to a greater
extent than the PRD. In addition, looking at predicted probabilities9 for a better comparison of
respondents with family abroad and those without it, everything else equal, table 4.20 shows that
members of migrant families are more likely to be PRI and PAN targets but less likely PRD
targets than similar non-migration-exposed ones (especially when using the ‘mean size of place’ to
calculate the predicted probabilities). As for the other predictors, results are comparable to those
in the analysis of return migrants. That is, being a woman and living in an urban area are both
positive and marginally significant predictors of a PRI target, while higher wealth leads to more
PAN targets and higher education to fewer PRD targets. Of course, these last two findings could
reflect the idea that the right-wing PAN party approaches richer citizens, but the left-wing PRD
party appeals to those with lower socioeconomic status.
Since those with family in the US also vary in their ideological orientation, I follow the same
approach as for return migrants. Obviously, taking ideology into account is also essential for the
hypothesis test put forward in this chapter. To start, in tables 4.21 and 4.23, I explore respondent’s
identification with the incumbent party, including reported past behavior in favor of the PRI as
well as current PRI ID. With respect to past electoral behavior, the analysis indicates that having
voted for the PRI in the past (and being a member of migrant) reports a negative and statistically
significant relationship with experiencing a PAN target (Model 3). This provides some preliminary
evidence that the opposing PAN does not target those migrant families that favor the incumbent
PRI. In addition, having family members abroad and not having voted for the PRI previously
increases the chances of experiencing PRI (Model 2) and PAN targeting (Model 3) as well as overall
targeting (Model 1), whereas having voted for the PRI in the past (and not being a migrant-family
member) is a positive and statistically significant predictor of more PRI and PAN targeting. Results
9 As in the previous section, I report predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals, and calculate them
using all variables at their means with the exception of the size of the place variable for which I use two different
estimations: i) one that employs the mixed areas (as opposed to rural and urban areas) as the reference category
(mixed areas), and another that gives these categories values from 1 to 3 according to size (1-rural, 2-mixed, 3-urban)
and then uses on the mean value to calculate the corresponding probability (mean size of place).
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are not very different when looking at PRI ID instead. Moreover, having family in the US and a PRI
political identification decreases the changes of being a PRD target (Model 4 of table 4.23), which
also supports the intuition that the opposing PRD does not attempt to buy migration-exposed
voters that favor the incumbent PRI.
Similarly, tables 4.25 and 4.27 analyze the connection between migration exposure and PAN
identity (voted opposition in for the PAN in the past and current PAN ID) to explain electoral
targeting. The most consistent result in these tables is that having voted for the PAN in previous
elections or holding a current PAN identity (and not having close relatives living in the US) reports
a negative and statistically significant relationship with a being a PRI target (Model 2) and any
target (Model 1). This connection conforms with the logic that the PRI has no intentions to mobilize
those voters who identify with other party (especially if they do not belong to migrant families).
Also, having close relatives in the US (and not a PAN ID) is a positive and marginally significant
predictor of PRI targeting (Model 2), but a negative and significant one of PRD targeting (Model
4). This results is not that different from the one found in table 4.19, where migrant families are
more likely PRI targets but less likely PRD ones. In addition, having family in the US and a
PAN identity (especially having voted for the PAN in the past)10 increases the chances of being a
PAN target (Model 1), which supports the notion that the PAN targets those supporters at risk of
staying home or migrant families.
Further, I explore variation in PRD orientation in tables 4.29 and 4.31. Again, this analysis
allows exploring if political parties approach those with this identity or not. As these tables show,
having family in the US and not a PRD political inclination increases the chances of being a PRI
and a PAN target (Models 2 and 3). This result is particularly strong in the case of PAN targets,
which hints at the idea that the PRI by having more resources can diversify more its targets by
targeting some PRD supporters while the PAN has to be more selective. Of course, it can also
point toward the logic that PRD supporters are closer ideologically to the PRI than to the PAN,
which makes it more difficult to the PAN to buy these potential votes to start with and so refrains
from doing so. As for the PRD, these tables indicate that the PRD targets supporters but mostly
10 In fact, this stronger results with respect to PAN last elections could reflect two things: First, political parties
rely more on information about previous elections to implement their strategies, and second, given that PAN ID is a
post-electoral measure and the PAN won these elections, a lot of respondents could have reported PAN ID but were
not PAN identifiers before the elections and so less likely to be approached by the PAN.
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if they do not belong to migrant family ones.
Building on these results, and in order to establish a better comparison between respondents
with and without family in the US and their respective political ideologies, I report predicted
probabilities (with 95% confidence intervals).11 The main comparisons are as follows:
First, given PRI orientation (either voted PRI last elections or have current PRI ID), migrant
families have a higher predicted probability of being targets than similar non-migrant families (e.g.,
0.31 and 0.27 respectively when looking at PRI ID). Tables 4.22 and 4.24 show the corresponding
probabilities. Moreover, given non-PRI ID or opposition and indifferent identity, the incumbent PRI
also targets migrant families with a higher probability than similar non-migrant ones. Consequently,
I explore further if the incumbent PRI targets especially migrant families that identity with any of
the key contenders (i.e., PAN supporters in Tables 4.26 and 4.28, PRD supporters 4.30 and 4.32, or
both). These results indicate that the migrant families have a higher predicted probability of being
PRI targets than non-migrant families when they all are opposition sympathizers. More precisely,
these tables show that the incumbent PRI i) is more likely to target migrant families that voted for
the PAN in the previous elections than similar non-migrant ones with the same previous electoral
behavior (e.g., 0.17 versus 0.06 respectively)12, and ii) also targets PRD supporters, but in that
case, the distinction between migrant and non-migrant families is not as strong (e.g., 0.21 versus
0.16). Comparing both scenarios (i.e., incumbent supporters versus non-incumbent supporters),
however, the highest chances of being a PRI target is for migrant families with PRI orientation
(i.e., 0.26 for migration-exposed citizens that voted for the PRI in the past), which is consistent
with a dominant mobilization strategy of core supporters.
And second, also given PRI orientation, opposition parties make barely any distinction between
migrant and non-migrant families since their respective predicted probability are quite similar.
Perhaps the only exception is that the PRD is less likely to target migrant families than non-
migrant families with this political orientation but for both types of respondents the values of
the predicted probabilities are quite small (i.e., 0.002 and 0.01, respectively). Tables 4.22 and
11 As before, I calculate these predicted probabilities using all variables at their means with the exception of the
size of the place variable for which I use two different estimations: i) one that employs the mixed areas (as opposed
to rural and urban areas) as the reference category (mixed areas), and another that gives these categories values from
1 to 3 according to size (1-rural, 2-mixed, 3-urban) and then uses on the mean value to calculate the corresponding
probability (mean size of place)
12 As before, past electoral behavior might be a more useful measure for political parties to identity targets.
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4.24 show the corresponding predicted probabilities. However, given non-PRI orientation (i.e.,
opposition and indifferent identity), migrant families report a higher probability of being PAN
targets than those not involved in migration (e.g., 0.13 and 0.07, respectively). Moreover, I explore
this relationship further by looking at variations in PAN identity (PAN last elections and PAN ID)
to explain PAN targets. According to this analysis, the main result is that the PAN is more likely
to target migrant families that favor this party than similar non-migrant ones. That is, predicted
probabilities are 0.09 and 0.01 for migrant and non-migrant families respectively when looking at
PAN last elections, and 0.11 and 0.04 when analyzing PAN ID, but results are overall also stronger
with respect to last electoral behavior. Interestingly, the PAN also targets some non-supporters
(both migration and non-migration-exposed voters alike) with a similar predicted probability to
that of supporters, which informs of PAN’s intentions to win these elections by also appealing to
these non-core voters.13 Tables 4.26 and 4.28 report these comparisons. A similar analysis looking
at PRD supporters and PRD targeting does not lead to strong conclusions (Tables 4.30 and 4.32).
In sum, the main takeaway points for this section are: i) the PRI is more likely to target PRI
supporters, and among those, migrant families have a higher probability of being subject to PRI
mobilization or turnout buying than non-migrant ones, ii) the incumbent PRI party is also more
likely to target migrant families than non-migrant ones when both favored the opposition (especially
the PAN) in previous elections, i.e., vote buying or persuasion of migrant families who are opposition
supporters, but iii) migrant families that favor the incumbent also have the highest probability of
being PRI targets, and iv) the PAN is more likely to mobilize migrant families that identify with
that party than similar non-migrant families with the same political orientation. Overall, these
results are consistent with hypothesis 1-3. Essentially, the PRI mobilizes its core supporters with
intentions to stay home (H1)(although those with intentions to vote are also targets to an extent),
and persuades to change party those voters mobilized by a key contender (the PAN in his case,
H3), and finally, the PAN also mobilizes its core supporters with intentions to stay home (H2).
13 By comparing, PAN targets of those voters who voted for the PRI and the PRD in the past, the higher predicted
probability of being a PAN target corresponds to non-migration-exposed voters that voted for the PRD in the past,
which indicates that the PAN, in order to win these elections, was appealing to those with intentions to vote but that
were other opposition sympathizers. Differences between migration and non-migration-exposed voters are however
very small, regardless of their political ideology. Moreover, looking at those without family members in the US or
those with intentions to vote, the PAN is more likely to target non-PAN supporters (especially past-PRD votes),
which supports the logic of trying to buy those who are not at risk of staying home but that are going to vote for
other party.
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This chapter however does not provide support for hypothesis 2 in the case of PRD targeting.
Programmatic Targeting: Advertising Materials
Table 4.33 shows the relationship between being a member of migrant family and receiving
promotional/advertising materials from different political parties. As before, this analysis controls
for other relevant factors such as wealth and education. This table indicates that having family
members in the US reports a positive relationship with receiving promotion materials from the
different political contenders (Models 2-4). These relationships however are not statistically sig-
nificant. The only exception is when looking at receiving any type of advertising materials (i.e.,
without party distinction), in which case migration-exposed voters indicate a positive and statisti-
cally significant relationship with this programmatic targeting (Model 1). In addition, Table 4.34
shows the corresponding predicted probabilities, which indicate that overall migrant families have a
higher predicted probability of receiving political advertising. The difference between the predicted
probability of respondents with family in the US and those without it is larger when considering
the PRI or just overall political advertising. This is perhaps unsurprising giving the well-known
PRI’s active role in electoral campaigning. As for the other predictors, results are similar to those
in the analysis of return migrants. That is, higher education increases the chances of receiving
PRI promotion materials, while being a women makes less likely receiving letters/advertisements
from the main opposition parties. Higher wealth also relates with more mailed advertisements,
regardless of the political party.
In addition, I incorporate respondents’ variation with respect to their past electoral behavior
as well as party identification. First, tables 4.35 and 4.37 explore voters’ identification with the
incumbent party. The main result in these tables is that having an incumbent orientation (and not
being a member of a migrant family) reports a negative and statistically significant relationship
with receiving advertising materials from the opposition parties (especially the PRD) (Models 3-4).
This applies to both past electoral behavior and current political orientation. And second, table
4.39 takes into account those who either voted for the opposition in previous elections (PAN and
PRD last elections) or identify with any of the opposition parties (PAN ID and PRD ID) to explain
receiving opposition promotion materials. Interestingly, the main result is that having voted for
the opposition previously (and not being a member of a migrant family) increases the chances of
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receiving materials from any of the opposing parties (Model 1 for the PAN and 3 for the PRD).
Moreover, while having family in the US increases the chances of receiving PAN advertising, this
relationship is negative and significant if those migration-exposed citizens voted for the PAN in
the past (Model 1). On the contrary, the chances of receiving PRD advertising increases for those
respondents with family in the US who voted for the PRD in the 1994 elections (Model 3). When
looking at opposition identity (PAN ID and PRD ID) as opposed to past voting behavior, results
are mostly not statistically significant, with the exception of receiving PRD advertising materials
which increases for those respondents with PRD ID (and no family members in the US) (Model 4).
Building on these results, and in order to establish a better comparison between migration
and non-migration exposed respondents and their respective political ideologies, I report predicted
probabilities (with 95% confidence intervals) for electoral advertising. I calculate these predicted
probabilities using the same methodology as before. Essentially, the following points are worth
emphasizing.
First, given PRI orientation (either voted PRI last elections or have current PRI ID), migration-
exposed voters have higher probability of receiving PRI materials, although the difference between
these two types of respondents is not very large (e.g., 0.48 and 0.41, respectively). Also, given
non-PRI ID or opposition and indifferent identity, migration-exposed voters also have a higher
probability of receiving PRI materials, although as before the difference in the predicted prob-
abilities for these two types of respondents is not very large (e.g., 0.46 and 0.43, respectively).
Consequently, and similar to the results for return migrants, the incumbent does not consider mi-
gration status as a key determinant for whom should receive their advertising materials. Tables
4.36 and 4.38 show these probabilities.
Second, given also PRI orientation, the opposition - both PAN and PRD - do not distinguish
between migration and non-migration-exposed voters since their predicted probabilities are fairly
similar (e.g., 0.24 and 0.20 respectively for migration and non-migration-exposed voters when look-
ing at PAN advertising, and 0.15 and 0.10 respectively when analyzing PRD advertising and when
both respondents have PRI ID) (See tables 4.36 and 4.38). Likewise, given non-PRI id or oppo-
sition and indifferent orientation, the opposition parties also make mostly no distinctions between
respondents with and without close relatives in another country. Nonetheless, tables 4.39 and 4.40
explore further the connection between having opposition identity and being an opposition target
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by distinguishing between PRD and PAN political orientations. Interestingly, these tables show
that given those respondents that voted for the PAN in the past, the PAN is more likely to send
advertising materials to non-migration-exposed ones (0.29 for migration-exposed voters versus 0.46
for non-migration-exposed ones), while given those respondents that voted for the PRD in the
past, the PRD is more likely to send advertising materials to migration-exposed ones (0.54 for
migration-exposed voters versus 0.36 for non-migration-exposed ones). When looking at PAN ID
and PRD ID instead, results report the same patterns but do not reach the same level of statistical
significance.
In sum, the main finding of this section is that given those that electorally favor the PAN in the
past, the PAN is more likely to send advertising materials to non-migration-exposed ones, while
given those that electorally favor the PRD in the previous elections, the PRD is more likely to send
advertising materials to migration-exposed ones. Thus, H2 or the targeting of migrant families
is only present in this case for the PRD. This finding nonetheless hints at the idea that because
of the differences in resource endowments, parties are not only strategic about whom to target
but also with respect to what strategy to use with different types of voters (i.e., migration versus
not migration-exposed and inclined to vote versus not inclined to vote). That is, the PAN uses
programmatic targeting for those core supporters with intentions to vote (i.e., non-migrant ones
receive advertising materials) and non-programmatic one to mobilize supporters without intentions
to vote (i.e., migration-exposed ones are subject to clientelism and home visits). This makes sense
since convincing someone to vote might require more effort and therefore some non-programmatic
targeting, while advertising materials can simply remind someone who already has intentions to
vote of the upcoming elections. The PRD, on the contrary, does not participate in much non-
programmatic targeting (probably due to lower resources), and therefore, relies on programmatic
targeting to mobilize supporters without intentions to vote (i.e., migration-exposed voters). I will
get back to this point in the discussion section of this chapter.
4.3.3 Robustness Checks
In this section, I analyze the extent to which the previous findings are robust to the following tests:
i) different model specifications, ii) alternative explanations, and iii) threats to causal inference.
To start, and as mentioned in the data section, I control for an additional set of variables, in par-
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ticular: evaluation of the national economy, employment situation, frequency of church attendance,
frequency of political talk, risk acceptance attitudes and geographic locations. Tables 4.41 to 4.52
show that the main statistically significant results of the previous section hold when including these
variables in the regression analysis. That is, the following statistically significant relationships are
still present: i) the PRI targets PRI supporters return migrant (Tables 4.41, 4.42, 4.43, 4.44), ii)
the PRI targets respondents with family in the US that are supporters as well as non-supporters,
and the distinction between members of migrant families and non-members is especially substantial
when both types are PAN last elections supporters (Tables 4.45, 4.46, 4.47, 4.48) , iii) the PAN
targets migrant families that voted for this party in the past (Tables 4.45, 4.49, 4.50), and iv) the
PAN and the PRD send advertising materials to non-migration and migration-exposed supporters,
respectively (Tables 4.51 and 4.52), although these last results are not as statistically significant
when controlling for these additional factors.
In addition to taking into account other factors that could mask the connection between expo-
sure to migration and electoral targeting, these additional factors also deal with alternative expla-
nations. Particularly, one of these is that migration-exposed voters are electoral targets because of
their social connectedness and political influence. That is, contrary to the political disengagement
mechanism put forward in this dissertation, migrant families could be targets because their access
to remittances makes them well-respected individuals with the capacity to influence the political
behavior of others within the community. After all, remittances contribute in some cases toward
public good provisions (e.g., Aparicio and Meseguer, 2012a; Duquetter-Rury, 2014). However, as
previously shown, results hold when controlling for frequency of political talk, which is arguably
necessary to exercise the role of political influencer, and of church attendance, which captures as
well respondents’ social connectivity.
Additionally, one could argue that the results are not due to political parties’ actions but rather
to the fact that migrant families tend to report more targeting than similar non-migrant ones.
The plausibility of this explanation relies on the social remittances mechanism and the fact that
migration provides exposure to the democratic practices of other countries where these practices
are less pervasive. As a result, migration-exposed voters could be more susceptible to this type of
actions and therefore more inclined to report them. In order to address this concern, I compare
migration and non-migration exposed voters with respect to two answers about the quality of
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elections in Mexico: the extent to which elections are clean (from 1- Nothing to 4- Totally) and
whether or not Mexico is a democracy. Certainly, one would expect that if migration-exposed
voters tend to be more susceptible to these strategies and report them more, they should also be
more inclined to characterize Mexico as not having clean elections and not being a democracy. Yet,
a simple look at the data does not support this intuition. That is, the correlations between being a
return migrant and having family in the US are always positive with evaluations of clean elections
and democracy. Accordingly, it is plausible to lower the concerns about attitudes toward electoral
practices being the factors behind this chapter’s findings.
Finally, I address some commons threats to causal inference: selection bias, omitted variable
bias, and endogeneity or reverse causality. While the optimal strategies to deal with these concerns
are longitudinal data on the same individuals before and after becoming migrant families, running
an experiment or using an instrumental variable, none of these are available. Therefore, I use the
existing data to show why this chapter’s results are still valid.
Omitted Variable Bias
One of the most common objections in observational studies is that, in the absence of random
treatment assignment, unobservable factors are causing the found relationship. I address this
concern by taking into account risk acceptance attitudes. That is, risk acceptance is an unobserved
characteristic that is related to migration and electoral targeting. In particular, migrants are risk
acceptant in the sense that they are willing to leave home and venture into a foreign country
(sometimes illegally) in the search of better economic opportunities. And risk aversion - usually in
connection with economic resources - translates into preferences for the immediacy of clientelistic
exchanges as opposed to the promise of a policy program for the future (e.g., Desposato, 2007;
Hicken, 2011; Stokes et al., 2013). Nonetheless, this chapter’s results hold when controlling for risk
acceptance attitudes.
Selection Bias
One common concern to all research on migration is the selection process that leads some
people to migrate. In this specific study, the selection bias could be present if, for instance, migrant
families are electoral targets even before participating or being exposed to this international process.
Consequently, the results would be capturing some pre-existing differences of migrant families as
opposed to a more recent effect of migration. While it is not plausible to entirely dismiss this
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selection bias, three reasons suggest this should less of a concern. First, the existing literature on
electoral targeting commonly finds that poorer voters are electoral targets. Yet, migrant families
do not belong to this poorest segment of the population but rather to the slightly better-off one
that can afford the migration process in the first place. Second, one could expect that migration
occurs because these voters are not beneficiaries of government handouts nor members of privileged
political networks. After all, if someone is able to get a public job or receive frequent government
benefits, the need to migrate and seek economic opportunities in a different country should be
lower. And third, as this chapter has argued, involvement in international migration helps political
parties to identify their targets and to know that these voters might be at risk of staying home. In
the absence of this information, political contenders might not have a good reason to target them.
In short, all these reasons raise some doubts over the claim that migrant families are targets before
getting involved in migration processes.
Reverse Causality
A clear case of reserve causality applies to being an electoral target and identifying with a
particular party. For instance, PRI targets lead people to identify themselves as having PRI ID.
Put differently, it is not that political parties participate in the mobilization of their supporters, but
rather that precisely because they are targets those voters display a particular party ID. Fortunately,
it is possible to address this issue in two different ways. First, the Mexico 2000 dataset has
information about the behavior in previous elections and results are generally present when using
this variable. And second, we can use this information about the last elections to analyze what
effect targeting has in party ID changes. In particular, 65% of respondents did not vote for the PRI
in the previous presidential elections of 1994, but 22% of those were PRI electoral targets. What
is interesting to explore is if those targeted switched to PRI ID after not having previously voted
for the PRI and thus fostering endogeneity concerns. However, a simple look at the data indicates
that targeting was not that effective since of the 22% targeted, 82% still responded not having
PRI ID while 17% had PRI ID. Of those who switched, these figures are also similar for migration
and non-migration exposed voters: 19% and 16% for respondents without and with family in the
US and 17% and 11% for non-return and return migrants, respectively. Looking at PAN targeting
leads to similar conclusions. That is, 82% of respondents did not vote for the PAN in the previous
presidential elections of 1994, but 12% of those were PAN electoral targets. As before, what is
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interesting to explore is if those targeted switched to PAN ID after not having previously voted
for the PAN. In this respect, the data indicate that targeting was not that effective since of the
12% targeted, 72% still responded not having PAN ID while 27% had PAN ID. Of those who
switched, these figures are also similar for migration and non-migration exposed voters: 21% and
31% for respondents without and with family in the US and 27% and 28% for non-return and return
migrants, respectively.
4.3.4 Extensions to the existing Analysis
Strong or Weak Supporters and Strong or Weak Non-Supporters?
In general, it is plausible to ask if when political parties mobilize their supporters, they target
those who strongly or weakly identify with the party. Similarly, one can ask if when political parties
target non-supporters, they attempt to get the votes of those who weakly or strongly identify with
the contender. Given the previous results, in particular, one may inquire if the PRI mobilizes strong
or weak PRI supporters, buys strong or weak PAN supporters, and likewise, if the PAN mobilizes
strong or weak PAN supporters.
To address these questions, I run the same models as in the previous section (i.e., full models
with additional control variables) but using a party ID variable that not-only identifies supporters
and non-supporters but also captures if those are strong or weak supporters and non-supporters
(0- Not party supporter, 1- Weakly party supporter, and 2- Strong party supporter).14 This
analysis however does not lead to strong conclusions. Essentially, when the PRI targets PRI
supporters (or PAN supporters), there is no statistically significant differences between strong and
weak PRI-inclined migrant and non-migrant families (or weakly and strong PAN-inclined migrant
and non-migrant families). Equally, when the PAN targets PAN supporters, there is no statistically
significant differences between strong and weak PAN-inclined migrant and non-migrant families.
As a result, the main takeaway points and findings from this chapter as those presented in previous
sections.
Mexico 2000 Panel Study
Together with the Mexico 2000 Post-Electoral Study (Lawson et al., 2000), researchers also
14 I only run this analysis for respondents with family in the US and not for return migrants. The reason is that
given the low number of return migrants in our sample, any claim based on the distinction between strong and weak
identifiers would be relying on a very small number of return migrants and hence its validity would be questionable.
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conducted a panel study that interviewed respondents over the period of six months and in four
different waves.15 This dataset started with 2,400 respondents in wave 1, then 950 in wave 2, 938 in
wave 3, and around 1200 in wave 4. That is, attrition happened, and some respondents participated
in only some of the waves, while others participated in all them.
Attempting to reproduce this chapter’s results with the panel dataset is challenging for a variety
of reasons. In particular, the ideal way to approximate the panel data to the cross-section post-
electoral survey previously used would be to take all those respondents that participated in all
the waves and analyze whether or not they were the targets at any point during the electoral
campaign. Unfortunately, only about 300 respondents in the panel dataset participated in all four
waves, which makes it very complicated to draw any claim about the targeting of migrant families.
In addition, if we analyze the behavior of political parties during any of the waves, we can reach
conclusions about what political parties did six or three months before the elections but it limits
knowing whether or not the overall strategy targeted migration-exposed voters. Of course, it is
also important to consider that attrition was non-random and so participants in waves 2, 3 and 4
chose to re-take the surveys. This fact requires being cautious about the representativeness of any
findings based on a single wave analysis.
Despite these problems, I show in tables 4.53 and 4.54 that some of this chapter’s results are
present in wave 4.16 In particular, according to these tables, the opposition targeted respondents
with family in the US and that identify with the PAN with a higher predicted probability than
similar respondents without family in the US. Needless to say, this result requires keeping in mind
the following points: first, this wave only captures if respondents were targets in the last few weeks
before the elections as opposed to at any moment during the entire campaign, and second, this
finding is far from matching previous findings in terms of statistical significance. Nonetheless, it
suggests that a similar pattern of targeting is present when looking at this single wave.
Overall, one can conclude that using this panel dataset to study changes from wave to wave
is probably a better option. In other words, the attrition and the fact that so few respondents
15 The author wishes to thank Miguel Basan˜ez, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domı´nguez, Federico
Este´vez, Joseph Klesner, Chappell Lawson (Principal Investigator), Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro
Moreno, and Alejandro Poire´. Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-9905703)
and Reforma newspaper. Available online at: http://web.mit.edu/polisci/faculty/C.Lawson.html.
16 I run this analysis using information from wave 4 for the dependent variable and from wave 1 for the independent
variables in order to avoid endogeneity concerns and maximize the number of respondents, since wave 1 had the largest
number of participants.
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participated in all four waves makes it difficult to use it for cross-section analysis. Thus, since this
dissertation does not theorize about variations from wave to wave, I leave exploring that option as
a direction for future work.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter provides interesting findings on the relationship between political parties’ electoral
strategies and migrant families.
First, the incumbent PRI uses non-programmatic targeting to participate in the turnout buying
of migration-exposed supporters. Put differently, the PRI is more likely to mobilize PRI supporters,
especially in the case of return migrants and those respondents with family in the US (i.e., higher
predicted probabilities for migration-exposed than non-migration-exposed voters). In addition, this
party also aims for those migration-exposed voters who favored the opposition in the past. That is,
the PRI uses also non-programmatic strategies to persuade or buy the votes of respondents with
family in the US that voted for the PAN in the previous presidential elections of 1994.17 With
respect to programmatic strategies or the delivery of advertising and promotion materials, the PRI
targets a wide variety of voters including supporters and non-supporters as well as those with (i.e.,
non-migrant families) and without intentions to vote (i.e., migrant families). Overall, these findings
confirm the idea that the PRI by having more resources reaches a larger share of the electorate,
including not only PRI sympathizers but also those mobilized voters who favor the opposition.
This behavior of course conforms with the traditional PRI strategy that attempts to win elections,
if possible by huge margins, in order to show electoral hegemony and prevent elite splits within the
party (Magaloni, 2006).
Second, the opposing PAN employs non-programmatic targeting to participate in the turnout
buying of migration-exposed supporters. In other words, the PAN is more likely to mobilize respon-
dents with family in the US that voted for this party in the past than similar non-migrant families
with the same political orientation. Additionally, among PAN sympathizers, this party also targets
non-migration-exposed supporters but uses instead programmatic tactics for these voters. Inter-
estingly, the PAN also uses both types of strategies to target some non-supporters (both migration
17 Of course, the slightly different results for return migrants and respondents with family in the US could be
motivated by the different number of each type of respondents.
57
and non-migration-exposed voters alike), which informs of PAN’s need to win these elections by
appealing as well to non-core voters. In particular, as Greene (2007) puts it, for opposition parties
to beat the PRI, they had to “retain their core voters, fight for independents, and perhaps even
convince some of their rival’s core voters to defect” (page 215).
And third, the opposing PRD does not participate in much non-programmatic targeting. Or
at least in 2000, this party engaged in this activity to a lower extent than the other two competing
parties. As a result, it is not possible to establish that this party is more likely to target migrant
families. On the contrary, if anything, results indicate that the PRD is less likely to target migrant
families although the predicted probabilities for both types of respondents are really small. However,
the PRD is more likely to send advertising materials to those who electorally favor the PRD in
the previous elections and especially if they have family members living in the US. This therefore
suggests that the PRD relies on programmatic targeting to mobilize supporters without intentions
to vote (i.e., migration-exposed voters). Moreover, it hints at the idea that since this party had
fewer resources for electoral purposes, most of its activity consisted of programmatic targeting
to mobilize supporters. Although, of course, it can also mean that this party actually prefers to
use programmatic targeting as opposed to non-programmatic activities such as clientelism. Thus,
without the appropriate survey data at the party elite-level, this ultimate reason remains unknown.
In chapter 6, I explore whether or not these strategies had an effect on voters’ electoral choices
and most importantly, if this influence was different for migration and non-migration exposed
citizens. Consequently, this dissertation will explore why migrant families voted for a particular
party (i.e., targeted or not) and if they contributed towards this phase of “Mexican democratization”
by voting for the opposition.
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4.5 Figures and Tables
Table 4.1: Return Migrant and Electoral Targets (Visit-Clientelism)
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Return Migrant 0.172 0.297 0.187
(0.251) (0.268) (0.349)
Education −0.085 −0.060 −0.132
(0.064) (0.070) (0.095)
Age −0.0004 −0.002 −0.010
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Women 0.156 0.258† −0.094
(0.126) (0.137) (0.186)
Wealth 0.113∗ 0.033 0.170∗
(0.050) (0.054) (0.076)
Rural Location −0.194 −0.078 0.235
(0.257) (0.293) (0.404)
Urban Location 0.282 0.490† 0.283
(0.227) (0.258) (0.368)
Constant −1.140∗∗∗ −1.491∗∗∗ −2.275∗∗∗
(0.340) (0.377) (0.527)
Observations 1,183 1,183 1,183
Log Likelihood −806.985 −713.281 −450.016
AIC 1,629.970 1,442.561 916.032
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
59
Table 4.2: Return Migrant and Electoral Targets: PRI Last Elections
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Return Migrant * PRI Last Elections 0.710 0.886 −0.200
(0.526) (0.556) (0.753)
Return Migrant −0.126 −0.040 0.209
(0.336) (0.377) (0.449)
PRI Last Elections 0.210 0.421∗∗ 0.244
(0.148) (0.160) (0.217)
Education −0.077 −0.058 −0.123
(0.067) (0.074) (0.099)
Age −0.001 −0.005 −0.012†
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Women 0.189 0.342∗ 0.032
(0.132) (0.145) (0.194)
Wealth 0.111∗ 0.050 0.155∗
(0.053) (0.058) (0.079)
Rural Location −0.154 −0.037 0.418
(0.266) (0.304) (0.442)
Urban Location 0.320 0.512† 0.513
(0.236) (0.270) (0.407)
Constant −1.206∗∗∗ −1.660∗∗∗ −2.490∗∗∗
(0.357) (0.399) (0.568)
Observations 1,075 1,075 1,075
Log Likelihood −734.552 −644.752 −414.755
AIC 1,489.105 1,309.505 849.511
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 4.3: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and PRI Last Elections
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Return Migrant 0.41 (0.23, 0.63) 0.16 (0.07, 0.31)
Non-Return Migrant 0.23 (0.15, 0.34) 0.16 (0.10, 0.25)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Return Migrant 0.49 (0.31, 0.68) 0.21 (0.11, 0.35)
Non-Return Migrant 0.30 (0.25, 0.35) 0.22 (0.19, 0.25)
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Return Migrant 0.08 (0.02, 0.26) 0.08 (0.04, 0.17)
Non-Return Migrant 0.08 (0.04, 0.17) 0.06 (0.03, 0.14)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Return Migrant 0.12 (0.04, 0.31) 0.12 (0.05, 0.25)
Non-Return Migrant 0.12 (0.09, 0.17) 0.10 (0.08, 0.13)
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Table 4.4: Return Migrant and Electoral Targets: PRI ID
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Return Migrant * PRI ID 1.237∗ 1.371∗ −1.469
(0.597) (0.617) (1.212)
Return Migrant −0.209 −0.097 0.258
(0.322) (0.366) (0.412)
PRI ID 0.541∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗ 0.282
(0.141) (0.150) (0.205)
Education −0.052 −0.024 −0.109
(0.066) (0.072) (0.096)
Age −0.0003 −0.003 −0.010
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Women 0.192 0.301∗ −0.083
(0.129) (0.142) (0.188)
Wealth 0.111∗ 0.039 0.165∗
(0.051) (0.056) (0.077)
Rural Location −0.203 −0.017 0.237
(0.267) (0.310) (0.423)
Urban Location 0.337 0.604∗ 0.318
(0.236) (0.276) (0.385)
Constant −1.407∗∗∗ −1.907∗∗∗ −2.427∗∗∗
(0.356) (0.403) (0.551)
Observations 1,155 1,155 1,155
Log Likelihood −779.307 −679.793 −439.619
AIC 1,578.614 1,379.587 899.238
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 4.5: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and PRI ID
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant 0.57 (0.32, 0.78) 0.13 (0.06, 0.26)
Non-Return Migrant 0.27 (0.17, 0.39) 0.14 (0.09, 0.22)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant 0.66 (0.42, 0.83) 0.18 (0.10, 0.31)
Non-Return Migrant 0.36 (0.30, 0.41) 0.20 (0.17, 0.23)
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant 0.03 (0.00, 0.25) 0.10 (0.03, 0.24)
Non-Return Migrant 0.10 (0.05, 0.20) 0.08 (0.04, 0.15)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant 0.04 (0.00, 0.29) 0.12 (0.06, 0.24)
Non-Return Migrant 0.13 (0.09, 0.17) 0.10 (0.08, 0.12)
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Table 4.6: Return Migrant and Electoral Targets: PAN Last Elections
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Return Migrant * PAN Last Elections −0.710 −0.650 0.348
(0.812) (0.918) (1.012)
Return Migrant 0.254 0.424 0.093
(0.276) (0.290) (0.394)
PAN Last Elections −0.466∗ −0.615∗∗ −0.437
(0.197) (0.228) (0.308)
Education −0.070 −0.056 −0.120
(0.067) (0.074) (0.099)
Age 0.003 0.002 −0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Women 0.207 0.361∗ 0.049
(0.133) (0.145) (0.194)
Wealth 0.119∗ 0.055 0.158∗
(0.053) (0.057) (0.079)
Rural Location −0.131 −0.017 0.437
(0.266) (0.303) (0.443)
Urban Location 0.331 0.515† 0.528
(0.236) (0.268) (0.406)
Constant −1.268∗∗∗ −1.691∗∗∗ −2.510∗∗∗
(0.357) (0.397) (0.569)
Observations 1,075 1,075 1,075
Log Likelihood −733.291 −645.578 −413.866
AIC 1,486.582 1,311.156 847.731
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 4.7: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and PAN Last Elections
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Return Migrant 0.10 (0.01, 0.38) 0.28 (0.16, 0.44)
Non-Return Migrant 0.12 (0.06, 0.21) 0.20 (0.13, 0.29)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Return Migrant 0.13 (0.02, 0.45) 0.35 (0.24, 0.48)
Non-Return Migrant 0.16 (0.11, 0.23) 0.26 (0.23, 0.30)
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Return Migrant 0.07 (0.01, 0.36) 0.08 (0.03, 0.20)
Non-Return Migrant 0.05 (0.02, 0.12) 0.07 (0.03, 0.15)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Return Migrant 0.12 (0.02, 0.44) 0.12 (0.06, 0.23)
Non-Return Migrant 0.08 (0.04, 0.13) 0.12 (0.09, 0.14)
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Table 4.8: Return Migrant and Electoral Targets: PAN ID
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Return Migrant * PAN ID −1.164† −1.481∗ 0.698
(0.595) (0.705) (0.770)
Return Migrant 0.497 0.733∗ −0.330
(0.314) (0.323) (0.539)
PAN ID −0.211 −0.336∗ −0.034
(0.141) (0.156) (0.206)
Education −0.072 −0.051 −0.118
(0.065) (0.071) (0.096)
Age 0.001 −0.001 −0.009
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Women 0.204 0.317∗ −0.082
(0.128) (0.140) (0.189)
Wealth 0.110∗ 0.036 0.161∗
(0.051) (0.055) (0.077)
Rural Location −0.176 0.013 0.234
(0.264) (0.304) (0.423)
Urban Location 0.354 0.618∗ 0.326
(0.234) (0.271) (0.385)
Constant −1.200∗∗∗ −1.582∗∗∗ −2.319∗∗∗
(0.349) (0.390) (0.545)
Observations 1,155 1,155 1,155
Log Likelihood −786.980 −693.103 −440.511
AIC 1,593.959 1,406.207 901.023
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.9: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and PAN ID
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Return Migrant 0.07 (0.02, 0.22) 0.33 (0.19, 0.51)
Non-Return Migrant 0.14 (0.08, 0.22) 0.19 (0.12, 0.28)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Return Migrant 0.11 (0.03, 0.29) 0.42 (0.28, 0.57)
Non-Return Migrant 0.20 (0.16, 0.25) 0.26 (0.23, 0.30)
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Return Migrant 0.11 (0.03, 0.32) 0.06 (0.02, 0.18)
Non-Return Migrant 0.08 (0.04, 0.16) 0.08 (0.04, 0.16)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Return Migrant 0.15 (0.06, 0.33) 0.08 (0.03, 0.20)
Non-Return Migrant 0.11 (0.08, 0.14) 0.11 (0.09, 0.14)
Table 4.10: Return Migrant and Electoral Targets: PRD Orientation
Any Target Any Target PRI Target PRI Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Return Migrant * PRD Last Elections −0.899 −1.129
(0.795) (0.988)
Return Migrant * PRD ID −0.508 −0.558
(0.815) (1.001)
Return Migrant 0.274 0.169 0.464 0.347
(0.274) (0.274) (0.287) (0.287)
PRD Last Elections 0.258 0.0004
(0.211) (0.238)
PRD ID 0.277 −0.181
(0.208) (0.241)
Education −0.093 −0.074 −0.080 −0.062
(0.067) (0.065) (0.073) (0.071)
Age 0.0005 0.001 −0.0005 −0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Women 0.190 0.183 0.318∗ 0.267†
(0.132) (0.128) (0.144) (0.139)
Wealth 0.106∗ 0.103∗ 0.041 0.025
(0.053) (0.051) (0.057) (0.055)
Rural Location −0.160 −0.212 −0.061 −0.028
(0.266) (0.263) (0.302) (0.302)
Urban Location 0.313 0.309 0.477† 0.541∗
(0.236) (0.233) (0.267) (0.268)
Constant −1.172∗∗∗ −1.218∗∗∗ −1.544∗∗∗ −1.510∗∗∗
(0.355) (0.349) (0.393) (0.389)
Observations 1,075 1,155 1,075 1,155
Log Likelihood −735.458 −789.422 −649.957 −699.199
AIC 1,490.917 1,598.843 1,319.915 1,418.398
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.11: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and PRD Orientation
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Return Migrant 0.11 (0.01, 0.44) 0.27 (0.16, 0.43)
Non-Return Migrant 0.19 (0.11, 0.31) 0.19 (0.12, 0.28)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Return Migrant 0.14 (0.02, 0.51) 0.34 (0.23, 0.47)
Non-Return Migrant 0.25 (0.17, 0.34) 0.25 (0.22, 0.28)
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Return Migrant 0.13 (0.02, 0.50) 0.24 (0.14, 0.40)
Non-Return Migrant 0.16 (0.09, 0.27) 0.19 (0.12, 0.28)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Return Migrant 0.17 (0.03, 0.57) 0.32 (0.21, 0.44)
Non-Return Migrant 0.22 (0.15, 0.30) 0.25 (0.22, 0.28)
Table 4.12: Return Migrant and Electoral Advertising
Any Ads PRI Ads PAN Ads PRD Ads
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Return Migrant −0.189 −0.043 −0.342 −0.378
(0.248) (0.246) (0.271) (0.314)
Education 0.193∗∗ 0.130∗ −0.020 0.040
(0.064) (0.062) (0.065) (0.073)
Age 0.006 0.004 −0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Women −0.119 −0.128 −0.320∗ −0.312∗
(0.124) (0.122) (0.130) (0.147)
Wealth 0.263∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.053) (0.060)
Rural Location 0.071 0.213 0.252 0.322
(0.238) (0.243) (0.269) (0.298)
Urban Location 0.229 0.250 0.225 0.026
(0.215) (0.219) (0.243) (0.272)
Constant −1.351∗∗∗ −1.662∗∗∗ −1.407∗∗∗ −2.243∗∗∗
(0.333) (0.333) (0.357) (0.404)
Observations 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183
Log Likelihood −823.3 −843.5 −779.3 −654.8
AIC 1,662.6 1,703.1 1,574.6 1,325.6
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.13: Return Migrant and Electoral Advertising: PRI Last Elections
Any Ads PRI Ads PAN Ads PRD Ads
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Return Migrant * PRI Last Elections −0.266 −0.336 0.299 0.512
(0.521) (0.520) (0.589) (0.666)
Return Migrant −0.152 −0.008 −0.556 −0.582
(0.320) (0.315) (0.351) (0.410)
PRI Last Elections −0.142 0.049 −0.447∗∗ −0.607∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.145) (0.158) (0.183)
Education 0.180∗∗ 0.106 −0.045 0.004
(0.067) (0.065) (0.069) (0.077)
Age 0.007 0.005 −0.002 0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Women −0.168 −0.108 −0.358∗∗ −0.327∗
(0.131) (0.129) (0.137) (0.155)
Wealth 0.271∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗
(0.052) (0.053) (0.056) (0.064)
Rural Location −0.053 0.171 0.152 0.296
(0.248) (0.252) (0.279) (0.308)
Urban Location 0.067 0.120 0.142 −0.034
(0.225) (0.227) (0.252) (0.283)
Constant −1.171∗∗∗ −1.710∗∗∗ −1.221∗∗ −2.024∗∗∗
(0.349) (0.350) (0.373) (0.421)
Observations 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,075
Log Likelihood −745.531 −763.954 −699.918 −588.122
AIC 1,511.062 1,547.907 1,419.836 1,196.244
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.14: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and PRI Last Elections
PRI Ads (mixed areas) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Election
Return Migrant 0.38 (0.20, 0.59) 0.45 (0.28, 0.62)
Non-Return Migrant 0.46 (0.35, 0.57) 0.45 (0.35, 0.56)
PRI Ads (mean size of place) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Election
Return Migrant 0.40 (0.23, 0.60) 0.48 (0.33, 0.62)
Non-Return Migrant 0.49 (0.43, 0.55) 0.48 (0.44, 0.52)
PAN Ads (mixed areas) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Election
Return Migrant 0.18 (0.08, 0.38) 0.21 (0.10, 0.37)
Non-Return Migrant 0.23 (0.15, 0.33) 0.32 (0.22, 0.43)
PAN Ads (mean size of place) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Election
Return Migrant 0.20 (0.09, 0.39) 0.23 (0.13, 0.37)
Non-Return Migrant 0.25 (0.21, 0.30) 0.35 (0.31, 0.38)
PRD Ads (mixed areas) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Election
Return Migrant 0.14 (0.05, 0.32) 0.15 (0.06, 0.31)
Non-Return Migrant 0.14 (0.08, 0.23) 0.24 (0.15, 0.35)
PRD Ads (mean size of place) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Election
Return Migrant 0.14 (0.05, 0.31) 0.15 (0.07, 0.29)
Non-Return Migrant 0.15 (0.11, 0.19) 0.25 (0.21, 0.28)
67
Table 4.15: Return Migrant and Electoral Advertising: PRI ID
Any Ads PRI Ads PAN Ads PRD Ads
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Return Migrant * PRI ID −0.702 −0.433 −1.377 −0.567
(0.586) (0.582) (0.912) (0.930)
Return Migrant −0.054 0.017 −0.192 −0.309
(0.294) (0.289) (0.306) (0.350)
PRI ID 0.147 0.252† −0.262† −0.569∗∗
(0.141) (0.140) (0.151) (0.182)
Education 0.189∗∗ 0.136∗ −0.035 −0.004
(0.065) (0.063) (0.067) (0.075)
Age 0.006 0.005 −0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Women −0.113 −0.119 −0.302∗ −0.334∗
(0.126) (0.124) (0.132) (0.150)
Wealth 0.272∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.054) (0.062)
Rural Location 0.064 0.236 0.243 0.360
(0.244) (0.250) (0.277) (0.309)
Urban Location 0.225 0.291 0.209 0.048
(0.221) (0.226) (0.251) (0.284)
Constant −1.407∗∗∗ −1.841∗∗∗ −1.402∗∗∗ −2.063∗∗∗
(0.343) (0.346) (0.369) (0.417)
Observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155
Log Likelihood −803.320 −822.254 −755.228 −630.106
AIC 1,626.641 1,664.508 1,530.455 1,280.212
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.16: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and PRI ID
PRI Ads (mixed areas) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant 0.36 (0.17, 0.61) 0.41 (0.26, 0.57)
Non-Return Migrant 0.46 (0.35, 0.58) 0.40 (0.30, 0.51)
PRI Ads (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant 0.42 (0.21, 0.65) 0.47 (0.33, 0.60)
Non-Return Migrant 0.53 (0.47, 0.58) 0.46 (0.43, 0.50)
PAN Ads (mixed areas) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant 0.06 (0.01, 0.26) 0.25 (0.14, 0.40)
Non-Return Migrant 0.23 (0.15, 0.34) 0.29 (0.20, 0.39)
PAN Ads (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant 0.07 (0.01, 0.29) 0.28 (0.18, 0.42)
Non-Return Migrant 0.27 (0.22, 0.33) 0.33 (0.29, 0.36)
PRD Ads (mixed areas) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant 0.06 (0.01, 0.27) 0.17 (0.08, 0.32)
Non-Return Migrant 0.13 (0.08, 0.22) 0.21 (0.14, 0.32)
PRD Ads (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant 0.06 (0.01, 0.27) 0.18 (0.10, 0.30)
Non-Return Migrant 0.15 (0.11, 0.19) 0.24 (0.21, 0.27)
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Table 4.17: Return Migrant and Electoral Advertising: Opposition Orientation
PAN Ads PAN Ads PRD Ads PRD Ads
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Return Migrant * PAN Last Elections −0.268
(0.749)
Return Migrant * PAN ID 0.309
(0.571)
Return Migrant * PRD Last Elections 0.063
(0.765)
Return Migrant * PRD ID 0.912
(0.805)
Return Migrant −0.421 −0.544 −0.495 −0.583
(0.312) (0.372) (0.387) (0.381)
PAN Last Elections 0.510∗∗
(0.185)
PAN ID 0.242†
(0.141)
PRD Last Elections 1.421∗∗∗
(0.214)
PRD ID 0.947∗∗∗
(0.217)
Education −0.045 −0.030 0.004 0.034
(0.069) (0.067) (0.079) (0.075)
Age −0.008 −0.004 0.0004 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Women −0.383∗∗ −0.312∗ −0.230 −0.290†
(0.138) (0.132) (0.160) (0.152)
Wealth 0.213∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.054) (0.065) (0.062)
Rural Location 0.131 0.237 0.351 0.368
(0.279) (0.277) (0.315) (0.311)
Urban Location 0.122 0.206 0.042 0.087
(0.252) (0.251) (0.290) (0.287)
Constant −1.217∗∗∗ −1.519∗∗∗ −2.325∗∗∗ −2.476∗∗∗
(0.374) (0.367) (0.433) (0.422)
Observations 1,075 1,155 1,075 1,155
Log Likelihood −699.617 −757.300 −568.106 −623.985
AIC 1,419.233 1,534.600 1,156.213 1,267.969
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.18: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and Opposition Orientation
PAN Ads (mixed areas) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Return Migrant 0.26 (0.12, 0.47) 0.16 (0.08, 0.31)
Non-Return Migrant 0.30 (0.21, 0.42) 0.26 (0.17, 0.36)
PAN Ads (mean size of place) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Return Migrant 0.30 (0.15, 0.49) 0.19 (0.10, 0.33)
Non-Return Migrant 0.35 (0.30, 0.40) 0.29 (0.26, 0.33)
PRD Ads (mixed areas) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Return Migrant 0.43 (0.15, 0.75) 0.10 (0.04, 0.22)
Non-Return Migrant 0.35 (0.22, 0.50) 0.17 (0.10, 0.26)
PRD Ads (mean size of place) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Return Migrant 0.45 (0.17, 0.75) 0.11 (0.06, 0.21)
Non-Return Migrant 0.38 (0.29, 0.48) 0.19 (0.17, 0.22)
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Table 4.19: Family US and Electoral Targets (Visit-Clientelism)
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US 0.353∗∗ 0.277∗ 0.424∗ −0.747∗
(0.127) (0.137) (0.191) (0.374)
Education −0.085 −0.071 −0.132 −0.388∗
(0.065) (0.070) (0.095) (0.198)
Age −0.0001 −0.002 −0.010 −0.008
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012)
Women 0.136 0.225† −0.086 0.393
(0.125) (0.136) (0.186) (0.357)
Wealth 0.090† 0.015 0.153∗ 0.148
(0.051) (0.055) (0.077) (0.143)
Rural Location −0.163 −0.064 0.282 1.252
(0.258) (0.293) (0.406) (1.097)
Urban Location 0.287 0.494† 0.288 1.221
(0.227) (0.257) (0.367) (1.063)
Constant −1.246∗∗∗ −1.499∗∗∗ −2.466∗∗∗ −4.196∗∗∗
(0.343) (0.379) (0.537) (1.273)
Observations 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183
Log Likelihood −801.678 −711.141 −445.408 −154.349
AIC 1,619.356 1,438.282 906.815 324.698
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 4.20: Predicted Probabilities - Family US
Mixed areas Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Family US 0.34 (0.25, 0.44) 0.21 (0.14, 0.30) 0.10 (0.05, 0.18) 0.005 (0.00, 0.04)
No Family US 0.26 (0.18, 0.36) 0.17 (0.11, 0.25) 0.07 (0.03, 0.13) 0.01 (0.00, 0.08)
Mean size Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Family US 0.37 (0.33, 0.41) 0.27 (0.24, 0.31) 0.13 (0.10, 0.16) 0.01 (0.00, 0.02)
No Family US 0.29 (0.26, 0.33) 0.22 (0.19, 0.26) 0.09 (0.06, 0.11) 0.03 (0.02, 0.05)
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Table 4.21: Family US and Electoral Targets: PRI Last Elections
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PRI Last Elections −0.304 −0.274 −0.932∗ −1.404
(0.270) (0.290) (0.406) (1.041)
Family US 0.508∗∗ 0.435∗ 0.724∗∗ −0.472
(0.169) (0.188) (0.262) (0.469)
PRI Last Elections 0.426∗ 0.626∗∗ 0.766∗ 0.211
(0.199) (0.216) (0.305) (0.458)
Education −0.071 −0.056 −0.121 −0.307
(0.067) (0.074) (0.099) (0.206)
Age −0.001 −0.005 −0.012 −0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.013)
Women 0.168 0.291∗ 0.025 0.495
(0.132) (0.143) (0.194) (0.382)
Wealth 0.086 0.026 0.152† 0.052
(0.054) (0.058) (0.080) (0.149)
Rural Location −0.107 −0.007 0.474 1.209
(0.267) (0.303) (0.444) (1.098)
Urban Location 0.317 0.493† 0.490 1.161
(0.236) (0.267) (0.407) (1.070)
Constant −1.416∗∗∗ −1.769∗∗∗ −2.929∗∗∗ −4.099∗∗
(0.367) (0.408) (0.593) (1.309)
Observations 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077
Log Likelihood −732.119 −644.949 −408.995 −139.767
AIC 1,484.238 1,309.898 837.991 299.534
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.22: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRI Last Elections
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.26 (0.16, 0.38) 0.20 (0.12, 0.29)
Non-Family US 0.23 (0.14, 0.35) 0.13 (0.08, 0.22)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.33 (0.26, 0.40) 0.25 (0.21, 0.30)
Non-Family US 0.29 (0.23, 0.36) 0.18 (0.14, 0.23)
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.07 (0.03, 0.16) 0.09 (0.04, 0.18)
Non-Family US 0.09 (0.04, 0.19) 0.04 (0.02, 0.10)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.11 (0.07, 0.17) 0.13 (0.10, 0.17)
Non-Family US 0.14 (0.09, 0.20) 0.07 (0.04, 0.10)
PRD Targets (mixed areas) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.002 (0.00, 0.02) 0.006 (0.00, 0.05)
Non-Family US 0.01 (0.00, 0.10) 0.01 (0.00, 0.08)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.006 (0.00, 0.03) 0.02 (0.00, 0.04)
Non-Family US 0.04 (0.02, 0.08) 0.03 (0.01, 0.05)
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Table 4.23: Family US and Electoral Targets: PRI ID
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PRI ID −0.293 −0.142 −0.420 −2.677∗
(0.271) (0.287) (0.403) (1.322)
Family US 0.457∗∗ 0.342† 0.562∗ −0.139
(0.158) (0.178) (0.239) (0.436)
PRI ID 0.793∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗ 0.479 0.750†
(0.193) (0.206) (0.298) (0.425)
Education −0.051 −0.036 −0.107 −0.380†
(0.066) (0.072) (0.097) (0.200)
Age 0.0003 −0.003 −0.009 −0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.013)
Women 0.162 0.245† −0.054 0.387
(0.128) (0.140) (0.188) (0.359)
Wealth 0.090† 0.023 0.145† 0.147
(0.052) (0.056) (0.078) (0.145)
Rural Location −0.172 −0.011 0.304 1.238
(0.266) (0.306) (0.424) (1.098)
Urban Location 0.316 0.564∗ 0.359 1.162
(0.235) (0.271) (0.385) (1.063)
Constant −1.601∗∗∗ −1.943∗∗∗ −2.763∗∗∗ −4.541∗∗∗
(0.365) (0.409) (0.570) (1.306)
Observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155
Log Likelihood −775.325 −679.762 −435.722 −150.752
AIC 1,570.649 1,379.525 891.443 321.505
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.24: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRI ID
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.31 (0.20, 0.44) 0.16 (0.10, 0.25)
Non-Family US 0.27 (0.17, 0.40) 0.12 (0.07, 0.20)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.40 (0.32, 0.47) 0.23 (0.19, 0.27)
Non-Family US 0.35 (0.28, 0.43) 0.17 (0.14, 0.21)
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.10 (0.04, 0.20) 0.09 (0.04, 0.18)
Non-Family US 0.09 (0.04, 0.18) 0.05 (0.02, 0.12)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.13 (0.09, 0.19) 0.12 (0.09, 0.16)
Non-Family US 0.12 (0.07, 0.17) 0.07 (0.05, 0.10)
PRD Targets (mixed areas) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.001 (0.00, 0.02) 0.007 (0.00, 0.05)
Non-Family US 0.01 (0.00, 0.13) 0.008 (0.00, 0.06)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.003 (0.00, 0.03) 0.02 (0.01, 0.04)
Non-Family US 0.05 (0.02, 0.10) 0.02 (0.01, 0.04)
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Table 4.25: Family US and Electoral Targets: PAN Last Elections
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PAN Last Elections 0.360 0.862† 1.835∗ 1.359
(0.386) (0.474) (0.838) (1.326)
Family US 0.338∗ 0.213 0.171 −0.984∗
(0.143) (0.154) (0.209) (0.435)
PAN Last Elections −0.705∗ −1.183∗∗ −1.730∗ −1.296
(0.301) (0.393) (0.773) (1.010)
Education −0.065 −0.054 −0.111 −0.271
(0.067) (0.073) (0.099) (0.207)
Age 0.003 0.001 −0.008 −0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.013)
Women 0.197 0.325∗ 0.063 0.555
(0.132) (0.144) (0.194) (0.382)
Wealth 0.091† 0.031 0.150† 0.060
(0.054) (0.058) (0.081) (0.150)
Rural Location −0.083 0.012 0.484 1.284
(0.268) (0.303) (0.444) (1.099)
Urban Location 0.344 0.517† 0.518 1.223
(0.236) (0.267) (0.406) (1.069)
Constant −1.361∗∗∗ −1.664∗∗∗ −2.629∗∗∗ −4.097∗∗∗
(0.362) (0.401) (0.579) (1.313)
Observations 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077
Log Likelihood −730.205 −643.358 −406.975 −139.153
AIC 1,480.410 1,306.716 833.949 298.306
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.26: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PAN Last Elections
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.17 (0.09, 0.29) 0.22 (0.14, 0.32)
Non-Family US 0.06 (0.02, 0.14) 0.19 (0.12, 0.28)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.23 (0.15, 0.33) 0.29 (0.25, 0.33)
Non-Family US 0.09 (0.04, 0.17) 0.25 (0.21, 0.29)
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.09 (0.03, 0.21) 0.08 (0.04, 0.16)
Non-Family US 0.01 (0.00, 0.06) 0.07 (0.03, 0.14)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.14 (0.08, 0.23) 0.12 (0.09, 0.16)
Non-Family US 0.02 (0.00, 0.09) 0.11 (0.08, 0.14)
PRD Targets (mixed areas) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.00 (0.00, 0.06) 0.00 (0.00, 0.03)
Non-Family US 0.00 (0.00, 0.05) 0.01 (0.00, 0.09)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.01 (0.00, 0.07) 0.01 (0.00, 0.03)
Non-Family US 0.01 (0.00, 0.07) 0.04 (0.02, 0.06)
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Table 4.27: Family US and Electoral Targets: PAN ID
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PAN ID 0.261 0.022 0.654 0.914
(0.276) (0.304) (0.424) (0.789)
Family US 0.273† 0.270† 0.216 −1.055∗
(0.152) (0.163) (0.230) (0.478)
PAN ID −0.445∗ −0.440† −0.448 −0.412
(0.207) (0.227) (0.342) (0.505)
Education −0.067 −0.058 −0.116 −0.384†
(0.065) (0.071) (0.097) (0.200)
Age 0.002 −0.002 −0.008 −0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012)
Women 0.173 0.266† −0.063 0.381
(0.128) (0.139) (0.189) (0.359)
Wealth 0.087† 0.020 0.143† 0.146
(0.052) (0.056) (0.078) (0.144)
Rural Location −0.162 −0.002 0.309 1.235
(0.264) (0.302) (0.424) (1.097)
Urban Location 0.339 0.582∗ 0.378 1.212
(0.233) (0.268) (0.385) (1.063)
Constant −1.236∗∗∗ −1.522∗∗∗ −2.481∗∗∗ −4.088∗∗∗
(0.352) (0.391) (0.556) (1.280)
Observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155
Log Likelihood −783.164 −694.096 −434.385 −152.875
AIC 1,586.328 1,408.193 888.770 325.751
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.28: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PAN ID
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Family US 0.16 (0.09, 0.25) 0.22 (0.14, 0.33)
Non-Family US 0.12 (0.07, 0.21) 0.18 (0.11, 0.27)
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Family US 0.22 (0.17, 0.28) 0.30 (0.26, 0.35)
Non-Family US 0.17 (0.12, 0.24) 0.25 (0.21, 0.29)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Family US 0.11 (0.05, 0.21) 0.09 (0.04, 0.17)
Non-Family US 0.04 (0.02, 0.11) 0.07 (0.03, 0.14)
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Family US 0.14 (0.10, 0.20) 0.12 (0.09, 0.16)
Non-Family US 0.06 (0.03, 0.11) 0.10 (0.07, 0.13)
PRD Targets (mixed areas) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Family US 0.00 (0.00, 0.06) 0.00 (0.00, 0.03)
Non-Family US 0.00 (0.00, 0.07) 0.01 (0.00, 0.09)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Family US 0.02 (0.00, 0.05) 0.01 (0.00, 0.03)
Non-Family US 0.02 (0.01, 0.06) 0.03 (0.02, 0.06)
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Table 4.29: Family US and Electoral Targets: PRD Last Elections
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PRD Last Elections 0.380 −0.012 −1.082† −0.822
(0.406) (0.456) (0.562) (1.112)
Family US 0.342∗ 0.308∗ 0.511∗ −0.685
(0.141) (0.153) (0.216) (0.443)
PRD Last Elections −0.001 −0.078 0.946∗ 1.193∗
(0.295) (0.331) (0.369) (0.524)
Education −0.088 −0.076 −0.134 −0.302
(0.067) (0.073) (0.098) (0.203)
Age 0.001 −0.001 −0.011 −0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.013)
Women 0.187 0.288∗ 0.070 0.620
(0.132) (0.143) (0.195) (0.387)
Wealth 0.080 0.015 0.134† 0.026
(0.053) (0.058) (0.081) (0.151)
Rural Location −0.134 −0.040 0.490 1.353
(0.267) (0.302) (0.445) (1.105)
Urban Location 0.321 0.483† 0.554 1.355
(0.236) (0.266) (0.407) (1.077)
Constant −1.272∗∗∗ −1.569∗∗∗ −2.767∗∗∗ −4.276∗∗∗
(0.360) (0.397) (0.579) (1.321)
Observations 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077
Log Likelihood −733.721 −650.753 −408.184 −138.807
AIC 1,487.442 1,321.507 836.367 297.614
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.30: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRD Last Elections
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US 0.21 (0.11, 0.36) 0.22 (0.14, 0.32)
Non-Family US 0.16 (0.08, 0.29) 0.17 (0.11, 0.26)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US 0.26 (0.16, 0.39) 0.28 (0.24, 0.32)
Non-Family US 0.21 (0.12, 0.33) 0.22 (0.19, 0.27)
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US 0.07 (0.02, 0.19) 0.08 (0.04, 0.16)
Non-Family US 0.12 (0.05, 0.27) 0.05 (0.02, 0.11)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US 0.11 (0.05, 0.22) 0.13 (0.10, 0.16)
Non-Family US 0.18 (0.10, 0.30) 0.08 (0.06, 0.11)
PRD Targets (mixed areas) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US 0.00 (0.00, 0.08) 0.00 (0.00, 0.03)
Non-Family US 0.02 (0.00, 0.19) 0.00 (0.00, 0.06)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US 0.02 (0.00, 0.11) 0.01 (0.00, 0.02)
Non-Family US 0.08 (0.03, 0.18) 0.02 (0.01, 0.05)
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Table 4.31: Family US and Electoral Targets: PRD ID
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PRD ID 0.300 0.074 −1.067† −1.408
(0.406) (0.472) (0.629) (1.249)
Family US 0.309∗ 0.266† 0.528∗∗ −0.565
(0.135) (0.145) (0.205) (0.399)
PRD ID 0.034 −0.309 0.462 0.951†
(0.302) (0.355) (0.422) (0.528)
Education −0.071 −0.073 −0.124 −0.382†
(0.065) (0.071) (0.097) (0.198)
Age 0.002 −0.002 −0.009 −0.008
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012)
Women 0.172 0.233† −0.070 0.389
(0.127) (0.138) (0.189) (0.360)
Wealth 0.081 0.007 0.139† 0.142
(0.052) (0.055) (0.078) (0.143)
Rural Location −0.178 −0.004 0.322 1.249
(0.264) (0.302) (0.424) (1.098)
Urban Location 0.318 0.556∗ 0.386 1.247
(0.233) (0.267) (0.385) (1.064)
Constant −1.324∗∗∗ −1.512∗∗∗ −2.591∗∗∗ −4.283∗∗∗
(0.352) (0.391) (0.557) (1.280)
Observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155
Log Likelihood −784.726 −697.240 −434.059 −152.060
AIC 1,589.452 1,414.481 888.118 324.120
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.32: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRD ID
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Family US 0.17 (0.09, 0.31) 0.21 (0.13, 0.31)
Non-Family US 0.13 (0.06, 0.25) 0.17 (0.10, 0.26)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Family US 0.23 (0.14, 0.35) 0.28 (0.24, 0.32)
Non-Family US 0.18 (0.10, 0.30) 0.23 (0.19, 0.27)
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Family US 0.05 (0.01, 0.16) 0.10 (0.05, 0.19)
Non-Family US 0.09 (0.03, 0.22) 0.06 (0.03, 0.12)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Family US 0.08 (0.03, 0.17) 0.13 (0.10, 0.17)
Non-Family US 0.12 (0.06, 0.24) 0.08 (0.06, 0.11)
PRD Targets (mixed areas) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Family US 0.00 (0.00, 0.06) 0.00 (0.00, 0.04)
Non-Family US 0.00 (0.00, 0.06) 0.00 (0.00, 0.07)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Family US 0.01 (0.00, 0.08) 0.01 (0.00, 0.03)
Non-Family US 0.07 (0.03, 0.17) 0.03 (0.01, 0.05)
Table 4.33: Family US and Electoral Advertising
Any Ads PRI Ads PAN Ads PRD Ads
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US 0.305∗ 0.215† 0.182 0.046
(0.124) (0.122) (0.130) (0.148)
Education 0.200∗∗ 0.132∗ −0.008 0.047
(0.064) (0.062) (0.065) (0.073)
Age 0.007 0.004 −0.004 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Women −0.075 −0.110 −0.260∗ −0.288∗
(0.123) (0.122) (0.129) (0.146)
Wealth 0.247∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.054) (0.061)
Rural Location 0.111 0.240 0.288 0.339
(0.240) (0.245) (0.270) (0.298)
Urban Location 0.249 0.262 0.246 0.040
(0.216) (0.219) (0.243) (0.272)
Constant −1.545∗∗∗ −1.781∗∗∗ −1.594∗∗∗ −2.357∗∗∗
(0.335) (0.336) (0.360) (0.407)
Observations 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183
Log Likelihood −819.2 −841.2 −777.8 −653.6
AIC 1,654.5 1,698.5 1,571.7 1,323.2
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.34: Predicted Probabilities - Family US
Mixed areas Any Ads PRI Ads PAN Ads PRD Ads
Family US 0.57 (0.47, 0.67) 0.45 (0.35, 0.55) 0.28 (0.19, 0.38) 0.19 (0.12, 0.29)
No Family US 0.50 (0.40, 0.60) 0.39 (0.30, 0.50) 0.24 (0.16, 0.34) 0.19 (0.12, 0.28)
Mean size Any Ads PRI Ads PAN Ads PRD Ads
Family US 0.62 (0.58, 0.66) 0.50 (0.46, 0.54) 0.32 (0.29, 0.36) 0.21 (0.18, 0.25)
No Family US 0.55 (0.51, 0.59) 0.45 (0.41, 0.49) 0.29 (0.25, 0.33) 0.20 (0.17, 0.24)
Table 4.35: Family US and Electoral Advertising: PRI Last Elections
Any Ads PRI Ads PAN Ads PRD Ads
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PRI Last Elections 0.122 0.185 −0.073 0.153
(0.268) (0.265) (0.291) (0.337)
Family US 0.278† 0.130 0.163 0.015
(0.164) (0.161) (0.166) (0.184)
PRI Last Elections −0.223 −0.082 −0.392† −0.650∗∗
(0.191) (0.192) (0.214) (0.249)
Education 0.196∗∗ 0.117† −0.027 0.026
(0.067) (0.065) (0.069) (0.077)
Age 0.008† 0.006 −0.001 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Women −0.116 −0.075 −0.296∗ −0.295†
(0.130) (0.128) (0.137) (0.155)
Wealth 0.248∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.057) (0.064)
Rural Location −0.007 0.200 0.179 0.308
(0.250) (0.253) (0.280) (0.309)
Urban Location 0.096 0.148 0.142 −0.023
(0.226) (0.228) (0.252) (0.283)
Constant −1.370∗∗∗ −1.799∗∗∗ −1.438∗∗∗ −2.130∗∗∗
(0.356) (0.357) (0.381) (0.428)
Observations 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077
Log Likelihood −743.461 −763.627 −700.571 −589.610
AIC 1,506.922 1,547.255 1,421.141 1,199.220
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
85
Table 4.36: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRI Last Elections
PRI Ads (mixed areas) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.48 (0.37, 0.60) 0.46 (0.35, 0.57)
Non-Family US 0.41 (0.29, 0.53) 0.43 (0.32, 0.54)
PRI Ads (mean size of place) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.52 (0.44, 0.59) 0.49 (0.44, 0.55)
Non-Family US 0.44 (0.37, 0.52) 0.46 (0.41, 0.52)
PAN Ads (mixed areas) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.23 (0.15, 0.34) 0.32 (0.22, 0.44)
Non-Family US 0.21 (0.13, 0.32) 0.29 (0.19, 0.40)
PAN Ads (mean size of place) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.25 (0.19, 0.32) 0.35 (0.30, 0.41)
Non-Family US 0.24 (0.18, 0.31) 0.32 (0.27, 0.37)
PRD Ads (mixed areas) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.15 (0.09, 0.25) 0.23 (0.15, 0.34)
Non-Family US 0.13 (0.07, 0.23) 0.23 (0.14, 0.34)
PRD Ads (mean size of place) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.16 (0.11, 0.22) 0.24 (0.20, 0.29)
Non-Family US 0.14 (0.09, 0.20) 0.24 (0.19, 0.29)
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Table 4.37: Family US and Electoral Advertising: PRI ID
Any Ads PRI Ads PAN Ads PRD Ads
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PRI ID 0.017 −0.060 0.039 0.445
(0.272) (0.268) (0.295) (0.358)
Family US 0.310∗ 0.221 0.168 −0.050
(0.150) (0.148) (0.154) (0.170)
PRI ID 0.118 0.266 −0.311 −0.812∗∗
(0.187) (0.188) (0.211) (0.265)
Education 0.197∗∗ 0.139∗ −0.022 0.004
(0.065) (0.063) (0.067) (0.075)
Age 0.006 0.005 − 0.003 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Women −0.062 −0.093 −0.230† −0.308∗
(0.125) (0.124) (0.131) (0.150)
Wealth 0.256∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.051) (0.055) (0.062)
Rural Location 0.106 0.264 0.279 0.370
(0.245) (0.251) (0.277) (0.309)
Urban Location 0.255 0.310 0.243 0.066
(0.221) (0.226) (0.251) (0.283)
Constant −1.610∗∗∗ −1.977∗∗∗ −1.588∗∗∗ −2.107∗∗∗
(0.350) (0.352) (0.375) (0.423)
Observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155
Log Likelihood −799.498 −820.053 −755.502 −628.204
AIC 1,618.996 1,660.106 1,531.004 1,276.408
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.38: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRI ID
PRI Ads (mixed areas) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.47 (0.35, 0.60) 0.42 (0.32, 0.53)
Non-Family US 0.43 (0.31, 0.56) 0.37 (0.27, 0.48)
PRI Ads (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.54 (0.46, 0.62) 0.49 (0.44, 0.54)
Non-Family US 0.50 (0.42, 0.58) 0.44 (0.38, 0.49)
PAN Ads (mixed areas) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.24 (0.15, 0.35) 0.29 (0.20, 0.40)
Non-Family US 0.20 (0.12, 0.31) 0.26 (0.17, 0.36)
PAN Ads (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.28 (0.21, 0.36) 0.34 (0.29, 0.39)
Non-Family US 0.24 (0.18, 0.31) 0.30 (0.26, 0.35)
PRD Ads (mixed areas) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.15 (0.08, 0.25) 0.20 (0.13, 0.31)
Non-Family US 0.10 (0.05, 0.19) 0.21 (0.13, 0.32)
PRD Ads (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.17 (0.12, 0.23) 0.22 (0.19, 0.27)
Non-Family US 0.12 (0.08, 0.18) 0.23 (0.19, 0.28)
88
Table 4.39: Family US and Electoral Advertising: Opposition Orientation
PAN Ads PAN Ads PRD Ads PRD Ads
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PAN Last Elections −1.055∗∗
(0.355)
Family US * PAN ID −0.161
(0.273)
Family US * PRD Last Elections 0.777†
(0.412)
Family US * PRD ID 0.042
(0.414)
Family US 0.338∗ 0.233 −0.063 0.031
(0.153) (0.163) (0.176) (0.164)
PAN Last Elections 1.060∗∗∗
(0.255)
PAN ID 0.320
(0.200)
PRD Last Elections 1.061∗∗∗
(0.289)
PRD ID 0.989∗∗∗
(0.300)
Education −0.036 −0.017 0.019 0.040
(0.069) (0.067) (0.079) (0.075)
Age −0.007 −0.004 0.001 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Women −0.323∗ −0.240† −0.185 −0.262†
(0.138) (0.132) (0.159) (0.151)
Wealth 0.203∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.055) (0.066) (0.063)
Rural Location 0.164 0.273 0.335 0.361
(0.281) (0.277) (0.316) (0.310)
Urban Location 0.144 0.228 0.039 0.070
(0.253) (0.251) (0.291) (0.285)
Constant −1.494∗∗∗ −1.740∗∗∗ −2.397∗∗∗ −2.579∗∗∗
(0.381) (0.372) (0.439) (0.425)
Observations 1,077 1,155 1,077 1,155
Log Likelihood −695.351 −756.190 −565.736 −623.084
AIC 1,410.702 1,532.380 1,151.471 1,266.168
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.40: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and Opposition Last Elections
PAN Ads (mixed areas) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.29 (0.18, 0.44) 0.29 (0.20, 0.40)
Non-Family US 0.46 (0.31, 0.61) 0.22 (0.15, 0.32)
PAN Ads (mean size of place) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.32 (0.23, 0.42) 0.32 (0.27, 0.36)
Non-Family US 0.49 (0.38, 0.60) 0.25 (0.21, 0.29)
PRD Ads (mixed areas) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US 0.54 (0.36, 0.70) 0.15 (0.09, 0.24)
Non-Family US 0.36 (0.22, 0.53) 0.16 (0.10, 0.26)
PRD Ads (mixed areas) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US 0.56 (0.43, 0.68) 0.17 (0.13, 0.20)
Non-Family US 0.38 (0.27, 0.51) 0.18 (0.14, 0.22)
90
4.5.1 Additional Figures and Tables
Table 4.41: Return Migrant and Electoral Targets (Visit-Clientelism)
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Return Migrant * PRI Last Elections 0.646 1.035† −0.211
(0.558) (0.593) (0.771)
Return Migrant −0.225 −0.219 0.203
(0.359) (0.407) (0.466)
PRI Last Elections 0.119 0.235 0.151
(0.168) (0.182) (0.246)
Education −0.118 −0.070 −0.099
(0.077) (0.084) (0.113)
Age −0.002 −0.005 −0.008
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Women 0.169 0.332∗ −0.037
(0.153) (0.168) (0.223)
Wealth 0.102† 0.034 0.106
(0.061) (0.066) (0.091)
Employed −0.106 0.007 −0.005
(0.156) (0.170) (0.227)
Church Attendance 0.119† 0.086 0.205∗
(0.068) (0.075) (0.102)
Talk Politics 0.218∗ 0.097 −0.064
(0.092) (0.100) (0.136)
Risk Acceptant −0.248 −0.360∗ 0.201
(0.162) (0.173) (0.243)
National Situation 0.187† 0.324∗∗ 0.203
(0.098) (0.108) (0.143)
Rural Location −0.104 −0.051 0.444
(0.297) (0.339) (0.499)
Urban Location 0.082 0.303 0.249
(0.273) (0.311) (0.469)
Constant −1.975∗∗∗ −2.065∗∗∗ −3.430∗∗∗
(0.484) (0.532) (0.759)
Region Dummies Y Y Y
Observations 950 950 950
Log Likelihood −637.441 −560.324 −363.263
AIC 1,312.883 1,158.649 764.526
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed and Center.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.42: Return Migrant and Electoral Targets (Visit-Clientelism)
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Return Migrant * PRI ID 1.430∗ 1.825∗∗ −1.303
(0.657) (0.688) (1.223)
Return Migrant −0.356 −0.310 0.222
(0.344) (0.392) (0.428)
PRI ID 0.349∗ 0.552∗∗ 0.089
(0.169) (0.180) (0.248)
Education −0.112 −0.071 −0.097
(0.075) (0.082) (0.109)
Age −0.0004 −0.004 −0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Women 0.176 0.308† −0.125
(0.150) (0.164) (0.217)
Wealth 0.113† 0.029 0.113
(0.059) (0.064) (0.088)
Employed −0.123 0.016 −0.041
(0.152) (0.166) (0.221)
Church Attendance 0.094 0.063 0.162†
(0.065) (0.072) (0.097)
Talk Politics 0.215∗ 0.111 −0.042
(0.089) (0.096) (0.130)
Risk Acceptant −0.206 −0.184 0.095
(0.168) (0.181) (0.251)
National Situation 0.119 0.204∗ 0.233†
(0.096) (0.104) (0.139)
Rural Location −0.159 −0.011 0.193
(0.298) (0.346) (0.471)
Urban Location 0.097 0.390 0.052
(0.273) (0.318) (0.440)
Constant −2.018∗∗∗ −2.269∗∗∗ −3.146∗∗∗
(0.480) (0.534) (0.731)
Region Dummies Y Y Y
Observations 1,014 1,014 1,014
Log Likelihood −673.885 −590.948 −384.871
AIC 1,385.771 1,219.895 807.743
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.43: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and PRI Last Elections
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Return Migrant 0.34 (0.17, 0.60) 0.13 (0.05, 0.29)
Non-Return Migrant 0.20 (0.11, 0.32) 0.16 (0.09, 0.27)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Return Migrant 0.40 (0.21, 0.62) 0.16 (0.07, 0.30)
Non-Return Migrant 0.23 (0.17, 0.31) 0.19 (0.14, 0.25)
Table 4.44: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and PRI ID
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant 0.56 (0.27, 0.81) 0.10 (0.04, 0.23)
Non-Return Migrant 0.22 (0.12, 0.35) 0.14 (0.08, 0.23)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant 0.62 (0.34, 0.83) 0.13 (0.06, 0.25)
Non-Return Migrant 0.27 (0.20, 0.35) 0.17 (0.13, 0.23)
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Table 4.45: Family US and Electoral Targets (Visit-Clientelism)
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US 0.441∗∗ 0.342∗ 0.513∗ −0.738†
(0.141) (0.152) (0.208) (0.396)
Education −0.131† −0.090 −0.120 −0.617∗∗
(0.074) (0.080) (0.109) (0.233)
Age −0.001 −0.004 −0.007 −0.019
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014)
Women 0.105 0.207 −0.125 −0.003
(0.148) (0.160) (0.216) (0.409)
Wealth 0.096 0.007 0.122 0.236
(0.059) (0.064) (0.088) (0.174)
Employed −0.122 −0.005 0.016 −1.063∗
(0.151) (0.163) (0.220) (0.463)
Church Attendance 0.109† 0.086 0.164† 0.160
(0.065) (0.070) (0.098) (0.187)
Talk Politics 0.201∗ 0.102 −0.075 0.413†
(0.088) (0.095) (0.129) (0.247)
Risk Acceptant −0.381∗ −0.486∗∗ 0.110 0.377
(0.151) (0.161) (0.227) (0.433)
National Situation 0.174† 0.279∗∗ 0.241† 0.742∗∗
(0.094) (0.102) (0.139) (0.274)
Rural Location −0.120 −0.045 0.339 0.999
(0.291) (0.332) (0.472) (1.139)
Urban Location 0.059 0.318 0.105 0.599
(0.264) (0.301) (0.439) (1.118)
Constant −1.914∗∗∗ −1.908∗∗∗ −3.355∗∗∗ −5.559∗∗∗
(0.468) (0.512) (0.729) (1.550)
Region Dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,035 1,035 1,035 1,035
Log Likelihood −684.757 −607.948 −385.588 −130.346
AIC 1,403.514 1,249.897 805.176 294.693
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.46: Family US and Electoral Targets (Visit-Clientelism)
PRI Target PRI Target PRI Target PRI Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PRI Last Elections −0.319
(0.314)
Family US * PRI ID −0.017
(0.310)
Family US * PAN Last Elections 0.834
(0.512)
Family US * PAN ID −0.257
(0.322)
Family US 0.476∗ 0.375† 0.233 0.413∗
(0.207) (0.193) (0.169) (0.182)
PRI Last Elections 0.482∗
(0.242)
PRI ID 0.680∗∗
(0.235)
PAN Last Elections −1.109∗∗
(0.428)
PAN ID −0.137
(0.244)
Constant −2.209∗∗∗ −2.240∗∗∗ −2.202∗∗∗ −1.956∗∗∗
(0.543) (0.538) (0.538) (0.519)
All Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 952 1,014 952 1,014
Log Likelihood −559.797 −591.073 −556.152 −597.498
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,157.593 1,220.146 1,150.304 1,232.997
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 4.47: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRI Last Elections
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.22 (0.12, 0.36) 0.19 (0.11, 0.31)
Non-Family US 0.19 (0.11, 0.32) 0.13 (0.07, 0.22)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.25 (0.18, 0.35) 0.22 (0.16, 0.30)
Non-Family US 0.22 (0.16, 0.31) 0.15 (0.10, 0.21)
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.16 (0.07, 0.30) 0.20 (0.12, 0.32)
Non-Family US 0.06 (0.02, 0.15) 0.16 (0.09, 0.27)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.19 (0.11, 0.30) 0.23 (0.17, 0.31)
Non-Family US 0.07 (0.03, 0.16) 0.20 (0.14, 0.26)
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Table 4.48: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRI ID
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.28 (0.16, 0.43) 0.16 (0.09, 0.27)
Non-Family US 0.21 (0.11, 0.35) 0.12 (0.06, 0.20)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.32 (0.23, 0.43) 0.20 (0.14, 0.26)
Non-Family US 0.25 (0.17, 0.35) 0.14 (0.10, 0.20)
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Family US 0.15 (0.08, 0.26) 0.21 (0.12, 0.34)
Non-Family US 0.13 (0.07, 0.24) 0.15 (0.08, 0.25)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Family US 0.18 (0.12, 0.26) 0.25 (0.19, 0.33)
Non-Family US 0.16 (0.11, 0.24) 0.18 (0.13, 0.25)
Table 4.49: Family US and Electoral Targets (Visit-Clientelism)
PAN Target PAN Target PRD Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PAN Last Elections 1.867∗
(0.851)
Family US * PAN ID 0.449
(0.443)
Family US * PRD Last Elections −0.993
(1.154)
Family US * PRD ID −1.539
(1.312)
Family US 0.192 0.336 −0.649 −0.562
(0.228) (0.252) (0.472) (0.420)
PAN Last Elections −1.672∗
(0.784)
PAN ID −0.286
(0.360)
PRD Last Elections 1.693∗∗
(0.596)
PRD ID 1.112†
(0.631)
Constant −3.635∗∗∗ −3.276∗∗∗ −6.304∗∗∗ −5.857∗∗∗
(0.780) (0.735) (1.680) (1.573)
All Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 952 1,014 952 1,014
Log Likelihood −354.640 −379.078 −115.005 −128.451
AIC 747.280 796.156 268.010 294.902
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.50: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PAN Last Elections
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.06 (0.02, 0.19) 0.05 (0.02, 0.14)
Non-Family US 0.00 (0.00, 0.05) 0.04 (0.01, 0.12)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.09 (0.04, 0.17) 0.07 (0.04,0.12)
Non-Family US 0.01 (0.00, 0.05) 0.06 (0.03, 0.10)
Table 4.51: Family US and Electoral Advertising: Opposition Orientation
PAN Ads PAN Ads PRD Ads PRD Ads
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PAN Last Elections −0.940∗
(0.386)
Family US * PAN ID −0.140
(0.293)
Family US * PRD Last Elections 0.641
(0.448)
Family US * PRD ID 0.138
(0.463)
Family US 0.263 0.207 −0.097 0.016
(0.167) (0.181) (0.195) (0.181)
PAN Last Elections 1.057∗∗∗
(0.285)
PAN ID 0.256
(0.219)
PRD Last Elections 1.022∗∗
(0.320)
PRD ID 0.758∗
(0.348)
Constant −1.897∗∗∗ −2.206∗∗∗ −3.173∗∗∗ −3.359∗∗∗
(0.511) (0.491) (0.594) (0.573)
All Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 952 1,014 952 1,014
Log Likelihood −603.630 −653.043 −478.630 −523.649
AIC 1,245.261 1,344.085 995.260 1,085.297
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed and Center.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 4.52: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and Opposition Last Elections
PAN Ads (mixed areas) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.26 (0.14, 0.43) 0.24 (0.15, 0.36)
Non-Family US 0.41 (0.24, 0.60) 0.19 (0.11, 0.30)
PAN Ads (mean size of place) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.28 (0.18, 0.40) 0.25 (0.19, 0.33)
Non-Family US 0.43 (0.30, 0.58) 0.21 (0.15, 0.27)
PRD Ads (mixed areas) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US 0.36 (0.19, 0.57) 0.09 (0.05, 0.17)
Non-Family US 0.24 (0.12, 0.42) 0.10 (0.05, 0.19)
PRD Ads (mixed areas) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US 0.36 (0.22, 0.52) 0.09 (0.06, 0.14)
Non-Family US 0.24 (0.14, 0.38) 0.10 (0.07, 0.15)
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4.5.2 Extensions to the Existing Analysis: 2000 Mexico Panel Study
Table 4.53: Family US and Opposition Targeting: Wave 4
Opposition Target Opposition Target
Model 1 Model 2
Family US * PRI ID −0.370
(0.488)
Family US * PAN ID −0.115
(0.535)
Family US 0.637∗ 0.524†
(0.320) (0.292)
PRI ID 0.274
(0.401)
PAN ID 0.272
(0.430)
Constant −3.759∗∗ −3.656∗∗
(0.854) (0.828)
All Controls Y Y
Observations 791 791
Log Likelihood −266.440 −266.340
AIC 568.880 568.680
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed and Center.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 4.54: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and Opposition Targets - Wave 4
Opposition Targets (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.12 (0.06, 0.21) 0.13 (0.07, 0.21)
Non-Family US 0.09 (0.05, 0.18) 0.07 (0.04, 0.13)
Opposition Targets (mean size of place) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Family US 0.14 (0.07, 0.25) 0.12 (0.07, 0.19)
Non-Family US 0.09 (0.04, 0.19) 0.07 (0.04, 0.13)
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Chapter 5
Electoral Targeting in Mexico’s 2006
Presidential Election
While the 2000 Mexican presidential elections were surprising due to the PRI’s first electoral defeat
in over seventy years, the 2006 ones resulted also in a never seen before electoral result: a near tie
between the PAN Candidate - Felipe Caldero´n and the PRD Candidate - Andre´s Manuel Lo´pez
Obrador. Multiple factors contributed toward this tight competition (Dominguez, 2009; Dominguez,
Lawson and Moreno, 2009; Flores-Macias, 2009): on the one hand, Lo´pez Obrador enjoyed a
lead in the public opinion polls throughout most of the campaign due to his likable personal
characteristics and respected political abilities. However, this candidate’s popularity contrasted
with the lack of good evaluations voters had on the rest of his party, the PRD. On the other,
Caldero´n entered the contest without the support of some of his party because of internal divisions
over whom the presidential candidate should be. Yet, a successful electoral campaign, together
with an improving economic situation and a highly-regarded incumbent PAN President, changed
the fate of the elections and gave the PAN another six years at the highest level of office.
This chapter has one clear objective: establish whether or not migrant families were more likely
electoral targets than similar non-migrant ones during the 2006 Mexican presidential elections.1
By doing so, it aims to understand the extent to which the incumbent (PAN) and the opposition
parties (PRI and PRD) engaged in vote buying, coercion and other mobilization strategies of
1 This chapter is a modified version of a poster presented at the American Political Science Association Annual
Meeting 2014, Washington, DC.
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migration-exposed voters in order to win these elections. Most importantly, it also addresses
how changes in incumbency and opposition status at the presidential level affected the electoral
targeting of the different parties. That is, the PAN was for the first time in Mexican history
the party of the President while the PRI no longer held that powerful position. As the previous
one, this chapter therefore analyzes what role the incumbent and the opposition parties played in
attempting to influence migrant families’ electoral choices. Undoubtedly, this is a necessary first
step to understand why migrant families voted in a particular way in these elections and hence how
they contributed to the PAN’s reelection victory.
5.1 International Migration and Electoral Strategies in 2006
This dissertation argues that because of their political disaffection, migrant families are more likely
to be electoral targets. In the context of the 2006 Mexican presidential elections, I look at two
types of electoral strategies: clientelism and home visits. As in Chapter 4, clientelism refers to
the exchange of goods and favors in return for electoral support, while home visits quite obviously
mean that a representative of a political party goes to someone’s house during elections time. Of
course, these visits can range from friendly ones that simply encourage voters to go to the polls to
more intimidating situations where political activists coerce voters to turn out as well as to cast
their ballots in a particular way.2
As for migration-exposed voters, I look at remittance recipients as well as those respondents with
close relatives living in the United States, and posit that the disengagement or disaffection from
national politics affects both types. In the first place, I expect remittance recipients to experience
disengagement from politics because the financial help from abroad makes them less dependent
on the national economic situation and less reliant on domestic politics to ensure well-being. In
the second, those respondents with family members living in the US might also have intentions
to leave and reunite with migrants already abroad, which quite possibly also lowers the need to
get involved in politics back home. Needless to say, overlap exists between those respondents that
receive remittances and those who have close relatives living in a foreign country.
With respect to the political contenders in 2006, one point is clear about these elections: the
2 Although sending electoral advertising is also an important electoral strategy, no question was asked about it in
the 2006 dataset. Therefore, this chapter focuses just on non-programmatic strategies: clientelism and home visits.
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PAN was now the party managing the national government and therefore the competitor with access
to centralized fiscal resources. Put differently, the PAN’s incumbency status at the President level
gave Caldero´n an advantage over the PRI and the PRD candidates, given that controlling this
institution facilitated the funding and implementation of electoral targeting. As a result, and
despite some initial divisions over whom the presidential candidate should be, the party eventually
united in support of Felipe Caldero´n and worked on intense canvassing and some gift distribution
prior to the elections and in order to ensure re-election (Shirk, 2009; Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez and
Magaloni, 2009).
With respect to the PRI, while this party still counted on a widespread political network at
the local level to mobilize voters, this capability did not prevent a disastrous electoral performance
in the 2006 elections. As Langston (2009) puts it: “The PRI not only posted a miserable third
place finish in the presidential race, but its candidate’s poor showing also cost the PRI over half
of its congressional delegation” (page 153). Of course, not a single factor caused this electoral
defeat but rather a combination of reasons, including: a very competitive primary that left the
party internally divided3, a candidate that lacked personal popularity but owned the reputation
of being a fraudulent politician, and a poor communication strategy during the campaign (i.e., no
clear electoral message nor a credible candidate) (Lawson, 2009; Langston, 2009). Altogether, this
meant that the PRI candidate, in addition to not possessing anymore the incumbency advantage
at the national level, did not have the support of a committed party working toward his electoral
victory at the local level. In other words, the absence of a good candidate as well as the internal
divisions throughout the campaign meant that Roberto Madrazo could not rely as much as before
on the workings of the PRI machine to deliver votes. Obviously, this electoral machinery had been
essential and highly successful in delivering winning strategies in the past.
As for the PRD candidate, Lo´pez Obrador had serious options of becoming the next Mexican
President in 2006. This fact was a certainly a change with respect to the 2000 elections and
demanded an electoral campaign able to materialize the initial projections into a final victory.
However, despite leading public opinion polls throughout most of the campaign, Lo´pez Obrador
did not have the incumbency advantage the PAN had nor a strong party supporting his candidacy.
3 See for example the TUCOM (“Todos Unidos con Mexico”) organization. This organization was created by
some PRI party leaders to mobilized against Madrazo’s presidential candidacy.
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As a result, the electoral campaign did not play in Lo´pez Obrador’s favor. Put differently, while it
is reasonable to argue that the PRD participated in electoral targeting and mobilization activities,
one can as well expect this party to have participated in these practices to a lower extent than (or
especially not more than) the other two main competitors.
In sum, and building on the hypotheses of chapter 3, I adapt them to the context of the 2006
presidential elections, with the PAN as the incumbent party and the PRD and the PRI as the
opposition parties, as follows:
H1: PAN Targeting of PAN Supporters: The incumbent PAN is systematically more likely to
electorally target migrant families that favor this party than similar non-migrant families with the
same political orientation (i.e., electoral mobilization or turnout buying).
H2: Opposition Targeting (PRI and PRD) of Opposition Supporters: The opposition parties
(PRI and PRD) are systematically more likely to electorally target migrant families who are non-
incumbent supporters (PRI and PRD supporters, respectively) than similar non-migrant families
with the same political orientation (i.e., electoral mobilization or turnout buying).
H3: PAN Targeting of non-PAN Supporters: Among non-PAN supporters, the PAN is systemati-
cally more likely to electorally target migrant families that do not favor the incumbent than similar
non-migrant families with the same political orientation, when these voters are mobilized by the
opposition (i.e., persuasion or vote buying).
Additionally, and contrary to the previous chapter where it was easier to hypothesize the PRI’s
response to the active PAN targeting. It is not that straightforward in this case to predict PAN’s
responses given that both PRI and PRD participated in electoral targeting to a certain extent.
Thus, I leave H3 as it is: the PAN targeting of non-PAN-supporters.
5.2 Data and Methodology
This chapter relies on data from the Mexico 2006 Panel Study (Lawson et al., 2007).4 The panel
format of this dataset relies on the fact that the same participants responded to (sometimes the
4 Senior Project Personnel for the Mexico 2006 Panel Study include (in alphabetical order): Andy Baker, Kathleen
Bruhn, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domnguez, Kenneth Greene, Joseph Klesner, Chappell Lawson
(Principal Investigator), Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro Moreno, Alejandro Poir, and David Shirk.
Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-0517971) and Reforma newspaper;
fieldwork was conducted by Reforma newspapers Polling and Research Team, under the direction of Alejandro
Moreno. http://web.mit.edu/clawson/www/polisci/research/mexico06/index.html.
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same) political and socioeconomic questions at three different points in time: October 2005 (wave
1), April and May 2006 (wave 2), and after the elections in July 2006 (wave 3).5 Of course,
attrition happened but a majority of the respondents remained involved during the second and
third wave (i.e., the sample started with 2400 respondents and finished with approximately 1600).
I use information from these three different waves in this chapter’s empirical analysis. I provide
further details in the remainder of this section.
Dependent Variables
From this dataset, I use two different questions to create my electoral targeting variable. The
first question asks if ‘a political party representative knocked on your door during the last few
weeks, and which party or candidate’ (home visits), and the second if ‘in the last few weeks, a
political party representative or candidate gave the respondents a gift, money, meals, groceries, or
any other type of help, and which party or candidate’ (clientelism). As in the previous chapter, this
non-programmatic targeting happens when either of these two questions receives a positive answer.
Moreover, given the panel format of this dataset, I create my dependent variable by considering
those respondents that participated in all the three waves and their answers to the questions about
clientelism and home visits, without regards to whether the targeting occurred in the first, second
or third wave. Thus, this variable takes the value of one when a respondent was a target either in
the first, second, or third wave, as well as when he/she was a target in more than one wave; and a
value of 0 when a target did not occur at all.6
Also, given that these questions allow exploring which political parties approached respondents,
I take this information into account. This variation results in different indicator variables that
capture whether the respondent was a party’s target or not: PRI target, PAN/Incumbent target
and PRD target.
Independent Variables
I use two different questions to capture migration-exposed citizens or members of migrant
families: i) those who report having close relatives living in the US (family US ), and ii) those who
5 Although this dataset also incorporates a cross-section part before and after the elections, no question was asked
about migration in this part of the dataset. Hence, the analysis is this chapter relies exclusively on the panel dataset.
6 I opted for coding this as an indicator as opposed to an index because for some respondents answering ‘yes’ to
these questions could refer to being a target at any point in the past, as opposed to only within ‘the last few weeks’
as the question specifies. Put differently, capturing with exactitude those who were a target only ‘within the last few
weeks’ seems a bit too demanding for respondents, and therefore, a simple indicator variable for the overall electoral
campaign is a priori more appropriate.
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affirm receiving themselves or the household money from someone living in the US (Remittance
Recipients). In both instances, these two resulting variables take the value of 1 when the respondent
falls into the migration category and 0 when the response is negative. Of course, overlap exists
between these two migration characteristics but it is far from complete.7
With respect to the panel format of this dataset, the first wave asks about having relatives in
the US and second one about receiving remittances. While it would be ideal to have these questions
again in subsequent waves in order to capture potential changes in migration status, it is reasonable
to expect that, given the short span (i.e., months as opposed to years) of the survey, changes would
be minimal and in general would not affect the results in any substantial way.
In addition, I use a variety of questions to capture respondents’ political orientation since this
information is essential to analyze if political parties’ strategies are conditional on these political
characteristics. First, I measure past electoral behavior with a question that directly reports this
electoral choice for the previous presidential elections of 2000, including: voted PRI last elections,
voted PAN last elections, and voted PRD last elections. Each of these variables takes the value of
1 when a respondent voted for a particular party, and 0 when they voted for another party or for
no party. Wave 1 of the survey includes this question. And second, I use a question that addresses
self-identification with an existing political party as: “priista” (PRI ID), “panista” (PAN ID or
Incumbent ID), or “perredista” (PRD ID). Each of these variables takes the value of 1 when a
respondent identifies with a particular party, and 0 when they favor other party or no party at all
and so qualify as ‘indifferent voters’. I use this information from the wave 1 of the survey even
though this question is present in wave 2 and wave 3 of the panel as well. The reason for choosing
answers from wave 1 is quite simply to avoid the endogeneity concerns that emerge from electoral
targeting driving party ID as opposed to party ID leading to political parties’ actions. The panel
format of this dataset makes addressing this endogeneity issue easier.
Control Variables
Finally, I control for those confounding factors that affect migration status and the dependent
variable, mainly: age, gender, wealth (as the sum of whether the respondent has a total of eight
7 In particular, 10% of the respondents belong to both categories, 40% of respondents have close relatives living
in the US but do not receive remittances, 1% of respondents receive remittances but do not have close relatives living
in the US, and 47% of the respondents do not belong to any migration category.
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items)8, and education level (ranging from 1- No education to 9- University degree or more). I also
include the type of place (rural, urban or mixed), given that the size of the location could affect
the workings of political networks and political parties’ ability to know who the migrant families
are. Also, since the political identity variables are from wave 1, I use these control variables from
wave 1 as well, although most of these personal characteristics do not change that much (if at all)
from wave to wave.
In alternative specifications, I include the following additional controls: approval or disapproval
of the incumbent President’s performance (0- Disapprove, 1- Neither and 2- Approve), frequency
of church attendance (from 0- Never to 4- More than once a week), frequency of political talk
(1-Never to 4- Daily), and geographic location (North, South, Center, Center-West and Mexico
City Area).9 In addition, I also use an alternative measure for the size of place: the population per
municipality. Different reasons motivate considering these variables: i) evaluation of president’s
performance might encourage participation in migration processes as well as getting involved in
political networks10, ii) church attendance measures respondents’ social connectivity which arguably
relates positively with facility to migrate and the exposure to political networks, iii) political talk
incorporates the fact that people who tend to talk more about politics are possibly local political
influencers, part of political networks and thus more likely targets, and iv) geographic location
takes into account the existing predisposition of certain areas to be migrant-rich as well as to favor
a particular party in their local workings and at the polls. The appendix summarizes descriptive
statistics for these variables.
5.3 Empirical Results
This section answers whether or not migrant families are the targets of electoral strategies. As
previously noted, I look at remittance recipients and those respondents with close relatives living
8 A measure of income (raging from 1- ‘0 to 1300’ to 10- ‘10500 or more’) is included in wave 2 and 3 of the study,
but not in wave 1. However, given that most of my control variables are from wave 1 and that subsequent waves lose
participants, I use wealth from wave 1 instead of income in order to maximize the number of respondents included
in the analysis. Both variables are of course positively and significantly correlated.
9 Unfortunately, no question asks about this risk acceptance attitudes in this 2006 data.
10 Of course, this variable can also be affected by the migration process and the fact that, for instance, receiving
remittances improves recipients’ economic situation and leads to better presidential evaluations. See in this respect
for example (Germano, 2013). Therefore, another reason for not including some of these variables as part of the
initial analysis is because some of them are post-treatment to the migration process, which hinders estimating the
effect of migration-exposure.
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in the US. A first look at the distribution of these practices indicates that 64% of remittance
recipients were not the targets of home visits/clientelism while 35% were. These figures are pretty
similar when looking at those respondents with family abroad. In addition, the main competing
parties - PAN, PRI and PRD - all reached a similar share of voters (see descriptive statistics in
the appendix), which introduces an interesting contrast with the electoral targeting dynamics of
previous elections. Given the binary nature of these dependent variables (i.e., electoral target or
not as well as party variation of those targets), I use logistic regressions for the empirical analysis.11
Further, this analysis proceeds by looking at the PAN’s strategic behavior in response to migration
status, PAN supporters and non-PAN supporters (i.e., PRI and PRD supporters), as well as the
opposition’s strategic behavior (both PRI and PRD) in response to migration status, PRI/PRD
supporters and non-PRI/non-PRD supporters.12
5.3.1 Remittance Recipients
Table 5.1 takes a first look at the extent to which being a remittance recipient predicts electoral
targeting (home visits and clientelism), when controlling for other relevant factors such as wealth
and age. This table indicates that being a remittance recipient reports a positive relationship with
being a target with all the political parties. However, this positive relationship is only statistically
significant in the case of PAN/incumbent targeting. Further, I look at predicted probabilities13 for
a better comparison of remittance recipients and non-recipients, everything else equal, in table 5.2.
As this table shows, those who receive remittances from the US have a higher predicted probability
of being electoral targets than similar non-recipients. This holds across the different competing
11 As in the previous chapter, an alternative way to analyze this electoral targeting is using a multinomial approach.
However, because some respondents are the targets of different parties, this complicates the creation of different
categories within the dependent variable for a multinomial logistic analysis (i.e., creates to many categories and leads
to some cells with a small number of respondents, especially when the migration-status is taken into account). A
logistic regression analysis makes the coding of the dependent variable more straightforward.
12 For this analysis, I use the weights from wave 1. This chapter’s results hold when using alternatively the weights
from wave 2 and wave 3. I also run the analysis without including any weights at all, in which case, this chapter’s
conclusions are similar when looking at the behavior of the PAN. The only noticeable difference is that the PRD
is not more likely to target remittances recipients than similar non-recipients with PRD orientation, but instead,
this party targets PRD supporters who are remittances recipients with a higher probability than non-recipients. Put
differently, some of the statistically significant relationships lose strength.
13 As in Chapter 4, I report predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals, and calculate them using all
variables at their means with the exception of the ‘size of the place’ for which I use two different estimations: i)
one that employs the mixed areas (as opposed to rural and urban areas) as the reference category (referred to as
‘mixed areas’ in tables), and another that gives these categories values from 1 to 3 according to size (1-rural, 2-mixed,
3-urban) and then uses the mean value to calculate the corresponding probability (referred to as ‘mean size’).
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parties but the difference between recipients and non-recipients is especially substantial in the case
of PAN targeting (0.17 for remittance recipients and 0.09 for non-recipients). As for the other
predictors in table 5.1, being older and living in an urban area are both positive and significant
predictors of experiencing targeting from different parties, while being a women leads only to more
PRD targets and higher wealth only to more PAN ones. As in the case of the 2000 elections
(Chapter 4), this last finding could be picking up the right-wing PAN party’s tendency to approach
richer, more conservative and potential supporters.
Additionally, in order to test this chapter’s hypotheses, it is necessary to consider variation in
political orientation. Thus, I analyze the relationship between past electoral behavior and party
identification (both from wave 1 of the study) with political parties’ strategic targeting (Tables 5.3
- 5.14).
To start, I explore respondent’s identification with the incumbent PAN party. As previously
described, ‘PAN last elections’ captures those who voted for the PAN in the presidential elections of
2000 as opposed to having voted for other party or no party at all (results in table 5.3); and PAN
ID identifies incumbent supporters whereas not having a PAN ID means opposition supporters
and indifferent voters (results in table 5.5). With respect to past electoral behavior, the analysis
indicates that being a remittance recipient and not having voted for the PAN in the past reports
a positive and statistically significant relationship with experiencing a PAN target (Model 3). No
other relationship is worth highlighting in this table 5.3. With regards to PAN ID, results are quite
similar since remittance recipients who do not have PAN ID have higher chances of being PAN
electoral targets (Model 3). In addition, table 5.5 shows that PAN ID is a negative and significant
predictor of PRI targeting (Model 2). As for the other parties, these tables do not show statistically
significant results for the connection between remittance recipients and PAN orientation. This is
not surprising given that in general I do not expect the opposing parties PRI and PRD to approach
those voters that identity with the incumbent PAN.
I also explore respondent’s identification with the PRI party, including information about voting
for the PRI in the past presidential elections (results in table 5.7) as well as about PRI ID (results
in table 5.9). Interestingly, table 5.7 shows that having voted for the PRI last elections (and not
being a remittance recipients) increases the chances of experiencing a PRI target (Model 2), while
being a remittance recipient that did not vote for that party in the past increases the probability of
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experiencing PAN (Model 3) and PRD electoral targeting (Model 4). These results therefore hint
at the idea that the PAN and PRD approach those migration-exposed voters that did not favor the
other contestant PRI in the past. When analyzing PRI ID to explain targeting in table 5.9 results
are pretty much the same. The only exception is the slight decrease in statistical significance to
explain PRD targets, which suggests that the PRD takes more into account past electoral behavior
favoring the PRI to design PRD targeting than current PRI identification. Furthermore, tables
5.11 and 5.13 show the results for performing the same analysis as before but looking at having
voted for the PRD in the last elections and holding PRD ID. In these tables, the main result is
that incumbent PAN targets report a positive and statistically significant relationship with those
remittance recipients that are not PRD sympathizers (Models 3). In addition, this analysis indicates
a positive and statistically significant relationship between remittance recipients with PRD ID and
PRD targets (Model 4, Table 5.13), which offers initial support to the notion of the PRD targeting
remittance recipients who are supporters.
Given these results, and in order to better understand the interactive effect of having a certain
political ideology and the distinction between remittance recipients and non-recipients on electoral
targeting, I report predicted probabilities (with 95% confidence intervals). I calculate these prob-
abilities using of course the distinction between recipients and non-recipients as well as whether
or not a respondent has a particular political ID. In addition, as in the previous chapter, I take
all other variables at their means with the exception of the ‘size of the place’ variable for which I
implement two different estimations: i) one that employs the mixed areas (as opposed to rural and
urban areas) as the reference category (i.e., referred to as ‘mixed areas’ in tables), and another that
gives these categories values from 1 to 3 according to size (1-rural, 2-mixed, 3-urban) and then uses
the mean value to calculate the corresponding probability (i.e., referred to as ‘mean size of place’
in tables). The following points are worth emphasizing:
First, given PAN/incumbent identity, the incumbent PAN party targets remittance recipients
with a higher probability than similar non-recipients. This relationship holds when either looking
at past electoral behavior or current PAN identity (Tables 5.4 and 5.6, respectively): for example, a
remittance recipient that identifies with the PAN has a predicted probability of being a PAN target
of 0.17 (0.16 if using PAN last elections), while a respondent with the same political orientation that
does not receive remittances has 0.10 chances (0.11 if using PAN last elections analysis). Equally,
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this previous result also translates into a remittance recipient being a more likely PAN target than
a similar non-recipients when both do not favor the PRI (Tables 5.8 and 5.10) nor the PRD (Tables
5.12 and 5.14). For example, a remittance recipient that did not vote for the PRI has a predicted
probability of being a PAN target of 0.18 (0.17 when looking at PRI ID instead) while for a non-
recipient with the same past electoral behavior this probability decreases to 0.10 (0.08 also when
looking at PRI ID). Likewise, a remittance recipient that did not vote for the PRD has a predicted
probability of being a PAN target of 0.17 (0.17 also when looking at PRD ID instead) while for a
non-recipient with the same past electoral behavior this probability decreases to 0.10 (0.09 when
looking at PRD ID).
Second, given overall non-PAN inclination (i.e., non-PAN last elections and non-PAN ID) or
opposition and indifferent identity, the incumbent PAN party is also more likely to target remittance
recipients than similar non-recipients (Tables 5.4 and 5.6). Consequently, I explore further if the
incumbent PAN targets especially remittance recipients that identity with any of the key contenders
(i.e., PRI supporters in Tables 5.8 and 5.10, PRD supporters in Tables 5.12 and 5.14). These results
indicate that the remittance recipients have also a higher probability of being PAN targets when
they identify with the PRI and the PRD than similar non-recipients who also identify with that
particular party. And results are stronger in the case of those who voted for the PRD in the past,
which is not surprising given the tight competition between PAN and PRD in the 2006 elections.
More precisely, a remittance recipient that voted for the PRI in 2000 has 0.17 (0.16 when using PRI
ID instead) chances of being a PAN target, while a non-recipient that voted the same way has a 0.10
chances (0.10 also when using PRI ID). As for PRD sympathizers, a remittance recipient that voted
for the PRD in 2000 has 0.24 (0.15 when using PRD ID instead) chances of being a PAN target,
while a non-recipient that voted the same way has a 0.08 chances (0.07 also when using PRD ID).
In short, the PAN targets supporters with a higher probability when they are remittance recipients
(and is also more likely to target remittances recipients who are not opposition supporters), but
this party also gets involved in the targeting of recipients who are non-supporters, especially if
these citizens voted for the PRD in the past.
And how about the behavior of the parties in opposition PRI and PRD? With respect to PRI
electoral targeting, and given those respondents that identify with this party (i.e, voted PRI last
elections and PRI ID), differences between remittance recipients and non-recipients are quite small,
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although the predicted probability is slightly higher for non-recipients (i.e., in Tables 5.8 and 5.10).
For instance, a recipient that voted for the PRI in 2000 has a 0.15 (0.13 when analyzing PRI
ID instead) chances of being a target and a non-recipient with the same past behavior 0.18 (0.15
when analyzing PRI ID instead). Likewise, these small differences (and even no differences at
all) between remittance recipients and non-recipients are also present when comparing the PRI
targeting of these two types of respondents and given lack of support for the PAN (Tables 5.4
and 5.6) or the PRD (Tables 5.12 and 5.14). In addition, given non-PRI orientation, remittance
recipients have a higher predicted probability of being PRI targets than similar non-recipients (e.g.,
0.13 for recipients and 0.09 for non-recipients). But overall these differences are also quite small.
And I further explore this connection by looking at PRI targeting of remittance recipients and
non-recipients that are PAN or PRD sympathizers. This analysis indicates that the PRI targets
remittance recipients with a higher predicted probability than non-recipients when they have either
PAN or PRD ideology. These results are stronger when looking at past electoral behavior and PRD
orientation. For example, remittance recipients that voted for the PRD in 2000 have 0.18 (0.15 if
voted PAN) chances of being PRI targets but 0.07 (0.11 if voted PAN) if they are non-recipients
that also voted for the PRD. In any case, the differences between recipients and non-recipients
are not statistically significant. Moreover, these predicted probabilities are very similar to those of
remittance recipients with PRI orientation (see above), and so, it is possible to conclude that the
PRI targets across different ideologies, and without making strong distinctions between remittance
recipients and non-recipients.14
Finally, analyzing PRD targeting, and given those respondents that identify with this party (i.e,
voted PRD last elections and PRD ID), the PRD is more likely to target remittance recipients that
similar non-recipients with the same political orientation (in Tables 5.12 and 5.14). For instance, a
recipient that voted for the PRD in 2000 has a 0.24 (0.21 when analyzing PRD ID instead) chances
of being a target and a non-recipient with the same past behavior 0.07 (0.07 also when analyzing
PRD ID instead). Similarly, remittance recipients have a higher predicted probability of being PRD
targets than non-recipients when both types do not favor the PAN nor the PRI (in Tables 5.4 and
5.6 for PAN orientation, and 5.8 and 5.10 for PRI orientation). Generally though, these differences
tend be quite small. On the flip side, given non-PRD orientation or opposition and indifference
14 Interestingly, given non-remittance recipients, the PRI is more likely to target PRI supporters.
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ideology, differences in the predicted probabilities of remittance recipients and non-recipients are
really small (e.g., 0.07 for recipients and 0.05 for non-recipients). And these small differences in
the predicted probabilities of remittance recipients and non-recipients hold when comparing both
types of respondents and the same PAN or PRI inclination. In short, the main result is that the
PRD participates in the mobilization of remittance recipients that are supporters.
In sum, the main takeaway points for this section are: i) the PAN is more likely to target
remittance recipients, and especially, ii) the PAN targets with a higher predicted probability re-
mittance recipients than non-recipients given PAN supporters, iii) the PAN is more likely to target
remittance recipients than non-recipients, given non-PAN sympathizers and especially PRD past
electoral supporters (which is not surprising given the tight competition between PAN and PRD in
the 2006 elections), iv) the PRD is more likely to target remittance recipients given PRD support-
ers, and v) PRI’s behavior does not lead to any conclusive remark about the this party’s treatment
of remittance recipient and non-recipients. Overall, these results are quite consistent with hypoth-
esis 1-3. Essentially, the PAN mobilizes its core supporters with intentions to stay home (H1), and
persuades to change party non-supporters, especially those voters that favored and are mobilized by
a key contender (the PRD in his case, H3). Interestingly, the PAN puts similar efforts in targeting
these two different sets of voters (i.e., PAN inclined and PAN non-inclined voters). Finally, the
PRD also mobilizes its core supporters with intentions to stay home (H2). With respect to PRI
targeting, results are not supportive of H2, which potentially might be due to the PRI’s lack of
coordinated party efforts during these elections.
5.3.2 Family Abroad
Table 5.15 takes a first look at the extent to which having close relatives in the US predicts
experiencing electoral targeting (home visits and clientelism), when controlling for other relevant
factors such as wealth and age. Interestingly, this table indicates that being part of a migrant
family reports a positive and statistically significant relationship with being a PAN (Model 3) and
a PRD (Model 4) target. This positive relationship is also present for PRI targeting but it does not
reach statistically significant results. In addition, looking at predicted probabilities15 for a better
15 As in the previous section, I report predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals, and calculate them
using all variables at their means with the exception of the size of the place variable for which I use two different
estimations: i) one that employs the mixed areas (as opposed to rural and urban areas) as the reference category
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comparison of respondents with family abroad and those without it, everything else equal, table
5.16 shows that members of migrant families have overall a higher predicted probability of being
electoral targets (albeit a small difference), regardless of the targeting party (i.e., experiencing
any target). Yet when looking at parties individually, while this difference between migration and
non-migration-exposed respondents is no longer present for PRI targets, the predicted probability
of being a target is higher for migration-exposed voters in the case of PAN and PRD targeting
(especially when using the ‘mean size of place’ to calculate the predicted probabilities). As for
the other predictors, results are comparable to those in the analysis of remittance recipients vs.
non-recipients.
Since those with family in the US also vary in their ideological orientation, I follow the same
approach as for remittance recipients. Obviously, taking ideology into account is also essential
for the hypothesis test put forward in this chapter. To start, I explore respondent’s identification
with the incumbent PAN party (i.e., voted PAN last elections in table 5.17 and PAN identity in
table 5.19). While these analysis do not show any statistically significant results in the case of
past electoral behavior (Table 5.17), Table 5.19 shows that i) having family abroad and a PAN
ID increase the chances of experiencing a PAN target (Model 3), and ii) having family abroad
and not a PAN ID increase the chances of experiencing a PRD target (Model 4). These results
therefore point toward the notion that the PAN targets members of migrant families who are PAN
supporters, but the PRD targets members of migrant families who are not PAN supporters.
Additionally, I explore respondents’ identification with the PRI party, including information
about voting for the PRI in the past presidential elections (results in table 5.21) as well as PRI
ID (results in table 5.23). Interestingly, table 5.21 shows that being a member of a migrant family
that did not vote for the PRI in the past increases the probability of experiencing PAN (Model
3). This result therefore hints at the idea that the PAN approaches those migration-exposed voters
that do not favor the other contestant PRI. When analyzing PRI ID to explain targeting in table
5.23, results are pretty much the same and in addition show that a PRI ID increases the chances
of experiencing a PRI target (Model 2). Furthermore, tables 5.25 and 5.27 show the results for
performing the same analysis as before but looking at having voted for the PRD in the last elections
(mixed areas), and another that gives these categories values from 1 to 3 according to size (1-rural, 2-mixed, 3-urban)
and then uses the mean value to calculate the corresponding probability (mean size of place).
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and holding PRD ID. In these tables, the main result is that incumbent PAN and, quite surprisingly,
the opposing PRD target those respondents with family in the US that are not PRD sympathizers
(Model 3 and 4 in both tables).
In order to understand the overall effect of having a certain political ideology and the distinction
between migrant and non-migrant families on electoral targeting, I report predicted probabilities
(with 95% confidence intervals).16 The following points are worth emphasizing:
First, given PAN/incumbent identity, the incumbent PAN party is more likely to target a
member of a migrant family than a similar respondent who does not have close relatives in the
US (in tables 5.18 and 5.20). This relationship holds especially when looking at current PAN ID.
For example, a migration-exposed voter that currently identifies with the PAN has a predicted
probability of being a PAN target of 0.15 (0.14 in the PAN last elections analysis), while a non-
migration-exposed respondent with the same political orientation has 0.06 chances (0.09 also in
the PAN last elections analysis). Of course, this previous result also translates into member of
migrant families having a higher predicted probability of experiencing PAN targeting when they
do not favor the PRI (Tables 5.22 and 5.24) nor the PRD (Tables 5.26 and 5.28). For example, a
migration-exposed voter that did not vote for the PRI in 2000 has a predicted probability of being
a PAN target of 0.12 (0.11 when looking at current PRI ID instead) while for a non-migration-
exposed voter with the same past electoral behavior this probability decreases to 0.08 (0.07 when
looking at PRI ID). Likewise, a member of a migrant family that did not vote for the PRD has a
predicted probability of being a PAN target of 0.12 (0.12 when looking at current PRD ID instead)
while for those who do not have close relatives living in the US but voted the same way have 0.09
(0.08 when using PRD ID). These differences are statistically significant when using ‘mean size of
place’ to calculate the corresponding predicted probabilities.
Second, given overall non-PAN inclination (i.e., non-PAN last elections and non-PAN ID) or
opposition and indifferent identity, the incumbent PAN party targets respondents with family in
the US with a higher predicted probability than similar respondents without family in a foreign
16 I calculate these probabilities using of course the distinction between recipients and non-recipients as well as
whether or not a respondent has a particular political ID. In addition, I take all other variables at their means with
the exception of the ‘size of the place’ variable for which I implement two different estimations: i) one that employs
the mixed areas (as opposed to rural and urban areas) as the reference category (i.e., referred to as ‘mixed areas’ in
tables), and another that gives these categories values from 1 to 3 according to size (1-rural, 2-mixed, 3-urban) and
then uses the mean value to calculate the corresponding probability (i.e., referred to as ‘mean size of place’ in tables).
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country (Tables 5.18 and 5.20). But differences between the two types are quite small and not
statistically significant. In addition, I explore further if the incumbent PAN targets migration-
exposed voters that identity with any of the key contenders (i.e., PRI supporters in Tables 5.22
and 5.24, PRD supporters in Tables 5.26 and 5.28). These results also indicate that the members
of migrant families have a higher probability of being PAN targets when they identify with the
PRI and the PRD than respondent with the same political orientation but without families in the
US. In general, however, these differences are not substantial. Thus far, the PAN is more likely to
target members of migrant families that are supporters (or non-opposition supporters) than similar
members of non-migrant families (especially when looking at PAN ID).
And how about the behavior of the parties in opposition PRI and PRD? With respect to PRI
electoral targeting, and given those respondents that identify with this party (i.e, voted PRI last
elections and PRI ID), members of migrant families have a higher predicted probability of being
PRI targets than similar non-migrant ones (in Tables 5.22 and 5.24). For instance, a migration-
exposed citizen that voted for the PRI in 2000 has a 0.20 (0.15 when analyzing PRI ID instead)
chances of being a PRI target and a non-migration one with the same past behavior 0.15 (0.14
when analyzing PRI ID instead). But of course these differences are small. Moreover, the PRI also
does not make strong distinctions between respondents with and without family in the US when
both types do not support the PAN (Tables 5.18 and 5.20) or the PRD (Tables 5.26 and 5.28). On
the other hand, given non-PRI orientation, non-migration-exposed voters have a higher predicted
probability of being PRI targets than similar migration-exposed ones (e.g., 0.09 for recipients and
0.11 for non-recipients), but overall differences are also quite small. These small differences in
the predicted probabilities of migration and non-migration-exposed voters are also present when
looking alternatively at PAN and PRD sympathizers. In short, results indicate that the PRI does
not make strong distinctions between migrant and non-migrant families.
Finally, analyzing PRD targeting, and given those respondents that identify with this party
(i.e, voted PRD last elections and PRD ID), results indicate that differences in the predicted
probabilities of being PRD targets for these two types of respondents are small (in Tables 5.26 and
5.28). For instance, a migration-exposed citizen that voted for the PRD in 2000 has a 0.08 (0.10
when analyzing PRD ID instead) chances of being a target and a non-migration exposed with the
same past behavior 0.10 (0.08 also when analyzing PRD ID instead). These results are similar when
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comparing members of migrant and non-migrant families that do not favor the PAN nor the PRI
(in Tables 5.18 and 5.20 for PAN orientation, and 5.22 and 5.24 for PRI orientation). Although
generally, members of migrant families have a higher predicted probability of being electoral targets.
In addition, given non-PRD orientation or opposition and indifference ideology, members of migrant
families have a higher predicted probability of being PRD targets, but again differences between
the two types of respondents are not very large (e.g., 0.07 for respondents with family in the US
and 0.04 for those without it when looking at those respondents that did not vote for the PRD in
the past). Interestingly, this difference is statistically significant when using the ‘mean size of the
place’ to calculate the corresponding predicted probabilities. Further, exploring identification with
the PRI and the PAN, these results show that the PRD targets members of migrant families with
a higher predicted probability than non-migrant families. For example, given PRI sympathizers,
respondents with family members in the US experience PRD targeting with a 0.07 probability,
while for those without relatives abroad this probability is 0.03. Altogether, these results suggest
that the PRD targets members of migrant families with a higher predicted probability than similar
members of non-migrant families. This pattern holds across PRD supporters and non-supporters.
In sum, the main takeaway point for this section is that the incumbent PAN is more likely
to target members of migrant families that identify with this party, which is consistent with H1
or turnout buying of PAN supporters. In addition, the PRD targets members of migrant families
with a higher predicted probability, including both supporters or non-supporters. The differences
between migration and non-migration exposed voters are however not always statistically significant
in the case of PRD targets. Further, this same analysis does not lead to strong conclusions with
respect to PRI’s behavior and the targeting of migrant families versus non-migrant ones.
5.3.3 Alternative Dependent Variable
One can wonder the extent to which the previous results rely on analyzing only those respondents
that participated in the three waves of the study. To address this potential concern, I run the
same analysis as in the previous section but using a different dependent variable. This dependent
variables gives as before the value of 1 to those respondents that experienced electoral targeting at
any point during the panel study, and 0 to those who did not. The main difference however is that
this variable no longer excludes those respondents that dropped from participating in subsequent
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waves, but instead, gives them the value of 0 for those waves in which they did not participate.
Of course, this approach introduces more non-targeted observations (even though whether or not
these citizens were targets is actually unknown), and makes it a priori harder to find results.
The empirical analysis nonetheless suggests that the relationships previously found are also
present when using this alternative dependent variable.17 In particular, and with respect to the
comparison remittance recipients versus non-recipients, Tables 5.29 and 5.30 show that remittance
recipients are more likely to be PAN targets than non-recipients everything else equal. In addi-
tion, when incorporating political orientation, Tables 5.31 and 5.32 indicate that i) given PAN
supporters, the PAN targets remittance recipients with a higher predicted probability than similar
non-recipients, and ii) this party is also more likely to target remittance recipients given non-PAN
supporters. Additionally, Tables 5.33 and 5.34 present that, given PRD orientation, i) the PAN
targets remittance recipients with a higher predicted probability, and ii) the PRD is more likely to
target remittance recipients than non-recipients (especially when looking at PRD ID). These results
therefore suggest that the PAN mobilizes core supporters and tries to vote buy some non-supporters,
while the PRD practices turnout buying of party sympathizers.
With respect to the contrast between members and non-members of migrant families, the main
findings still hold. Essentially, respondents with family in the US are more likely PAN targets than
those without relatives abroad (see Tables 5.35 and 5.36). Moreover, given PAN supporters, this
same party is also more likely to target members of migrant families than non-members everything
else equal (especially when looking at PAN ID) (See Tables 5.37 and 5.38). In other words, the
PAN participates in the turnout buying of migrant families. Consequently, results are overall quite
consistent when using this alternative measure of the dependent variable.
17 For this analysis, I use weights from wave 2 when analyzing remittance recipients/non-recipients and weights
from wave 1 when analyzing respondents with/without family in the US. The reason is that the question about
remittances was only asked in the second wave. Therefore, when using this migration variable for the regression
analysis we are missing those respondents that did not participate in the second wave. Hence, that is the motivation
to use the weights from wave 2. In addition, since the dependent variable gets the value of 0 for those respondents that
did not participate in subsequent waves (i.e., wave 2 and wave 3), we are not loosing observations in the analysis due
to the dependent variable. And that also motivates conditioning the selection of weights according to the migration
variables as opposed to the dependent variable.
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5.3.4 Robustness Checks
As in the previous chapter, in this section I analyze the extent to which the previous findings
are robust to the following tests: i) controlling for additional confounding factors, ii) alternative
explanations, and iii) threats to causal inference.
To start, I control for an additional set of variables, in particular: evaluation of President’s
performance, frequency of church attendance, frequency of political talk, alternative measure of
the size of place and geographic location. Tables 5.39 to 5.50 test whether the main results of
the previous section hold when including these additional controls. As these tables shows, the
following patterns are still present: i) the PAN targets remittances recipients who are supporters
with a higher predicted probability than similar non-recipients (using both PAN last elections and
PAN ID) (Tables 5.39, 5.40, 5.41 and 5.42), ii) the PAN is more likely to target remittance recipients
than similar non recipients, given non-PAN sympathizers and especially PRD supporters (Tables
5.43, 5.45, 5.44 and 5.46), iii) the PRD is more likely to target remittance recipients given PRD
supporters (Tables 5.43, 5.45, 5.44 and 5.46). On the contrary, when including these additional
controls, the analysis no longer supports the finding that the PAN is more likely to target migrant
families that are supporters than similar non-migrant ones with the same political orientation
(Tables 5.47, 5.48, 5.49 and 5.50). Nonetheless, the same pattern of targeting holds, that is, the
PAN targets members of migrant families with PAN ID with a higher predicted probability than
non-members of migrant families, everything else equal.18
Also as in Chapter 4, in addition to taking into account other factors that could mask the
connection between exposure to migration and electoral targeting, these additional variables also
deal with alternative explanations. Particularly, one of these is that migration-exposed voters are
electoral targets because of their social connectedness and political influence. However, results
hold when controlling for frequency of political talk, which is arguably necessary to exercise the
role of political influencer, and for church attendance, which captures as well respondents’ social
connectivity.
Additionally, in order to test if findings are due to migration-exposed voters reporting more
targeting than similar non-recipient ones, I compare these migration and non-migration exposed
18 All these predicted probabilities in the “Additional Figures and Tables” section are calculated as before, that is
with all variables at their means and, in addition, using “center” as the geographic region of reference.
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voters with respect to two answers about the quality of elections in Mexico: the extent to which
elections are clean (from 1- Nothing to 4- Totally) and whether or not Mexico is a democracy.
Certainly, one would expect that if migration-exposed voters tend to be more susceptible to these
strategies and report them more, they should also be more inclined to characterize Mexico as not
having clean elections and as not being a democracy. Yet, a simple look at the data does not support
this intuition. In particular, the correlations between being a remittance recipient and evaluations
of clean elections and democracy are always positive. And the same positive relationship exists
when looking at respondents with family in the US and their evaluations of Mexico’s elections
and democracy. Accordingly, it is plausible to lower the concerns about attitudes toward electoral
practices being the factors behind this chapter’s findings.
Finally, I address some commons threats to causal inference: omitted variable bias, selection
bias and endogeneity or reverse causality. With respect to omitted variables bias, the main concern
is that some unobservable factor is the one connecting international migration and more electoral
targeting. In the previous chapter, I addressed this issue by controlling for risk acceptance at-
titudes and showing that the statistically significant results for exposure to migration and more
electoral targeting hold. Unfortunately, the 2006 dataset does not have any questions about risk
acceptance attitudes, which makes it impossible to follow the same approach as for the 2000 elec-
tions. Nonetheless one can argue that if results hold in 2000 when controlling for this unobserved
characteristic, this personal feature should not affect the robustness of the results in 2006. As for
selection bias, I direct the reader to this section of the previous chapter since the same reasoning
applies to the 2006 analysis.
To conclude this section, I address reverse causality concerns. A clear case of reserve causality
applies to being an electoral target and identifying with a particular party. For instance, PAN
targets lead these targets to identifying themselves as having PAN ID. Of course, this issue is less
of a concern in this analysis because of the panel format of the 2006 dataset and the fact that
we have party ID from wave 1 (in October), and electoral targeting happened most intensively as
election day was approaching (in July). In any case, I exploit respondents’ behavior in the previous
elections to further deal with this problem. Particularly, 61% of respondents did not vote for the
PAN in the previous presidential elections of 2000, and of those a 1% were PAN targets during
the first wave. What is interesting to explore is if those targeted switched to PAN ID after not
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having previously voted for the PAN and thus fostering endogeneity concerns. However, a simple
look at the data indicates that targeting was not that effective since of the 1% targeted, 76% still
responded not having PAN ID while 23% had PAN ID. And in general, we are dealing with a very
small number of respondents since targeting during this period was minimal.
Similarly, in the case of the PRI, 79% of respondents did not vote for the PRI in the previous
presidential elections of 2000, but of those respondents 3% were PRI targets during the first wave.
Of this 3% targeted, 80% did not respond having a PRI ID in wave 1, while only 20% did. And
for the PRD, 88% of respondents did not vote for the PRD in the previous presidential elections
of 2000, but 2% of those were PRD targets. Of this 2% targeted, 77% did not respond having a
PRD ID in wave 1, while only 23% did. In short, this simple analysis can lower the concerns about
endogeneity driving the chapter’s findings.
5.3.5 Extensions to the Existing Analysis
Strong or Weak Supporters and Strong or Weak Non-Supporters?
As in Chapter 4, it is plausible to ask if when political parties mobilize their supporters, they
target those who strongly or weakly identify with the party. Similarly, one can ask if when political
parties target non-supporters, they attempt to get the votes of those who weakly or strongly identify
with the contender. To address these questions, I run the same models as in the previous section
(i.e., full models with additional control variables and participants of all waves) but using a party ID
variable that not-only identifies supporters and non-supporters but also captures if those are strong
or weak supporters and non-supporters (0- Not a party supporter, 1- Weakly party supporter, and
2- Strong party supporter supporter, all from in wave 1). I only run this analysis for the comparison
of respondents with/without family in the US and not in the case of remittances recipients/non-
recipients. The reason is that given the lower number of remittance recipient in our sample, any
claim based on the distinction between strong and weak identifiers would be relying on a small
number of respondents and hence its validity would be questionable.
The analysis considering strong and weak party supporters, however does not lead to strong
conclusions. Essentially, when the PAN targets PAN supporters, there are no statistically significant
differences between strong and weak PAN-inclined migrant and non-migrant families. To be precise,
the predicted probability of being a PAN target increases substantially for those who are strong
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supporters (0.24 for respondents with family in the US and 0.18 for those without) as opposed to
weak supporters (0.12 for respondents with family in the US and 0.06 for those without). Yet, this
increase happens for both respondents with and without family in the US. Thus, one can claim
that the PAN is more likely to target strong supporters than weak supporters, but without making
claims about the distinction between migration and non-migration-exposed voters in that respect.19
In addition, no other result with respect to the behavior of the other parties - PRI and PRD - and
political identities - PRI ID and PRD ID - is worth highlighting.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter provides interesting findings on the relationship between political parties’ electoral
strategies and migrant families.
On the one hand, the incumbent PAN uses non-programmatic targeting to participate in the
turnout buying of remittance recipients supporters. Put differently, the PAN targets PAN sup-
porters than receive remittances with a higher predicted probability than similar non-recipients.
This finding is also present for those respondents who have family members living in the US. In
addition, this party is more likely to target migration-exposed voters who favored the opposition.
That is, the PAN uses also non-programmatic strategies to persuade or buy the votes of migrant
families that favor the opposing parties, especially the PRD. Altogether, this chapter’s findings
suggest that the incumbency advantage gave the PAN the possibility to target not only supporters
with intentions to stay home (i.e., remittance recipients and respondents with family in the US)
but also mobilized opposition supporters, especially those sympathizers of the main competitor
during these 2006 elections. On the other, the opposing PRD employs non-programmatic targeting
to participate in the turnout buying of remittance recipients who are supporters. In other words,
the PRD is more likely to mobilize remittance recipients that identify with that party than sim-
ilar non-recipients with the same political orientation. This finding is not present in the case of
respondents with family in the US.
Finally, this chapter has not found any strong relationship between the PRI electoral targeting
and the distinction between migration and non-migration exposed voters. Of course, the fact that
19 Results not shown in full detail for simplicity and due to the lack of statistically significant results.
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the PRI candidate - Madrazo - did not count on the workings of the PRI machine to deliver votes
could explain the this lack of findings. In the next chapter, I explore whether or not these strategies
had an effect on voters’ electoral choices and most importantly, if this influence was different for
migration and non-migration exposed citizens.
5.5 Figures and Tables
Table 5.1: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Remittances w2 0.323† 0.084 0.674∗∗∗ 0.278
(0.177) (0.217) (0.202) (0.234)
Education 0.020 0.027 0.009 0.042
(0.031) (0.038) (0.039) (0.042)
Age 0.007 0.011∗ 0.010∗ 0.009†
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Women 0.159 0.201 0.075 0.338∗
(0.122) (0.148) (0.151) (0.167)
Wealth 0.067† 0.050 0.161∗∗ −0.021
(0.037) (0.045) (0.049) (0.050)
Rural Location −0.078 0.171 −0.013 0.121
(0.245) (0.315) (0.338) (0.384)
Urban Location 0.673∗∗ 0.669∗ 0.696∗ 0.939∗∗
(0.213) (0.278) (0.290) (0.337)
Constant −2.052∗∗∗ −2.999∗∗∗ −3.575∗∗∗ −3.276∗∗∗
(0.361) (0.451) (0.476) (0.519)
Observations 1,361 1,361 1,361 1,361
Log Likelihood −931.981 −718.530 −683.068 −560.415
AIC 1,879.962 1,453.060 1,382.136 1,136.831
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 5.2: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances
Mixed areas Any Targets PRI Targets PAN Targets PRD Targets
Remittances 0.28 (0.19, 0.39) 0.12 (0.06, 0.20) 0.17 (0.09, 0.27) 0.08 (0.04, 0.16)
No Remittances 0.22 (0.16, 0.29) 0.11 (0.06, 0.17) 0.09 (0.05, 0.15) 0.06 (0.03, 0.12)
Mean size Any Targets PRI Targets PAN Targets PRD Targets
Remittances 0.37 (0.30, 0.45) 0.18 (0.13, 0.24) 0.24 (0.18, 0.31) 0.15 (0.10, 0.22)
No Remittances 0.30 (0.27, 0.33) 0.16 (0.14, 0.19) 0.14 (0.12, 0.16) 0.12 (0.10, 0.14)
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Table 5.3: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PAN Last Elections
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Remittances w2 * PAN Last Elections −0.127 0.455 −0.363 0.066
(0.375) (0.444) (0.424) (0.480)
Remittances w2 0.342 −0.057 0.815∗∗ 0.311
(0.239) (0.297) (0.275) (0.319)
PAN Last Elections 0.187 −0.143 0.219 0.062
(0.137) (0.166) (0.173) (0.187)
Education 0.016 0.029 0.016 0.026
(0.033) (0.040) (0.041) (0.045)
Age 0.007 0.012∗ 0.012∗ 0.009
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Women 0.153 0.207 0.088 0.320†
(0.128) (0.154) (0.158) (0.174)
Wealth 0.054 0.041 0.123∗ −0.017
(0.040) (0.048) (0.051) (0.053)
Rural Location 0.084 0.292 0.042 0.385
(0.254) (0.319) (0.345) (0.408)
Urban Location 0.654∗∗ 0.610∗ 0.632∗ 1.037∗∗
(0.220) (0.282) (0.294) (0.363)
Constant −2.001∗∗∗ −2.901∗∗∗ −3.494∗∗∗ −3.299∗∗∗
(0.379) (0.468) (0.494) (0.553)
Observations 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206
Log Likelihood −842.392 −657.170 −619.369 −507.427
AIC 1,704.784 1,334.340 1,258.738 1,034.854
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 5.4: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PAN Last Elections
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Remittances 0.16 (0.08, 0.31) 0.18 (0.10, 0.32)
Non-Remittances 0.11 (0.06, 0.18) 0.09 (0.05, 0.15)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Remittances 0.23 (0.14, 0.36) 0.26 (0.18, 0.36)
Non-Remittances 0.16 (0.13, 0.20) 0.13 (0.11, 0.16)
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Remittances 0.15 (0.07, 0.29) 0.11 (0.06, 0.22)
Non-Remittances 0.11 (0.06, 0.17) 0.12 (0.07, 0.19)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Remittances 0.23 (0.14, 0.35) 0.18 (0.11, 0.27)
Non-Remittances 0.16 (0.13, 0.20) 0.18 (0.15, 0.21)
PRD Targets (mixed areas) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Remittances 0.09 (0.03, 0.20) 0.08 (0.03, 0.17)
Non-Remittances 0.06 (0.03, 0.12) 0.06 (0.03, 0.11)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Remittances 0.18 (0.10, 0.30) 0.16 (0.10, 0.25)
Non-Remittances 0.13 (0.10, 0.16) 0.12 (0.09, 0.15)
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Table 5.5: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PAN ID
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Remittances w2 * PAN ID 0.237 0.590 −0.149 −0.479
(0.400) (0.483) (0.447) (0.569)
Remittances w2 0.284 −0.040 0.749∗∗ 0.399
(0.207) (0.255) (0.237) (0.265)
PAN ID −0.150 −0.409∗ 0.172 −0.019
(0.147) (0.188) (0.179) (0.197)
Education 0.018 0.020 0.022 0.037
(0.032) (0.039) (0.039) (0.043)
Age 0.007† 0.010∗ 0.012∗ 0.010†
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Women 0.157 0.199 0.077 0.352∗
(0.124) (0.151) (0.154) (0.169)
Wealth 0.059 0.049 0.145∗∗ −0.015
(0.038) (0.046) (0.050) (0.051)
Rural Location −0.034 0.216 0.019 0.172
(0.245) (0.315) (0.339) (0.385)
Urban Location 0.701∗∗ 0.694∗ 0.689∗ 0.970∗∗
(0.214) (0.279) (0.291) (0.338)
Constant −1.995∗∗∗ −2.876∗∗∗ −3.665∗∗∗ −3.311∗∗∗
(0.368) (0.460) (0.485) (0.529)
Observations 1,311 1,311 1,311 1,311
Log Likelihood −907.465 −694.399 −662.281 −549.493
AIC 1,834.931 1,408.798 1,344.561 1,118.985
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 5.6: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PAN ID
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Remittances 0.17 (0.08, 0.34) 0.17 (0.09, 0.29)
Non-Remittances 0.10 (0.06, 0.17) 0.09 (0.05, 0.14)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Remittances 0.25 (0.14, 0.41) 0.25 (0.18, 0.33)
Non-Remittances 0.15 (0.12, 0.20) 0.13 (0.11, 0.16)
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Remittances 0.13 (0.05, 0.27) 0.11 (0.06, 0.20)
Non-Remittances 0.08 (0.04, 0.14) 0.11 (0.07, 0.18)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Remittances 0.20 (0.11, 0.35) 0.17 (0.11, 0.25)
Non-Remittances 0.12 (0.09, 0.17) 0.18 (0.15, 0.21)
PRD Targets (mixed areas) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Remittances 0.06 (0.02, 0.16) 0.09 (0.04, 0.18)
Non-Remittances 0.06 (0.03, 0.12) 0.06 (0.03, 0.11)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Remittances 0.11 (0.04, 0.25) 0.17 (0.11, 0.25)
Non-Remittances 0.12 (0.09, 0.16) 0.12 (0.10, 0.14)
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Table 5.7: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PRI Last Elections
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Remittances w2 * PRI Last Elections −0.450 −0.535 −0.171 −0.999
(0.423) (0.485) (0.481) (0.627)
Remittances w2 0.402† 0.307 0.698∗∗ 0.560∗
(0.214) (0.262) (0.242) (0.266)
PRI Last Elections 0.262 0.727∗∗∗ 0.092 0.157
(0.161) (0.182) (0.206) (0.217)
Education 0.027 0.035 0.026 0.035
(0.033) (0.040) (0.041) (0.045)
Age 0.007† 0.010† 0.013∗ 0.010†
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Women 0.148 0.177 0.086 0.320†
(0.128) (0.155) (0.158) (0.174)
Wealth 0.059 0.047 0.126∗ −0.019
(0.039) (0.048) (0.051) (0.053)
Rural Location 0.066 0.206 0.047 0.390
(0.254) (0.322) (0.345) (0.409)
Urban Location 0.668∗∗ 0.636∗ 0.635∗ 1.047∗∗
(0.220) (0.283) (0.293) (0.363)
Constant −2.091∗∗∗ −3.103∗∗∗ −3.522∗∗∗ −3.395∗∗∗
(0.381) (0.477) (0.495) (0.556)
Observations 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206
Log Likelihood −841.361 −647.053 −620.756 −504.971
AIC 1,702.721 1,314.106 1,261.512 1,029.942
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 5.8: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PRI Last Elections
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Remittances 0.17 (0.07, 0.34) 0.18 (0.10, 0.30)
Non-Remittances 0.10 (0.06, 0.18) 0.10 (0.06, 0.16)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Remittances 0.24 (0.13, 0.40) 0.25 (0.18, 0.34)
Non-Remittances 0.15 (0.11, 0.21) 0.14 (0.12, 0.17)
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Remittances 0.15 (0.06, 0.31) 0.13 (0.06, 0.23)
Non-Remittances 0.18 (0.11, 0.28) 0.09 (0.06, 0.15)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Remittances 0.22 (0.12, 0.38) 0.19 (0.13, 0.28)
Non-Remittances 0.26 (0.21, 0.32) 0.14 (0.12, 0.17)
PRD Targets (mixed areas) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Remittances 0.04 (0.01, 0.14) 0.10 (0.04, 0.20)
Non-Remittances 0.06 (0.03, 0.13) 0.06 (0.03, 0.11)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Remittances 0.09 (0.03, 0.24) 0.19 (0.13, 0.28)
Non-Remittances 0.14 (0.10, 0.19) 0.12 (0.10, 0.14)
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Table 5.9: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PRI ID
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Remittances w2 * PRI ID −0.665 −0.333 −0.253 −1.035
(0.419) (0.478) (0.466) (0.704)
Remittances w2 0.519∗ 0.247 0.783∗∗∗ 0.451†
(0.205) (0.258) (0.233) (0.256)
PRI ID 0.206 0.595∗∗∗ 0.234 −0.183
(0.146) (0.169) (0.185) (0.206)
Education 0.025 0.036 0.024 0.040
(0.032) (0.039) (0.039) (0.043)
Age 0.008† 0.010∗ 0.012∗ 0.011†
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Women 0.147 0.157 0.061 0.366∗
(0.124) (0.152) (0.155) (0.170)
Wealth 0.058 0.053 0.151∗∗ −0.025
(0.038) (0.046) (0.050) (0.051)
Rural Location −0.011 0.213 0.027 0.215
(0.246) (0.318) (0.340) (0.385)
Urban Location 0.713∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗ 0.722∗ 0.940∗∗
(0.214) (0.281) (0.292) (0.338)
Constant −2.147∗∗∗ −3.267∗∗∗ −3.739∗∗∗ −3.264∗∗∗
(0.375) (0.472) (0.493) (0.535)
Observations 1,311 1,311 1,311 1,311
Log Likelihood −905.907 −691.477 −662.678 −545.749
AIC 1,831.813 1,402.954 1,345.356 1,111.499
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 5.10: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PRI ID
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Remittances 0.16 (0.07, 0.33) 0.17 (0.09, 0.28)
Non-Remittances 0.10 (0.06, 0.17) 0.08 (0.05, 0.14)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Remittances 0.25 (0.14, 0.41) 0.25 (0.18, 0.33)
Non-Remittances 0.16 (0.12, 0.20) 0.13 (0.11, 0.15)
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Remittances 0.13 (0.06, 0.28) 0.11 (0.05, 0.19)
Non-Remittances 0.15 (0.09, 0.23) 0.08 (0.05, 0.14)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Remittances 0.22 (0.12, 0.37) 0.17 (0.11, 0.25)
Non-Remittances 0.23 (0.18, 0.27) 0.14 (0.12, 0.16)
PRD Targets (mixed areas) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Remittances 0.03 (0.00, 0.12) 0.10 (0.05, 0.20)
Non-Remittances 0.05 (0.03, 0.11) 0.07 (0.03, 0.12)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Remittances 0.06 (0.02, 0.20) 0.19 (0.12, 0.27)
Non-Remittances 0.10 (0.07, 0.14) 0.12 (0.10, 0.15)
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Table 5.11: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PRD Last Elections
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Remittances w2 * PRD Last Elections 1.361∗ 0.974 0.694 1.141
(0.654) (0.757) (0.725) (0.702)
Remittances w2 0.168 0.060 0.597∗∗ 0.212
(0.194) (0.232) (0.220) (0.259)
PRD Last Elections −0.212 −0.565† −0.269 0.281
(0.244) (0.334) (0.320) (0.301)
Education 0.022 0.024 0.024 0.026
(0.033) (0.040) (0.040) (0.045)
Age 0.008† 0.012∗ 0.013∗ 0.009
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Women 0.157 0.204 0.087 0.333†
(0.128) (0.154) (0.158) (0.174)
Wealth 0.059 0.043 0.127∗ −0.018
(0.039) (0.047) (0.051) (0.053)
Rural Location 0.073 0.275 0.045 0.372
(0.254) (0.319) (0.345) (0.410)
Urban Location 0.667∗∗ 0.605∗ 0.632∗ 1.077∗∗
(0.221) (0.282) (0.294) (0.365)
Constant −2.011∗∗∗ −2.886∗∗∗ −3.483∗∗∗ −3.330∗∗∗
(0.379) (0.468) (0.492) (0.554)
Observations 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206
Log Likelihood −840.758 −655.893 −620.210 −504.117
AIC 1,701.517 1,331.786 1,260.420 1,028.233
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 5.12: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PRD Last Elections
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances 0.24 (0.08, 0.55) 0.17 (0.09, 0.29)
Non-Remittances 0.08 (0.03, 0.16) 0.10 (0.06, 0.16)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances 0.33 (0.13, 0.63) 0.24 (0.18, 0.32)
Non-Remittances 0.12 (0.06, 0.20) 0.15 (0.12, 0.17)
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances 0.18 (0.05, 0.47) 0.13 (0.07, 0.22)
Non-Remittances 0.07 (0.03, 0.15) 0.12 (0.07, 0.19)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances 0.26 (0.09, 0.56) 0.19 (0.13, 0.27)
Non-Remittances 0.11 (0.06, 0.19) 0.18 (0.16, 0.21)
PRD Targets (mixed areas) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances 0.24 (0.08, 0.54) 0.07 (0.03, 0.15)
Non-Remittances 0.07 (0.03, 0.16) 0.05 (0.03, 0.11)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances 0.42 (0.18, 0.70) 0.15 (0.10, 0.22)
Non-Remittances 0.15 (0.09, 0.24) 0.12 (0.10, 0.14)
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Table 5.13: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PRD ID
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Remittances w2 * PRD ID 0.560 0.600 0.155 1.268∗
(0.447) (0.562) (0.544) (0.528)
Remittances w2 0.238 0.021 0.688∗∗ −0.041
(0.198) (0.240) (0.222) (0.287)
PRD ID −0.014 −0.417† −0.283 0.230
(0.176) (0.235) (0.239) (0.228)
Education 0.019 0.026 0.021 0.034
(0.032) (0.039) (0.039) (0.043)
Age 0.007† 0.010∗ 0.012∗ 0.010†
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Women 0.172 0.192 0.064 0.413∗
(0.124) (0.151) (0.155) (0.172)
Wealth 0.060 0.042 0.146∗∗ −0.008
(0.038) (0.046) (0.050) (0.051)
Rural Location −0.018 0.214 0.014 0.229
(0.246) (0.315) (0.339) (0.387)
Urban Location 0.708∗∗∗ 0.678∗ 0.695∗ 1.019∗∗
(0.214) (0.279) (0.291) (0.341)
Constant −2.061∗∗∗ −2.891∗∗∗ −3.563∗∗∗ −3.500∗∗∗
(0.370) (0.460) (0.485) (0.537)
Observations 1,311 1,311 1,311 1,311
Log Likelihood −906.398 −696.791 −662.622 −542.539
AIC 1,832.796 1,413.583 1,345.244 1,105.078
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 5.14: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PRD ID
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Remittances 0.15 (0.06, 0.34) 0.17 (0.10, 0.29)
Non-Remittances 0.07 (0.03, 0.13) 0.09 (0.05, 0.15)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Remittances 0.22 (0.10, 0.41) 0.25 (0.18, 0.34)
Non-Remittances 0.11 (0.07, 0.16) 0.14 (0.12, 0.17)
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Remittances 0.13 (0.05, 0.30) 0.11 (0.06, 0.20)
Non-Remittances 0.07 (0.04, 0.14) 0.11 (0.07, 0.18)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Remittances 0.20 (0.09, 0.38) 0.18 (0.12, 0.25)
Non-Remittances 0.12 (0.08, 0.17) 0.17 (0.15, 0.20)
PRD Targets (mixed areas) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Remittances 0.21 (0.09, 0.41) 0.05 (0.02, 0.12)
Non-Remittances 0.07 (0.03, 0.14) 0.06 (0.03, 0.11)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Remittances 0.35 (0.20, 0.54) 0.11 (0.07, 0.18)
Non-Remittances 0.14 (0.10, 0.20) 0.11 (0.09, 0.14)
Table 5.15: Family US and Electoral Target
Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US 0.110 0.0002 0.403∗∗ 0.376∗
(0.121) (0.145) (0.153) (0.166)
Education 0.008 0.013 −0.008 0.027
(0.031) (0.037) (0.038) (0.042)
Age 0.006 0.009† 0.010∗ 0.009
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Women 0.152 0.187 0.058 0.315†
(0.122) (0.147) (0.151) (0.166)
Wealth 0.071† 0.060 0.150∗∗ −0.030
(0.038) (0.046) (0.049) (0.050)
Rural Location −0.067 0.165 0.010 0.101
(0.244) (0.314) (0.337) (0.383)
Urban Location 0.693∗∗ 0.688∗ 0.731∗ 0.974∗∗
(0.213) (0.278) (0.289) (0.337)
Constant −2.011∗∗∗ −2.904∗∗∗ −3.579∗∗∗ −3.315∗∗∗
(0.363) (0.452) (0.479) (0.524)
Observations 1,367 1,367 1,367 1,367
Log Likelihood −937.057 −724.432 −690.056 −562.783
AIC 1,890.115 1,464.865 1,396.112 1,141.566
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 5.16: Predicted Probabilities - Family US
Mixed areas Any Targets PRI Targets PAN Targets PRD Targets
Family US 0.23 (0.17, 0.31) 0.11 (0.06, 0.17) 0.11 (0.07, 0.18) 0.08 (0.04, 0.14)
No Family US 0.21 (0.15, 0.29) 0.11 (0.06, 0.17) 0.08 (0.04, 0.13) 0.05 (0.02, 0.10)
Mean size Any Targets PRI Targets PAN Targets PRD Targets
Family US 0.32 (0.29, 0.35) 0.17 (0.14, 0.20) 0.17 (0.15, 0.20) 0.14 (0.12, 0.17)
No Family US 0.30 (0.26, 0.33) 0.17 (0.14, 0.20) 0.12 (0.10, 0.15) 0.10 (0.08, 0.13)
Table 5.17: Family US and Electoral Target: PAN Last Elections
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PAN Last Elections 0.161 0.043 0.158 0.169
(0.251) (0.300) (0.317) (0.345)
Family US −0.002 −0.063 0.296 0.294
(0.169) (0.199) (0.220) (0.235)
PAN Last Elections 0.087 −0.092 0.089 0.010
(0.190) (0.225) (0.251) (0.273)
Education 0.011 0.017 −0.001 0.007
(0.033) (0.039) (0.040) (0.045)
Age 0.006 0.011∗ 0.011∗ 0.008
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Women 0.158 0.215 0.065 0.299†
(0.127) (0.152) (0.157) (0.173)
Wealth 0.057 0.054 0.112∗ −0.027
(0.040) (0.048) (0.051) (0.054)
Rural Location 0.102 0.289 0.084 0.370
(0.253) (0.319) (0.343) (0.407)
Urban Location 0.662∗∗ 0.632∗ 0.644∗ 1.058∗∗
(0.220) (0.281) (0.293) (0.363)
Constant −1.935∗∗∗ −2.846∗∗∗ −3.380∗∗∗ −3.243∗∗∗
(0.386) (0.474) (0.504) (0.565)
Observations 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214
Log Likelihood −849.533 −666.868 −627.738 −511.518
AIC 1,719.065 1,353.736 1,275.476 1,043.036
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 5.18: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PAN Last Elections
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.14 (0.08, 0.23) 0.11 (0.06, 0.18)
Non-Family US 0.09 (0.05, 0.16) 0.08 (0.04, 0.15)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.20 (0.16, 0.26) 0.16 (0.13, 0.20)
Non-Family US 0.14 (0.10, 0.19) 0.13 (0.09, 0.17)
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.11 (0.06, 0.19) 0.12 (0.07, 0.19)
Non-Family US 0.11 (0.06, 0.19) 0.12 (0.07, 0.20)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.17 (0.13, 0.22) 0.18 (0.14, 0.22)
Non-Family US 0.17 (0.13, 0.23) 0.19 (0.15, 0.24)
PRD Targets (mixed areas) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.08 (0.04, 0.15) 0.07 (0.03, 0.13)
Non-Family US 0.05 (0.02, 0.10) 0.05 (0.02, 0.10)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.16 (0.12, 0.21) 0.14 (0.11, 0.18)
Non-Family US 0.11 (0.07, 0.15) 0.11 (0.07, 0.15)
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Table 5.19: Family US and Electoral Target: PAN ID
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PAN ID 0.430 −0.132 0.801∗ −0.387
(0.283) (0.346) (0.365) (0.375)
Family US 0.035 0.047 0.207 0.472∗
(0.141) (0.167) (0.181) (0.195)
PAN ID −0.394† −0.248 −0.399 0.169
(0.223) (0.265) (0.306) (0.294)
Education 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.019
(0.032) (0.038) (0.039) (0.043)
Age 0.007† 0.009† 0.012∗ 0.009
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Women 0.163 0.204 0.054 0.316†
(0.123) (0.149) (0.153) (0.168)
Wealth 0.060 0.061 0.133∗∗ −0.026
(0.038) (0.046) (0.050) (0.051)
Rural Location −0.027 0.217 0.033 0.149
(0.245) (0.315) (0.338) (0.384)
Urban Location 0.723∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗ 0.710∗ 1.007∗∗
(0.214) (0.279) (0.291) (0.339)
Constant −1.965∗∗∗ −2.866∗∗∗ −3.571∗∗∗ −3.350∗∗∗
(0.370) (0.461) (0.487) (0.535)
Observations 1,318 1,318 1,318 1,318
Log Likelihood −913.045 −703.352 −666.990 −552.137
AIC 1,846.090 1,426.705 1,353.980 1,124.274
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 5.20: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PAN ID
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Family US 0.15 (0.08, 0.24) 0.10 (0.06, 0.17)
Non-Family US 0.06 (0.02, 0.12) 0.08 (0.05, 0.14)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Family US 0.22 (0.17, 0.28) 0.16 (0.13, 0.19)
Non-Family US 0.09 (0.05, 0.15) 0.13 (0.10, 0.17)
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Family US 0.08 (0.04, 0.14) 0.12 (0.07, 0.18)
Non-Family US 0.09 (0.04, 0.16) 0.11 (0.06, 0.18)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Family US 0.13 (0.09, 0.19) 0.18 (0.15, 0.22)
Non-Family US 0.14 (0.09, 0.21) 0.18 (0.14, 0.21)
PRD Targets (mixed areas) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Family US 0.06 (0.03, 0.13) 0.08 (0.04, 0.14)
Non-Family US 0.06 (0.02, 0.12) 0.05 (0.02, 0.10)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Family US 0.12 (0.09, 0.18) 0.15 (0.12, 0.18)
Non-Family US 0.11 (0.07, 0.18) 0.10 (0.07, 0.13)
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Table 5.21: Family US and Electoral Target: PRI Last Elections
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PRI Last Elections 0.202 0.542† −0.088 0.531
(0.290) (0.326) (0.368) (0.410)
Family US 0.022 −0.183 0.392∗ 0.245
(0.145) (0.180) (0.183) (0.197)
PRI Last Elections 0.104 0.369 0.117 −0.296
(0.216) (0.246) (0.284) (0.328)
Education 0.016 0.022 0.004 0.008
(0.033) (0.039) (0.040) (0.044)
Age 0.007 0.008 0.012∗ 0.008
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Women 0.154 0.183 0.069 0.302†
(0.127) (0.154) (0.157) (0.173)
Wealth 0.065† 0.058 0.120∗ −0.022
(0.040) (0.048) (0.051) (0.053)
Rural Location 0.078 0.205 0.076 0.378
(0.254) (0.323) (0.343) (0.408)
Urban Location 0.683∗∗ 0.658∗ 0.660∗ 1.083∗∗
(0.220) (0.283) (0.292) (0.363)
Constant −2.013∗∗∗ −2.901∗∗∗ −3.491∗∗∗ −3.236∗∗∗
(0.383) (0.478) (0.498) (0.558)
Observations 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214
Log Likelihood −849.284 −654.491 −629.064 −510.804
AIC 1,718.569 1,328.982 1,278.128 1,041.607
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 5.22: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRI Last Elections
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.12 (0.07, 0.22) 0.12 (0.07, 0.20)
Non-Family US 0.09 (0.05, 0.18) 0.08 (0.05, 0.14)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.18 (0.13, 0.26) 0.18 (0.15, 0.21)
Non-Family US 0.14 (0.09, 0.21) 0.13 (0.10, 0.16)
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.20 (0.12, 0.32) 0.09 (0.05, 0.15)
Non-Family US 0.15 (0.08, 0.26) 0.11 (0.06, 0.18)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.29 (0.22, 0.38) 0.14 (0.11, 0.18)
Non-Family US 0.23 (0.16, 0.31) 0.17 (0.13, 0.21)
PRD Targets (mixed areas) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.08 (0.04, 0.17) 0.07 (0.03, 0.13)
Non-Family US 0.04 (0.01, 0.09) 0.05 (0.02, 0.10)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PRI Last Elections Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US 0.17 (0.12, 0.25) 0.14 (0.11, 0.17)
Non-Family US 0.09 (0.05, 0.15) 0.11 (0.08, 0.15)
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Table 5.23: Family US and Electoral Target: PRI ID
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PRI ID −0.132 0.104 −0.002 0.451
(0.267) (0.308) (0.339) (0.395)
Family US 0.179 −0.003 0.434∗ 0.247
(0.145) (0.182) (0.185) (0.191)
PRI ID 0.199 0.496∗ 0.180 −0.558†
(0.198) (0.230) (0.265) (0.313)
Education 0.014 0.024 0.003 0.016
(0.032) (0.038) (0.039) (0.043)
Age 0.007† 0.009† 0.011∗ 0.009
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Women 0.151 0.163 0.041 0.339∗
(0.124) (0.150) (0.154) (0.169)
Wealth 0.061 0.060 0.140∗∗ −0.033
(0.038) (0.047) (0.050) (0.051)
Rural Location −0.023 0.183 0.034 0.132
(0.245) (0.317) (0.338) (0.385)
Urban Location 0.734∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗ 0.752∗∗ 0.959∗∗
(0.214) (0.280) (0.291) (0.338)
Constant −2.121∗∗∗ −3.157∗∗∗ −3.700∗∗∗ −3.085∗∗∗
(0.382) (0.480) (0.502) (0.544)
Observations 1,318 1,318 1,318 1,318
Log Likelihood −914.215 −700.088 −670.512 −550.674
AIC 1,848.431 1,420.176 1,361.024 1,121.348
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 5.24: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRI ID
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.13 (0.07, 0.22) 0.11 (0.06, 0.18)
Non-Family US 0.08 (0.04, 0.15) 0.07 (0.04, 0.13)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.20 (0.14, 0.26) 0.17 (0.14, 0.20)
Non-Family US 0.13 (0.09, 0.19) 0.11 (0.09, 0.15)
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.15 (0.09, 0.25) 0.09 (0.05, 0.15)
Non-Family US 0.14 (0.08, 0.23) 0.09 (0.05, 0.15)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.24 (0.18, 0.31) 0.14 (0.12, 0.18)
Non-Family US 0.22 (0.16, 0.28) 0.15 (0.11, 0.18)
PRD Targets (mixed areas) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.07 (0.03, 0.14) 0.08 (0.04, 0.14)
Non-Family US 0.03 (0.01, 0.08) 0.06 (0.03, 0.12)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PRI ID Non-PRI ID
Family US 0.13 (0.09, 0.19) 0.15 (0.12, 0.18)
Non-Family US 0.07 (0.04, 0.11) 0.12 (0.09, 0.15)
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Table 5.25: Family US and Electoral Target: PRD Last Elections
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PRD Last Elections 0.343 0.153 0.796 −0.560
(0.467) (0.617) (0.678) (0.549)
Family US 0.037 −0.045 0.316† 0.419∗
(0.132) (0.156) (0.166) (0.185)
PRD Last Elections −0.270 −0.528 −0.751 0.782†
(0.377) (0.492) (0.593) (0.428)
Education 0.014 0.015 0.003 0.008
(0.033) (0.039) (0.040) (0.044)
Age 0.008† 0.011∗ 0.012∗ 0.008
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Women 0.161 0.209 0.066 0.313†
(0.127) (0.152) (0.157) (0.173)
Wealth 0.066† 0.055 0.124∗ −0.027
(0.040) (0.048) (0.051) (0.053)
Rural Location 0.107 0.291 0.087 0.378
(0.253) (0.319) (0.343) (0.407)
Urban Location 0.677∗∗ 0.619∗ 0.658∗ 1.088∗∗
(0.220) (0.281) (0.293) (0.363)
Constant −2.001∗∗∗ −2.838∗∗∗ −3.444∗∗∗ −3.359∗∗∗
(0.379) (0.467) (0.493) (0.555)
Observations 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214
Log Likelihood −850.985 −666.268 −628.282 −510.890
AIC 1,721.971 1,352.536 1,276.563 1,041.780
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 5.26: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRD Last Elections
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US 0.13 (0.06, 0.24) 0.12 (0.07, 0.19)
Non-Family US 0.04 (0.01, 0.14) 0.09 (0.05, 0.15)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US 0.18 (0.11, 0.30) 0.18 (0.15, 0.21)
Non-Family US 0.07 (0.02, 0.19) 0.14 (0.11, 0.17)
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US 0.08 (0.03, 0.18) 0.12 (0.07, 0.19)
Non-Family US 0.07 (0.02, 0.20) 0.12 (0.07, 0.20)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US 0.13 (0.07, 0.23) 0.18 (0.15, 0.21)
Non-Family US 0.12 (0.05, 0.26) 0.19 (0.15, 0.22)
PRD Targets (mixed areas) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US 0.08 (0.03, 0.19) 0.07 (0.03, 0.13)
Non-Family US 0.10 (0.03, 0.23) 0.04 (0.02, 0.09)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US 0.17 (0.10, 0.28) 0.14 (0.12, 0.18)
Non-Family US 0.19 (0.10, 0.35) 0.10 (0.07, 0.13)
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Table 5.27: Family US and Electoral Target: PRD ID
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PRD ID −0.349 −0.334 −0.542 −0.233
(0.320) (0.417) (0.428) (0.406)
Family US 0.196 0.043 0.501∗∗ 0.428∗
(0.135) (0.159) (0.170) (0.190)
PRD ID 0.279 −0.112 0.061 0.557†
(0.233) (0.292) (0.315) (0.306)
Education 0.010 0.018 0.003 0.019
(0.032) (0.038) (0.039) (0.043)
Age 0.007† 0.010† 0.011∗ 0.009†
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Women 0.168 0.191 0.044 0.347∗
(0.124) (0.150) (0.153) (0.169)
Wealth 0.058 0.049 0.134∗∗ −0.024
(0.038) (0.046) (0.050) (0.051)
Rural Location −0.030 0.196 0.025 0.155
(0.245) (0.315) (0.338) (0.385)
Urban Location 0.712∗∗∗ 0.685∗ 0.720∗ 1.000∗∗
(0.213) (0.279) (0.290) (0.338)
Constant −2.075∗∗∗ −2.863∗∗∗ −3.605∗∗∗ −3.474∗∗∗
(0.372) (0.461) (0.490) (0.539)
Observations 1,318 1,318 1,318 1,318
Log Likelihood −913.006 −706.903 −668.585 −550.400
AIC 1,846.012 1,433.805 1,357.170 1,120.801
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 5.28: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRD ID
PAN Targets (mixed areas) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Family US 0.08 (0.04, 0.15) 0.12 (0.07, 0.20)
Non-Family US 0.08 (0.04, 0.16) 0.08 (0.04, 0.13)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Family US 0.12 (0.07, 0.19) 0.19 (0.16, 0.22)
Non-Family US 0.13 (0.07, 0.20) 0.12 (0.09, 0.15)
PRI Targets (mixed areas) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Family US 0.08 (0.04, 0.15) 0.11 (0.07, 0.18)
Non-Family US 0.10 (0.05, 0.19) 0.11 (0.06, 0.18)
PRI Targets (mean size of place) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Family US 0.12 (0.07, 0.19) 0.18 (0.15, 0.21)
Non-Family US 0.16 (0.10, 0.24) 0.17 (0.14, 0.21)
PRD Targets (mixed areas) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Family US 0.10 (0.04, 0.19) 0.07 (0.04, 0.13)
Non-Family US 0.08 (0.03, 0.17) 0.05 (0.02, 0.09)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Family US 0.18 (0.12, 0.26) 0.14 (0.11, 0.17)
Non-Family US 0.15 (0.09, 0.23) 0.09 (0.07, 0.12)
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5.5.1 Alternative Dependent Variable
Table 5.29: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Remittances w2 0.272† 0.061 0.514∗∗ 0.303
(0.165) (0.209) (0.197) (0.218)
Education 0.036 0.028 0.021 0.032
(0.028) (0.035) (0.035) (0.038)
Age 0.007† 0.009∗ 0.010∗ 0.007
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Women 0.181 0.140 0.079 0.235
(0.111) (0.138) (0.141) (0.153)
Wealth 0.084∗ 0.066 0.153∗∗∗ 0.014
(0.034) (0.043) (0.046) (0.046)
Log Municipal Population 0.114∗∗ 0.039 0.142∗∗ 0.119∗
(0.036) (0.045) (0.047) (0.050)
Constant −3.303∗∗∗ −3.121∗∗∗ −4.894∗∗∗ −4.068∗∗∗
(0.479) (0.586) (0.634) (0.660)
Observations 1,751 1,751 1,751 1,751
Log Likelihood −593.453 −437.341 −423.300 −345.616
AIC 1,200.907 888.683 860.600 705.231
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 5.30: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances
Mean Size of Place Any Targets PRI Targets PAN Targets PRD Targets
Remittances 0.33 (0.27, 0.40) 0.15 (0.11, 0.21) 0.20 (0.15, 0.26) 0.15 (0.10, 0.21)
No Remittances 0.27 (0.25, 0.30) 0.15 (0.13, 0.17) 0.13 (0.11, 0.15) 0.11 (0.10, 0.13)
147
Table 5.31: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PAN Supporters
PAN Target PAN Target
Model 1 Model 2
Remittances w2 ∗PAN Last Elections −0.196
(0.411)
Remittances w2 ∗PAN ID −0.035
(0.434)
Remittances w2 0.597∗ 0.543∗
(0.266) (0.232)
PAN Last Elections 0.240
(0.162)
PAN ID 0.243
(0.169)
Education 0.023 0.031
(0.037) (0.036)
Age 0.011∗ 0.011∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Women 0.101 0.069
(0.148) (0.143)
Wealth 0.121∗ 0.138∗∗
(0.048) (0.046)
Log Municipal Population 0.128∗∗ 0.126∗∗
(0.049) (0.048)
Constant −4.669∗∗∗ −4.758∗∗∗
(0.659) (0.641)
Observations 1,545 1,689
Log Likelihood −379.565 −412.243
AIC 777.129 842.486
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 5.32: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PAN Last Elections
PAN Targets (Mean Size of Place) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Remittances 0.21 (0.13, 0.33) 0.21 (0.14, 0.29)
Non-Remittances 0.15 (0.12, 0.19) 0.12 (0.10, 0.15)
PAN Targets (Mean Size of Place) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Remittances 0.23 (0.13, 0.37) 0.20 (0.14, 0.27)
Non-Remittances 0.15 (0.12, 0.19) 0.12 (0.10, 0.14)
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Table 5.33: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PRD Supporters
PAN Target PRD Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Remittances w2 ∗PRD Last Elections 0.227 0.636
(0.669) (0.602)
Remittances w2 ∗PRD ID −0.189 0.855†
(0.520) (0.469)
Remittances w2 0.491∗ 0.270 0.581∗∗ 0.021
(0.216) (0.244) (0.217) (0.273)
PRD Last Elections −0.208 0.424
(0.286) (0.262)
PRD ID −0.231 0.355†
(0.213) (0.200)
Education 0.030 0.011 0.031 0.022
(0.037) (0.040) (0.036) (0.039)
Age 0.012∗ 0.006 0.011∗ 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Women 0.103 0.259 0.066 0.271†
(0.147) (0.159) (0.143) (0.155)
Wealth 0.128∗∗ 0.013 0.141∗∗ 0.026
(0.048) (0.049) (0.046) (0.047)
Log Municipal Population 0.127∗ 0.114∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.104∗
(0.049) (0.052) (0.048) (0.051)
Constant −4.686∗∗∗ −3.892∗∗∗ −4.729∗∗∗ −3.980∗∗∗
(0.658) (0.685) (0.640) (0.670)
Observations 1,545 1,545 1,689 1,689
Log Likelihood −380.478 −309.987 −412.454 −336.374
AIC 778.957 637.974 842.907 690.749
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 5.34: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PRD Last Elections
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances 0.21 (0.08, 0.45) 0.21 (0.15, 0.28)
Non-Remittances 0.11 (0.07, 0.18) 0.14 (0.12, 0.16)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances 0.33 (0.16, 0.57) 0.15 (0.10, 0.21)
Non-Remittances 0.17 (0.11, 0.25) 0.11 (0.10, 0.13)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Remittances 0.15 (0.07, 0.30) 0.22 (0.16, 0.29)
Non-Remittances 0.11 (0.08, 0.15) 0.13 (0.12, 0.16)
PRD Targets (mean size of place) PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Remittances 0.30 (0.18, 0.45) 0.11 (0.07, 0.17)
Non-Remittances 0.15 (0.11, 0.20) 0.11 (0.09, 0.13)
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Table 5.35: Family US and Electoral Target
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US 0.142 0.047 0.307∗ 0.232†
(0.099) (0.125) (0.132) (0.139)
Education 0.034 0.032 0.010 0.046
(0.025) (0.031) (0.032) (0.035)
Age 0.010∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.011∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Women 0.307∗∗ 0.210† 0.157 0.410∗∗
(0.098) (0.124) (0.128) (0.138)
Wealth 0.044 0.034 0.118∗∗ −0.035
(0.031) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042)
Log Municipal Population 0.108∗∗∗ 0.047 0.123∗∗ 0.118∗∗
(0.032) (0.041) (0.043) (0.045)
Constant −3.507∗∗∗ −3.430∗∗∗ −4.918∗∗∗ −4.439∗∗∗
(0.430) (0.534) (0.580) (0.602)
Observations 2,383 2,383 2,383 2,383
Log Likelihood −1,442.870 −1,056.300 −988.319 −834.355
AIC 2,899.740 2,126.600 1,990.638 1,682.711
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 5.36: Predicted Probabilities - Family US
Mean Size of Place Any Targets PRI Targets PAN Targets PRD Targets
Family US 0.24 (0.22, 0.27) 0.13 (0.11, 0.15) 0.12 (0.11, 0.14) 0.11 (0.09, 0.13)
No Family US 0.22 (0.19, 0.24) 0.12 (0.10, 0.14) 0.09 (0.08, 0.11) 0.09 (0.07, 0.10)
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Table 5.37: Family US and Electoral Target: PAN Last Elections
PAN Target PAN Target
Model 1 Model 2
Family US ∗PAN Last Elections 0.073
(0.271)
Family US ∗PAN ID 0.431
(0.300)
Family US 0.247 0.191
(0.191) (0.157)
PAN Last Elections 0.331
(0.213)
PAN ID 0.032
(0.246)
Education 0.007 0.024
(0.034) (0.033)
Age 0.012∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.005) (0.004)
Women 0.171 0.146
(0.134) (0.130)
Wealth 0.074† 0.092∗
(0.044) (0.042)
Log Municipal Population 0.106∗ 0.109∗
(0.045) (0.044)
Constant −4.555∗∗∗ −4.770∗∗∗
(0.608) (0.592)
Observations 2,115 2,303
Log Likelihood −893.982 −953.025
AIC 1,805.965 1,924.051
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 5.38: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PAN Supporters
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.16 (0.13, 0.20) 0.11 (0.09, 0.14)
Non-Family US 0.12 (0.09, 0.16) 0.09 (0.07, 0.12)
PAN Targets (mean size of place) PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Family US 0.17 (0.13, 0.21) 0.11 (0.09, 0.13)
Non-Family US 0.10 (0.06, 0.14) 0.09 (0.07, 0.12)
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5.5.2 Additional Figures and Tables
Table 5.39: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PAN Last Elections
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Remittances w2 * PAN Last Elections −0.217 0.310 −0.407 −0.042
(0.386) (0.460) (0.437) (0.494)
Remittances w2 0.296 −0.216 0.703∗ 0.300
(0.248) (0.311) (0.285) (0.330)
PAN Last Elections 0.305∗ −0.063 0.280 0.248
(0.149) (0.181) (0.188) (0.203)
Education 0.023 0.030 0.028 0.014
(0.036) (0.043) (0.044) (0.049)
Age 0.007 0.013∗ 0.013∗ 0.010
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Women 0.199 0.282† 0.132 0.478∗
(0.136) (0.165) (0.169) (0.187)
Wealth 0.007 −0.005 0.057 −0.038
(0.041) (0.050) (0.053) (0.056)
Church Attendance 0.030 −0.024 −0.001 −0.029
(0.061) (0.074) (0.076) (0.084)
Talk Politics 0.160† 0.229∗ 0.266∗ 0.217†
(0.084) (0.101) (0.105) (0.113)
Presidential Approval −0.198∗ −0.179† −0.180† −0.197†
(0.082) (0.098) (0.101) (0.107)
Log Municipal Population 0.095∗ 0.010 0.106† 0.054
(0.046) (0.056) (0.059) (0.062)
Constant −3.279∗∗∗ −3.409∗∗∗ −4.730∗∗∗ −4.451∗∗∗
(0.690) (0.842) (0.878) (0.954)
Region Dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,147
Log Likelihood −794.976 −609.680 −580.319 −468.932
AIC 1,621.952 1,251.360 1,192.639 969.864
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 5.40: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PAN Last Elections
PAN Targets PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Remittances 0.18 (0.10, 0.31) 0.20 (0.12, 0.31)
Non-Remittances 0.14 (0.10, 0.20) 0.11 (0.08, 0.16)
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Table 5.41: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PAN ID
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Remittances w2 * PAN ID 0.134 0.530 −0.089 −0.763
(0.410) (0.503) (0.460) (0.584)
Remittances w2 0.202 −0.271 0.569∗ 0.389
(0.216) (0.268) (0.248) (0.279)
PAN ID −0.083 −0.389† 0.140 0.213
(0.159) (0.204) (0.195) (0.217)
Education 0.037 0.038 0.048 0.035
(0.035) (0.043) (0.043) (0.048)
Age 0.008† 0.013∗ 0.014∗ 0.011†
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Women 0.191 0.234 0.080 0.489∗∗
(0.132) (0.161) (0.164) (0.182)
Wealth 0.031 0.003 0.080 −0.014
(0.040) (0.050) (0.052) (0.055)
Church Attendance 0.062 0.009 0.053 0.025
(0.058) (0.072) (0.073) (0.081)
Talk Politics 0.171∗ 0.248∗ 0.221∗ 0.269∗
(0.082) (0.100) (0.102) (0.110)
Presidential Approval −0.106 −0.106 −0.131 −0.143
(0.080) (0.097) (0.099) (0.107)
Log Municipal Population 0.111∗ 0.036 0.117∗ 0.062
(0.045) (0.055) (0.057) (0.060)
Constant −3.868∗∗∗ −4.044∗∗∗ −5.150∗∗∗ −5.189∗∗∗
(0.671) (0.829) (0.852) (0.930)
Region Dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,240 1,240 1,240 1,240
Log Likelihood −862.260 −646.513 −624.818 −504.914
AIC 1,756.520 1,325.026 1,281.635 1,041.827
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 5.42: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PAN ID
PAN Targets PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Remittances 0.19 (0.09, 0.34) 0.18 (0.11, 0.28)
Non-Remittances 0.13 (0.08, 0.18) 0.11 (0.08, 0.15)
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Table 5.43: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PRD Last Elections
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Remittances w2 * PRD Last Elections 1.172† 0.765 0.526 1.012
(0.667) (0.779) (0.748) (0.716)
Remittances w2 0.097 −0.137 0.480∗ 0.152
(0.203) (0.245) (0.229) (0.272)
PRD Last Elections −0.258 −0.577 −0.145 −0.068
(0.262) (0.353) (0.341) (0.324)
Education 0.031 0.027 0.035 0.021
(0.036) (0.043) (0.044) (0.049)
Age 0.009† 0.013∗ 0.014∗ 0.012†
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Women 0.208 0.287† 0.132 0.487∗∗
(0.136) (0.165) (0.169) (0.187)
Wealth 0.018 −0.001 0.064 −0.029
(0.041) (0.050) (0.053) (0.055)
Church Attendance 0.036 −0.029 0.007 −0.026
(0.061) (0.074) (0.076) (0.084)
Talk Politics 0.172∗ 0.234∗ 0.279∗∗ 0.216†
(0.084) (0.102) (0.104) (0.113)
Presidential Approval −0.159∗ −0.208∗ −0.146 −0.151
(0.081) (0.096) (0.098) (0.105)
Log Municipal Population 0.101∗ 0.008 0.108† 0.062
(0.047) (0.056) (0.059) (0.062)
Constant −3.460∗∗∗ −3.356∗∗∗ −4.836∗∗∗ −4.638∗∗∗
(0.685) (0.836) (0.872) (0.947)
Region Dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,147
Log Likelihood −795.691 −606.920 −582.152 −467.927
AIC 1,623.381 1,245.839 1,196.304 967.854
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 5.44: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PRD ID
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Remittances w2 * PRD ID 0.576 0.650 0.187 1.459∗∗
(0.460) (0.580) (0.557) (0.552)
Remittances w2 0.115 −0.225 0.508∗ −0.190
(0.207) (0.254) (0.231) (0.301)
PRD ID 0.060 −0.290 −0.009 −0.020
(0.192) (0.254) (0.258) (0.254)
Education 0.036 0.042 0.045 0.033
(0.035) (0.042) (0.043) (0.048)
Age 0.009† 0.013∗ 0.014∗ 0.012†
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Women 0.208 0.248 0.083 0.525∗∗
(0.132) (0.162) (0.164) (0.184)
Wealth 0.032 −0.003 0.083 −0.008
(0.040) (0.049) (0.052) (0.054)
Church Attendance 0.064 0.003 0.054 0.027
(0.059) (0.072) (0.073) (0.081)
Talk Politics 0.168∗ 0.239∗ 0.231∗ 0.275∗
(0.081) (0.099) (0.101) (0.110)
Presidential Approval −0.110 −0.162† −0.108 −0.109
(0.077) (0.093) (0.095) (0.102)
Log Municipal Population 0.109∗ 0.028 0.121∗ 0.062
(0.045) (0.054) (0.057) (0.060)
Constant −3.885∗∗∗ −3.886∗∗∗ −5.216∗∗∗ −5.253∗∗∗
(0.670) (0.820) (0.852) (0.931)
Region Dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,240 1,240 1,240 1,240
Log Likelihood −860.357 −647.345 −625.234 −499.371
AIC 1,752.714 1,326.689 1,282.468 1,030.741
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 5.45: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PRD Last Elections
PAN Targets PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances 0.26 (0.08, 0.57) 0.19 (0.12, 0.28)
Non-Remittances 0.11 (0.05, 0.20) 0.13 (0.09, 0.17)
PRD Targets PRD Last Elections Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances 0.13 (0.04, 0.36) 0.05 (0.02, 0.11)
Non-Remittances 0.04 (0.02, 0.09) 0.05 (0.03, 0.08)
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Table 5.46: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PRD ID
PAN Targets PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Remittances 0.21 (0.09, 0.41) 0.18 (0.11, 0.27)
Non-Remittances 0.11 (0.07, 0.18) 0.11 (0.08, 0.16)
PRD Targets PRD ID Non-PRD ID
Remittances 0.14 (0.05, 0.29) 0.03 (0.01, 0.07)
Non-Remittances 0.04 (0.02, 0.08) 0.04 (0.02, 0.07)
Table 5.47: Family US and Electoral Target: PAN Last Elections
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PAN Last Elections 0.015 −0.268 −0.011 −0.042
(0.263) (0.318) (0.332) (0.363)
Family US −0.139 −0.325 0.131 0.232
(0.179) (0.214) (0.230) (0.246)
PAN Last Elections 0.275 0.156 0.255 0.319
(0.204) (0.244) (0.269) (0.291)
Education 0.020 0.027 0.011 −0.006
(0.036) (0.043) (0.044) (0.048)
Age 0.006 0.011† 0.012∗ 0.008
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Women 0.188 0.263 0.095 0.439∗
(0.136) (0.164) (0.168) (0.185)
Wealth 0.014 0.016 0.055 −0.040
(0.042) (0.051) (0.053) (0.056)
Church Attendance 0.032 −0.028 0.001 −0.034
(0.061) (0.074) (0.076) (0.083)
Talk Politics 0.156† 0.228∗ 0.252∗ 0.190†
(0.085) (0.102) (0.105) (0.113)
Presidential Approval −0.202∗ −0.185† −0.210∗ −0.237∗
(0.082) (0.098) (0.100) (0.107)
Log Municipal Population 0.093∗ 0.009 0.102† 0.062
(0.046) (0.056) (0.058) (0.062)
Constant −3.143∗∗∗ −3.330∗∗∗ −4.427∗∗∗ −4.315∗∗∗
(0.692) (0.846) (0.877) (0.956)
Region Dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,153 1,153 1,153 1,153
Log Likelihood −799.785 −612.691 −588.466 −474.994
AIC 1,631.571 1,257.382 1,208.932 981.988
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 5.48: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PAN Last Elections
PAN Targets PAN Last Elections Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US 0.16 (0.11, 0.23) 0.13 (0.09, 0.18)
Non-Family US 0.14 (0.09, 0.21) 0.11 (0.07, 0.17)
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Table 5.49: Family US and Electoral Target: PAN ID
Any Target PRI Target PAN Target PRD Target
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family US * PAN ID 0.138 −0.474 0.539 −0.655†
(0.292) (0.361) (0.375) (0.391)
Family US −0.099 −0.263 0.022 0.353†
(0.151) (0.182) (0.192) (0.212)
PAN ID −0.147 0.007 −0.219 0.573†
(0.234) (0.281) (0.318) (0.315)
Education 0.031 0.032 0.036 0.019
(0.035) (0.042) (0.043) (0.047)
Age 0.008† 0.012∗ 0.014∗ 0.010
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Women 0.189 0.221 0.056 0.441∗
(0.131) (0.160) (0.163) (0.181)
Wealth 0.039 0.020 0.081 −0.021
(0.040) (0.050) (0.052) (0.054)
Church Attendance 0.056 0.003 0.046 0.025
(0.058) (0.071) (0.073) (0.081)
Talk Politics 0.156† 0.244∗ 0.193† 0.241∗
(0.082) (0.100) (0.102) (0.110)
Presidential Approval −0.108 −0.106 −0.156 −0.180†
(0.080) (0.096) (0.098) (0.106)
Log Municipal Population 0.111∗ 0.040 0.114∗ 0.067
(0.045) (0.055) (0.057) (0.060)
Constant −3.749∗∗∗ −4.000∗∗∗ −4.843∗∗∗ −5.095∗∗∗
(0.672) (0.832) (0.847) (0.930)
Region Dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244
Log Likelihood −867.297 −649.746 −631.512 −510.110
AIC 1,766.593 1,331.492 1,295.025 1,052.219
S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 5.50: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PAN ID
PAN Targets PAN ID Non-PAN ID
Family US 0.16 (0.11, 0.24) 0.12 (0.08, 0.17)
Non-Family US 0.10 (0.05, 0.17) 0.12 (0.08, 0.17)
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Chapter 6
The Effectiveness of Targeting in 2000
and 2006
The objective of this chapter is to compare the effectiveness of targeting for migrant and non-
migrant families.1 In other words, this chapter raises the following question: given political parties’
electoral actions, how do migration and non-migration-exposed citizens vote? In order to answer
this question, I first provide some key information about the workings of the Mexico’s 2000 and
2006 presidential elections. These facts are essential to understanding electoral outcomes and serve
as the starting point to analyze what role political parties’ strategies and migration-exposed voters
play in producing those results.
With respect to the Mexico’s 2000 presidential election, three related factors explain why the
PAN candidate - Vicente Fox - won this contest. First, electoral competition emerged around the
issues of economic policy and political regime, which divided the electorate between PRI supporters
and non-supporters (Dominguez and Lawson, 2004; Magaloni and Poire, 2004a). That is, while
some voters were loyal to the PRI and wanted to preserve the existing economic and political model,
others wished for a change in the status quo and aimed to bring reforms to Mexico. For this latter
group, demands for democracy together with doubts about the PRI’s ability to handle the economy
were key determinants of their voting intentions (Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2007).
Second, the patterns of political participation greatly benefited the opposition over the PRI.
1 Part of this chapter, i.e., the analysis corresponding at the 2006 elections, and a modified version was presented
in poster format at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting 2014, Washington, DC.
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As Lawson (2004) puts it: “on election day, opposition supporters turned out in higher than usual
numbers and PRI supporters proved more inclined to stay home” (page 10). A couple of reasons
suggest why this happened. On the one hand, and in comparison with previous elections, PRI’s
strategies of turnout and vote buying appealed to a smaller segment of the electorate (Dominguez
and Lawson, 2004). Put differently, in 2000 a lower number of voters were willing to behave
according to the dictates of this party’s electoral tactics. On the other, Fox was highly successful
in bringing a wide set of voters to the polls by using a centrist electoral message and emphasizing
the need for democratic change (Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2007). Jointly, these reasons explain why
turnout favored the opposition.
And third, strategic voting translated into voter coordination against the incumbent PRI and
in favor of the opposing PAN. These strategic voters were mostly PRD weakly supporters who saw
the PAN as the more viable opposition party and the one with real winning possibilities against
the PRI (Magaloni and Poire, 2004b). Most importantly, this coordination was plausible due to
i) the common goal of political change, ii) the increasing availability and importance of polling
information in Mexico, and the fact that in 2000 predictions make the PAN as the potential winner
against the PRI, and iii) Fox’s electoral message, which delivered the idea of democracy and a
centrist policy program (Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2007).
In sum, demands for political change, successful mobilization of opposition supporters and voter
coordination in favor of the PAN made possible Vicente Fox’s victory.
The Mexico’s 2006 presidential election resembles the 2000 one in certain aspects but is entirely
different in others. For instance, while electoral competition also focused on the economy and the
pursuit of economic growth, political and regime change received little emphasis this time around.
In particular, a division emerged between those voters who wanted to keep the PAN in power and
the same economic policies in place, and those who wished for the PRD to step in and implement
a more leftist economic program. Perhaps unsurprisingly, PAN supporters had a more positive
evaluation of Mexican democracy than PRD sympathizers, but still, the nature of the political
regime was not an essential electoral concern in the 2006 contest (Dominguez, 2009; Ai Camp,
2009).
In addition, the 2006 elections highlighted the fact that electoral strategies such as vote buying
and coercion were not as common as what had historically been the case in Mexico (Dominguez,
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2009). Certainly, the decrease in the use of these practices was already noticeable in 2000 but
became more evident in 2006. As for the reasons behind this decline, one can mention that the
traditionally clientelistic PRI no longer had the incumbency advantage nor the access to extra
resources, which hindered the implementation of widespread targeting. Also, instead of relying
predominantly on electoral actions to get votes, the new incumbent invested in highly effective
social programs that aimed to win poorer voters before the electoral campaign (Diaz-Cayeros,
Estevez and Magaloni, 2009). Nonetheless, and despite this lower intensity, political parties still
participated to a great extent in electoral targeting and hence analyzing their effects on vote choices
is paramount.
Finally, something that clearly distinguished the 2000 from the 2006 elections is the fact that
strategic voting was not a key determinant of the electoral outcome in the latter contest (Dominguez,
2009). In the absence of substantial voter coordination or strategic voting, the electoral result was
due to (Flores-Macias, 2009): i) Calderon’s successful strategy of getting PAN partisans to the polls
as well as of appealing to other segments of the electorate, ii) Lo´pez-Obrador’s failure in convincing
non-partisans and moderates that his economic proposal was what Mexico needed, and iii) the fact
that most of Madrazo’s supporters ended up not voting, given the lower expectations of this PRI
candidate wining the elections.
All in all, the right economic proposal and an electoral campaign that reached a broad spectrum
of voters translated into the PAN keeping the presidency in 2006.
With these general facts about the Mexico’s 2000 and 2006 presidential elections in mind, it is
time to analyze how migration and non-migration exposed citizens responded to political parties’
actions and hence how they behaved at the polls.
6.1 International Migration and Electoral Choices
6.1.1 The Effectiveness of Electoral Strategies: Theoretical Approach
As a short recapitulation, this dissertation argues that, due to political disaffection from national
politics, political parties have incentives to make migrant families their electoral targets even if
this process involves tailoring exchanges and employing different electoral methods. In return, my
expectation is for migrant families to respond favorably to these practices and to cast their votes
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for the targeting party. The reasoning is quite simple. Either because the exchanged goods/favors
bring migrant families economic gains or because these migration-exposed voters just need extra
motivation to turn out to vote, electoral targeting should be effective among these voters. I also
claim that electoral effectiveness should prevail over other competing mechanisms: the income and
the social remittances effect. Chapter 3 provides the detailed reasoning for these assertions.
6.1.2 The Effectiveness of Electoral Strategies: Empirical Approach
As previously mentioned, the objective of this chapter is to compare the effectiveness of targeting
for migrant and non-migrant families. To accomplish so, this section proposes to compare the
behavior of: first, targeted and non-targeted voters in order to establish the difference between
effective and ineffective targeting; and second, migration and non-migration-exposed citizens so
that it is plausible to know if these two types of citizens respond equally or differently to targeting.
In addition, this latter comparison also allows to establish if the mechanism (i.e., effective targeting,
ineffective targeting, no targeting) leading to a certain electoral choice is the same or different for
these two types of voters. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present these comparisons. In particular, Table 6.1
shows the different types of outcomes that might occur given effective and ineffective targeting. And
Table 6.2 establishes the potential differences for migration and non-migration-exposed voters as
well as the implication for targeting: i.e., whether the connection between international migration
and the weakening of these practices exists or not.
More precisely, Table 6.1 explains that the comparison of targeted and non-targeted voters al-
lows establishing that effective targeting happens in three situations: i) an increase in the predicted
probability of voting for the targeting party2 through a decrease in the predicted probability of
voting for the opposition and without changes in the predicted probability of abstention (outcome
type 1 - vote buying), ii) an increase in the predicted probability of voting for the targeting party
through a decrease in the predicted probability of abstention and without changes in the predicted
probability of voting for the opposition (outcome type 2 - turnout buying), and iii) no changes in
the predicted probability of voting for the targeting party but a decrease in the predicted probabil-
ity of voting for the opposition party through an increase in the predicted probability of abstention
2 The targeting party is the incumbent in Table 6.1, but the same logic follows if using an opposition party as the
targeting one, and changes in the predicted probabilities would apply accordingly.
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(outcome type 3 - abstention buying). Of course, it is also quite possible to observe a combination
of the previous outcomes and where targeting increases the predicted probability of voting for this
targeting party through a decrease in both the predicted probability of voting for the opposition
and in the predicted probability of abstention.
Similarly, the comparison of targeted and non-targeted voters allows establishing that ineffective
targeting happens in three situations: i) no changes in either the predicted probability of voting
for the targeting party, the opposition, or abstention (outcome type 4 - rejection with no changes),
ii) a decrease in the predicted probability of voting for the targeting party through an increase in
the predicted probability of abstention and without changes in the predicted probability of voting
for the opposition (outcome type 5 - rejection with abstention), and iii) a decrease in the predicted
probability of voting for the targeting party through an increase in the predicted probability of
voting for the opposition and without changes in the predicted probability of abstention (outcome
type 6 - rejection with change in vote choice).3 As before, it is also possible to observe a combination
of these outcomes and where targeting decreases the predicted probability of voting for this targeting
party through an increase in both the predicted probability of voting for the opposition and in the
predicted probability of abstention.
Given these different effective and ineffective targeting outcomes, it is now possible to compare
the behavior of migration and non-migration-exposed voters. In particular, Table 6.2 establishes
four key cases: i) targeting is effective for both types of voters, ii) targeting is ineffective for both
types of voters, iii) targeting is only effective for migration-exposed voters, and iv) targeting is only
effective for non-migration-exposed voters. Accordingly, the implication for these comparisons is
that one can only claim that international migration leads to the weakening of certain electoral
practices such as clientelism in situations i and iv. That is, in the case when targeting is effective
for both types of voters, weakening occurs only if the relative change in the predicted probabilities,
from a situation of non-targeted voter to a targeted one, is lower for migration-exposed citizens.
For example, targeting leads to an increase in the predicted probability of voting for the targeting
party but the marginal change for targeted migration and non-migration-exposed voters versus non-
3 This outcome seems more plausible in those elections where only the incumbent participates in these ‘question-
able’ electoral strategies. In those situations, targeting by the incumbent leads to the rejection of those practices and
more votes for the opposition parties that do not practice them. On the contrary, in those elections where all parties
participate in electoral targeting, it is less clear that rejection of those practices should lead to more votes for other
parties that also participate in them (even if the voter only experience targeting by one of the parties).
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targeted migration and non-migration-exposed voters is lower for the migration-exposed ones. In
addition, if targeting is only effective for non-migration-exposed voters, it is quite straightforward
to speculate that a connection between international migration and the weakening of electoral
targeting exists.
Further, one can ask about the implications of having two different processes leading to effec-
tive (or ineffective) targeting for migration and non-migration-exposed voters. For example, for
migration-exposed voters effective targeting might occur through outcome type 1 - vote buying,
whereas for non-migration-exposed ones through outcome type 2 - turnout buying.4 In response,
one can argue that this information just adds richness to our analysis by explaining why different
types of citizens cast their ballot in a particular way on election day, but does not affect the overall
conclusions of the study.
6.2 Data and Methodology
6.2.1 2000’s Presidential Elections
In order to compare the effectiveness of electoral targeting for migration and non-migration-exposed
voters, I use as in Chapter 4 data from the Mexico 2000 Post-Electoral Study (Lawson et al., 2000).5
The research design for this chapter is as follows6:
Dependent Variables
From this dataset, I use the following question to create two dependent variables: if ‘the respon-
dent voted in the elections of July 2nd and the chosen party’.7 This electoral choice results in two
different categorical variables. The first one captures: 1- Did not vote, 2 - Voted PRI (incumbent),
3 - Voted Other (opposition) (i.e., voted for any other party, left the ballot in blank), while the
4 Perhaps the most complicated case is when migrant families are subject to abstention buying. In a way, one
could argue that this abstention buying is an alternative explanation to the political disengagement mechanism and
the fact that migrant families are more likely to stay home on elections day. However, I claim that this abstention
buying can also happen precisely because of the political disaffection and the fact that these voters already inclined
to stay. That is, political parties see these voters as appealing targets who can easily deliver more abstention.
5 The author wishes to thank Miguel Basan˜ez, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domı´nguez, Federico
Este´vez, Joseph Klesner, Chappell Lawson (Principal Investigator), Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro
Moreno, and Alejandro Poire´. Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-9905703)
and Reforma newspaper. Available online at: http://web.mit.edu/polisci/faculty/C.Lawson.html.
6 With respect to the Mexico 2000 Panel study, see section 4.3.4 for an explanation of why using the post-electoral
study is more adequate for this dissertation’s analysis.
7 The wording of the question was: Did you vote in the elections of July 2nd? if yes, Could you please mark in
this ballot for whom you vote in the Presidential Elections?.
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second incorporates more information about the opposition party of choice: 1- Did not vote or
other option (e.g., left the ballot in blank), 2 - Voted PRI (incumbent), 3 - Voted PAN, and 4 -
Voted PRD. Using both dependent variables for the empirical analysis allows me to study voting
behavior in favor of the incumbent or the opposition as a whole as well as understanding which
opposition party got most of the votes. Given the categorical nature of these dependent variables,
empirical results in this chapter are from multinomial logistic regressions.
Independent Variables
The key independent variables are those that capture migration-exposed voters: i.e., return
migrants and those respondents with close relatives in the US; and experiencing non-programmatic
targeting: i.e., clientelism and home visits. These variables are essential to analyzing if migration
and non-migration-exposed voters’ electoral choices are conditional on being targeted or not, as well
as to understand the relative effectiveness of targeting among these two set of voters. The reason
for focusing on non-programmatic targeting and using programmatic targeting (i.e., advertising
materials) as a control variable (see below) is to isolate the effect of these more ‘questionable’
electoral strategies for migration and non-migration-exposed voters. Since chapter 4 describes the
coding of these variables, I direct the reader to that chapter.
Control Variables
I control for those factors that affect the selection process of who gets targeted, including:
education, age, gender, wealth, frequency of church attendance, risk acceptance attitudes, size/type
of place (rural, urban or mixed) and geographical location (North, South, Center, Center-West and
Mexico City Area). I also control for programmatic targeting in order to capture the effect of this
tactic on electoral choices. Chapter 4 also describes the coding of these variables in detail.
Together with these variables, I also include voters’ political orientation given that this factor is
an essential determinant of turnout and vote buying strategies. In particular, I use three different
variables: i) past electoral behavior, which measures for each respondent this electoral choice for the
presidential elections of 1994 (i.e., voted PRI last elections, PAN last elections, PRD last elections,
voted opposition)8, ii) respondent’s political orientation on the left-right scale (from 0- Left to 10-
Right), and iii) respondent’s support for income redistribution measures (from 1- ‘The government
8 I do not use party ID because of the endogeneity and high correlation concerns that arise between targeting and
a certain party ID in the 2000 dataset.
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should try to reduce differences between the rich and the poor’ to 10-‘The Government’s attempts
to decrease differences between the rich and the poor create more problems than the ones they
solve’). I use these last two different measures to, on the one hand, account for other forms of
political orientation besides the ones more directly associated to targeting such as past electoral
behavior and party ID; and, on the other, because while a lot of respondents do not know their
location on the left-right scale (which of course decreases the number of observations), this is not a
big concern in the case of preferences toward income redistribution. Of course, a positive correlation
exists between favoring income redistribution attitudes and a left-wing ideology.
In addition, I include those factors that not only affect the dependent variable of the electoral
choice but also relate to the migration status of a voter. Those are: interest in politics (1- Nothing,
2- A little, 3- Something, and 4- A lot), evaluation of the national economic situation (in the last
12 months, the national economic situation has 0- Worsened a little/a lot, 1- Neither worsened or
improved, and 2- Improved a little/a lot), and evaluations of Mexico’s democracy (0- Mexico is
not a democracy, and 1- Mexico is a democracy). The motivation for controlling for these factors
is quite straightforward: i) interest in politics is of course a clear determinant of the decision to
participate in elections, and based on the notion of migrant-families’ political disaffection from
national politics, it can also relate to the migration status; ii) evaluation of the national economic
situation is an essential factor of two decision: the one about whom to vote for as well as the one
about migrating in the first place, and iii) evaluations of Mexico’s democracy is a key control in the
2000 elections given that electoral competition was primarily about those in favor of preserving the
political status quo and those who wanted regime change. Also, migrant families could have more
negative evaluations of Mexico’s democracy and therefore reasons to leave this political system.
Accordingly, these factors are highly relevant for this chapter’s empirical analysis.
6.2.2 2006’s Presidential Elections
In order to study the effectiveness of electoral targeting in 2006, I use as in Chapter 5 data from
the Mexico 2006 Panel Study (Lawson et al., 2007).9 As previously explained, this dataset has a
9 Senior Project Personnel for the Mexico 2006 Panel Study include (in alphabetical order): Andy Baker, Kathleen
Bruhn, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domnguez, Kenneth Greene, Joseph Klesner, Chappell Lawson
(Principal Investigator), Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro Moreno, Alejandro Poir, and David Shirk.
Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-0517971) and Reforma newspaper;
fieldwork was conducted by Reforma newspapers Polling and Research Team, under the direction of Alejandro
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panel format that captured information at three different points in time. In this chapter 6, I use
information from these three different waves.
Dependent Variables
From this dataset, I use a question asked in wave 3 (i.e., after the elections) to create two
dependent variables: if ‘the respondent voted in the elections of July 2nd and the chosen party’.10
This electoral choice results in two different categorical variables. The first one captures: 1- Did not
vote, 2 - Voted PAN (incumbent), 3 - Voted Other (opposition) (i.e., voted for any other party, left
the ballot in blank, refused to answer), while the second incorporates more information about the
opposition party of choice: 1- Did not vote or other option (e.g., other minor party), 2 - Voted PAN
(incumbent), 3 - Voted PRI, and 4 - Voted PRD. Given the categorical nature of these dependent
variables, empirical results are from multinomial logistic regressions.
Independent Variables
As before, the key independent variables are those that capture migration-exposed voters: i.e.,
remittance recipients and those respondents with close relatives in the US; and experiencing non-
programmatic targeting: i.e., clientelism and home visits. Since chapter 5 describes the coding of
these variables in detail, I direct the reader to that chapter.
Control Variables
As for the 2000 analysis, I control for those factors that affect the selection process of who gets
targeted, including: education, age, gender, wealth, frequency of church attendance, size/type of
place (rural, urban or mixed) and geographical location (North, South, Center, Center-West and
Mexico City Area). Chapter 5 describes the coding of these variables in detail.11
Together with these variables, I also control for voters’ political orientation, particularly: i)
past electoral behavior, which measures for each respondent this electoral choice for the previous
presidential elections of 200012, ii) respondent’s political orientation on the left-right scale (from 0-
Left to 7- Right), and iii) respondent’s support for government intervention/social insurance, which
Moreno. http://web.mit.edu/clawson/www/polisci/research/mexico06/index.html.
10 The wording of the questions was: ‘There were presidential elections this past July 2nd. As you know, some
people do not have time to vote, or are not interested. Did you or did you not vote in the elections this past July
2nd?’ and ‘For the purposes of this survey, I will give you a sheet where you can mark how you voted on the last
presidential elections, without me seeing you, and then deposit it in this bag. For whom did you vote for president?’.
11 Due to the fact that questions about risk acceptance attitudes or programmatic targeting were not asked in
2006, this information is not part of the 2006 analysis.
12 Although I could use party ID from wave 1, I prefer past electoral behavior in order to make the analysis
consistent with that of the 2000 elections.
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approximates the income redistribution attitudes used for the 2000 analysis (from 1- ‘the govern-
ment should be responsible for the economic well being of individuals’, 2- Both, or 3- ‘Individuals
should be responsible for their own economic well being’). The reasoning for using these different
variables is the same as in the 2000 analysis.
In addition, I include those factors that not only affect the dependent variable of the electoral
choice but also relate to the migration status of a voter. Those are: interest in politics (1- Nothing,
2- A little, 3- Something, and 4- A lot), presidential approval (‘In general, do you approve or
disapprove of the way which Vicente Fox is doing his job as president? from 0- Disapprove a
little/a lot, 1- Neither approve nor disapprove, and 2- Approve a little/a lot), and evaluations of
Mexico’s democracy (0- Mexico is not a democracy, and 1- Mexico is a democracy). The motivation
for controlling for these factors is the same as in the 2000 analysis. All these variables are from
wave 1.13
6.3 Empirical Results
This section compares the effect of electoral targeting on voting choices among migration and non-
migration exposed voters. Put differently, the ultimate objective of this analysis is to establish if
voters were more likely to vote for a particular party due to i) the absence of electoral targeting, ii)
effective targeting, or iii) ineffective targeting and; of course, whether or not this mechanism was
different from migration and non-migration-exposed voters.
6.3.1 2000 Presidential Elections
To start, I simply analyze the predicted probabilities of each vote choice by running a set multino-
mial logistic regressions (abstention as the reference category) with the migration exposure factor -
return migration and family in the US - as the only independent variable. In particular, Tables 6.3
and 6.4 show, respectively, the results of the multinomial logistic regression and the corresponding
13 Various reasons support using the control variables from wave 1: First, in order to avoid endogeneity concerns
(e.g., targeting affecting evaluations of the president and political orientation), and second, to avoid the loss of
respondents who did not participate in wave 2 but took part in wave 1 and in the last post-electoral round (i.e.,
responded the question about the electoral choice). This last point does not apply to the analysis of remittance
recipients since the question about receiving remittances was asked in wave 2. Still, looking at the number of
respondents for the remittance recipients analysis and the number of respondents with family in the US analysis, the
difference in the number of respondents is minimal.
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predicted probabilities for return and non-return migrants. As these tables show, being a return
migrant is not a significant predictor of the different electoral choices (i.e., abstain, vote incumbent
PRI, or voted other), which means that the predicted probabilities for each vote option are quite
similar for these two types of voters. Regardless of these small differences, it is interesting to notice
that non-return migrants have a higher predicted probability of abstaining and voting for the PRI
than return migrants (0.17 versus 0.14 and 0.28 versus 0.22, respectively), while the opposite holds
for voting for opposition parties (0.63 for return migrants vs. 0.54 for non-return ones).
Similarly, Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the results of the multinomial logistic regression and the
corresponding predicted probabilities for respondents with and without family in the US. Inter-
estingly, having family abroad marginally increases the log odds of voting for the opposition as
opposed to abstaining. In terms of predicted probabilities (Table 6.6), respondents with family in
the US have a higher predicted probability of voting for the opposition (0.58 versus 0.52), while
those without it have a higher predicted probability of abstaining and voting for the incumbent
PRI (0.18 versus 0.15 and 0.29 versus 0.25, respectively). In any case, these differences are quite
small. Additionally, when incorporating variation in the opposition party of choice in Tables 6.7
and 6.8, results suggest that having family in the US increases the log odds of voting for the PAN as
opposed to abstaining. This means that when looking at the corresponding predicted probabilities
in Table 6.8 respondents with family in the US voted for the PAN with a 0.44 probability and this
values is 0.38 for those respondents without it.
Given this baseline behavior of migration and non-migration-exposed voters, it is now necessary
to incorporate the effect of electoral targeting on these vote choices.
Return Migrants
Table 6.9 takes a simple first look (i.e., no control variables) at the extent to which PRI and
opposition targeting have an effect on voting behavior among return and non-return migrants. As
this table shows, experiencing a PRI target and an opposition target increases the log odds of voting
for both the PRI and the opposition as opposed to staying home on election day. With respect to
the return-migration variable, results are not statistically significant.
Nonetheless, in order to get a better comparison of the effect of targeting on electoral choices
among return and non-return migrants, I report predicted probabilities in Table 6.10. Briefly, this
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Table 6.10 shows that electoral targeting is effective among return and non-return migrants since for
both types of respondents experiencing a PRI target increases the predicted probability of voting
for the PRI and decreases the one of abstaining (or turnout buying) as well as of voting for the
opposition (or vote buying). In the case of experiencing an opposition target, the pattern of changes
in the predicted probabilities is the same, that is, increases in the predicted probability of voting for
the opposition while decreasing the chances of voting for the PRI as well as abstaining. Interestingly,
when looking at the relative change in the predicted probability of voting for the targeting party
from a situation of not being a target to that of being one, return migrants experience a marginal
increase that is always greater than the one for non-return migrants. Thus, PRI targets as well
as opposition targets are relatively more effective among return migrants than among non-return
migrants.
Given these baseline results, I explore how controlling for relevant factors affects, if at all, the
relationships of interest. As explained in the previous section, I include those individual charac-
teristics that intervene in the selections process of who gets a target such as education, wealth
and political orientation, as well as those individual attitudes that affect the dependent variable
such as evaluations of the nation’s economy and democracy. Particularly, I incorporate political
orientation by looking at past electoral behavior (Table 6.11), left-right ideology (Table 6.12), and
income redistribution preferences (Table 6.13). In general, results in these tables are quite similar
to those of the simple models. That is, a PRI target mainly increases the log odds of voting for
the PRI as opposed to staying home on election day and an opposition target also increases the
log odds of voting for the opposition as opposed to abstaining. In addition, the return-migration
variables are mostly not statistically significant. Quite interestingly as well, the variable capturing
programmatic targeting (PRI Ads and Opposition Ads) - or whether or not a respondent received
advertising materials from a particular party - is not statistically significant to explain electoral
choices.14
Analyzing predicted probabilities, results are also similar to those of the simplest models.15
Essentially, PRI targeting and opposition targeting are effective among return and non-return
14 In some of the models (see Table 6.13) receiving promotion materials from the opposition decreases the log odds
of voting as opposed to abstaining, but this result does not hold across the different model specifications.
15 I calculate these predicted probabilities using all variables at their means, with the exception of the categorial
variables for location and region, which take respectively the values of ‘mixed’ location and ‘center’ region.
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migrants since both increase the chances of voting for the respective party. This happens when
for controlling for either past electoral behavior (Table 6.14), left-right ideology (Table 6.15) or
redistributive attitudes (Table 6.16). However, a couple of findings are worth emphasizing. First,
the PRI gets more votes among return migrants by getting them to not vote for the opposition (or
vote buying) instead of through a decrease in abstention. That is, when comparing targeted and
non-targeted return migrants, the predicted probabilities for abstaining barely change. Exploring
this result further by comparing those respondents who voted for the PRI in the past or PRI
supporters and those who did not or non-PRI supporters, the predicted probability of abstaining
in the former group goes from 0.10 when non-targeted to 0.08 when targeted, and from 0.10 when
non-targeted to 0.13 when targeted in the latter group. That means that abstention among return
migrants increases mostly among non-PRI supporters after being PRI targets while it decreases
among PRI-supporters after being PRI targets. Thus, this suggests that the PRI gets involved
in some abstention buying of non-PRI supporters. Second, the opposition gets more votes among
non-return migrants by getting them to vote (or turnout buying) instead of through a decrease
in votes for the PRI. That is, when comparing targeted and non-targeted non-return migrants,
the predicted probabilities of voting for the PRI barely change. And third, looking at the relative
change in the predicted probability of voting for the targeting party from a situation of not being
a target to that of being one, return migrants experience a marginal increase that is always greater
than the one for non-return migrants in the case of PRI targets but not for opposition targets.
Put differently, PRI targets are relatively more effective among return migrants than among non-
return ones, but the marginal effect is similar for return and non-return migrants when looking at
opposition targets and across the different model specifications.
In sum, electoral targeting is effective among both return migrants and non-return migrants.
Moreover, the PRI tends to be relatively more effective among return migrants, even when com-
paring PRI supporters and non-PRI supporters. In addition, this effective targeting means that
the highest probability of i) abstaining corresponds to non-targeted non-return migrants, although
the values for return migrants are pretty close, ii) voting for the PRI is for PRI targeted non-return
migrants, and iii) voting for the opposition is for opposition targeted return migrants. Conse-
quently, electoral targeting reinforces the voting patterns described at the beginning of this section:
the probability of voting for the PRI is highest for non-return migrants (e.g., 0.28 vs. 0.19 for
170
return migrants in the same situation and when controlling for past electoral behavior), and the
probability of voting for the opposition is highest for return-migrants (e.g., 0.89 vs. 0.78 for non-
return migrants in the same situation and also when controlling for past electoral behavior). But in
any case, the differences in these predicted probabilities of making different electoral choices from
targeted and non-targeted return and non-return migrants are not substantial.
Family Abroad
Following the same approach as for return migrants, Table 6.17 takes a simple first look (i.e., no
control variables) at the extent to which PRI and opposition targeting have an effect on voting
behavior among respondents with and without family in the US. As this table shows, experiencing
a PRI target increases the log odds of voting for this party as opposed to abstaining, and an
opposition target marginally increases the log odds of both voting for the PRI and the opposition.
With respect to the migration variable, results are not statistically significant.
Additionally, in order to get a better comparison of the effect of targeting on electoral choices
among migration and non-migration-exposed voters, I report predicted probabilities in Table 6.18.
According to these results (table 6.18), electoral targeting is effective among voters with and without
family in the US. In particular, experiencing a PRI target increases the predicted probability of
voting for the PRI and decrease the one of abstaining (or turnout buying) and of voting for the
opposition (or vote buying) for both types of respondents. The relative change in the predicted
probability of voting for the PRI from a situation of not being a target to that of being one is also
quite similar for migration and non-migration-exposed voters (albeit slightly larger for migrant-
families). In the case of experiencing an opposition target, results are quite the same: an opposition
target increases the predicted probability of voting for the opposition for both types of respondents
as well. Although in the case of respondents without family in the US, even if an opposition target
increases the predicted probability of voting for this party, it also increases slightly the one of voting
for the PRI (together with the decrease in abstention). This means that the relative change in the
predicted probability of voting for the opposition from a situation of not being a target to that
of being one is larger for migrant families than for non-migrant ones (relative changes of 0.19 and
0.13, respectively). But in any case, this difference is not substantial. In sum, PRI targets and
opposition targets are similarly effective among migrant and non-migrant families.
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I explore this simple analysis further in Table 6.19 and use a dependent variable the breaks
down the opposition parties into PAN and PRD.16 As this table shows, and similar to the previous
analysis, experiencing a PRI target increases the log odds of voting for this party as opposed to
abstaining, and quite interestingly, a PAN target marginally increases the log odds of voting for the
PRD as opposed to abstaining. With respect to the migration variable, results suggest that a PRI
target increases the log odds of respondents with family in the US voting for the PAN as opposed
to abstaining. But for the most part, the migration variables remain not statistically significant.
When looking at the corresponding predicted probabilities in Tables 6.20, some interesting
contrast for respondents with and without family in the US emerge. First, the PRI is effective
among both types of respondents albeit, as above, the relative change is slightly larger for migration-
exposed than for non-migration-exposed voters. Most importantly, this increase in the predicted
probability of voting for the PRI after a PRI target happens through a decrease in abstention
for both types of voters (or turnout buying) but through a decrease in the predicted probability
of voting for the PRD in the case of respondents with family in the US (or vote buying) and
through a decrease in the predicted probability of voting for the PAN in the case of respondents
without family in the US (or vote buying). And second, while the PAN is effective in making
PAN targets increase the predicted probability of respondents with family in the US to vote for
the PAN, this is not the case for respondents without family in the US. That is, for non-migration-
exposed voters, a PAN target has no effect on the predicted probability of voting for the PAN but
instead it increases the predicted probability of these respondents voting for the competitors PRI
and PRD (or rejection with change of vote choice). In short, PRI targets are similarly effective
among migrant and non-migrant families, while PAN targets tend to motivate votes from members
of migrant families only.
As in the analysis for return migrants, I explore how controlling for relevant factors affects these
relationships of interest. As before, I incorporate political orientation by looking at past electoral
behavior (Table 6.21), left-right ideology (Table 6.22), and income redistribution preferences (Table
6.23). In general, results in these tables are quite similar to those of the simple models, at least in
16 I do not follow this approach for return migrants because due to the lower number of return migrants in the
sample and the fact that this variable divides respondents into more electoral choices, the analysis would rely on
some very small cells and is therefore not quite appropriate nor a robust estimation. Additionally, I do not conduct
an independent analysis for PRD targets due the low incidence of PRD targeting during these elections.
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terms of statistical significance. That is, a PRI target increases the log odds of voting for the PRI
as opposed to staying home on election day and an opposition target also increases the log odds of
voting for the opposition as opposed to abstaining. But only results with respect to PRI targeting
are robust to the different model specifications (i.e., different set of control variables). In addition,
the migration variables are mostly not statistically significant, which suggests generally not big
differences between migration and non-migration-exposed voters in terms of electoral effectiveness
and the subsequent vote choices. Quite interestingly as well, the variables capturing programmatic
targeting (PRI ads and Opposition Ads) are also not significant to explain electoral choices.17
Analyzing predicted probabilities, results are also similar to those of the simplest models.18 Es-
sentially, PRI targeting and opposition targeting are effective among respondents with and without
family in the US since both increase the chances of voting for the respective party. This happens
when for controlling for either past electoral behavior (Table 6.24), left-right ideology (Table 6.25)
or redistributive attitudes (Table 6.26). However, a couple of differences are worth emphasizing.
First, the previous finding that opposition targets not only increase votes for the opposition but also
for the PRI (together with decreases in abstention) is the case of respondents without family in the
US is not consistent when including control variables and using the different model specifications.
And second, looking at the relative change in the predicted probability of voting for the targeting
party from a situation of not being a target to that of being one, respondents with family in the
US experience a marginal increase that tends to be greater than the one for non-migrant family
members in the case of PRI targets. This means that the increase in the predicted probability of
voting for the PRI for a member of migrant family that is a PRI target versus one that is not a PRI
target is substantial (i.e., 0.27 for PRI targets members of migrant families and 0.12 for non-PRI
targets members of migrant families when controlling for past electoral behavior). Put differently,
PRI targets are relatively more effective among migrant families than among non-migrant ones,
but the marginal effect is mostly similar for member and non-members of migrant families when
looking at opposition targets and across the different model specifications.
In addition, I also expand this analysis by using the dependent variable that breaks down the
17 In some of the models (see Table 6.23) receiving promotion materials from the opposition decreases the log odds
of voting as opposed to abstaining, but this result does not hold across the different model specifications.
18 I calculate these predicted probabilities using all variables at the means, with the exception of the categorial
variables for location and region, which take respectively the values of ‘mixed’ location and ‘center’ region.
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opposition parties into PAN and PRD. As before, I incorporate political orientation by looking
at past electoral behavior (Tables 6.27 and 6.28), left-right ideology (Tables 6.29 and 6.30), and
income redistribution preferences (Tables 6.31 and 6.32). Some interesting results emerge from
these tables. In particular, and similar to the simple analysis, a PRI target tends to increase the
log odds of voting for the PRI as opposed to staying home on election day and, quite interestingly,
a PAN target increases the log odds of voting for the opposition, especially for the PRD, as opposed
to abstaining. In addition, with respect to the migration variables, these tables show the following:
i) having family in the US and not being a PRI target marginally decreases the log odds of voting
for the PRI as opposed to abstaining, and ii) while having family in the US and experiencing
a PAN target decreases the log odds of voting for the PRD, having family in the US and not
experiencing a PAN target increases the log odds of voting for the PRD. Finally, the variables
capturing programmatic targeting (PRI ads and PAN Ads) are also never statistically significant
to explain electoral choices when using this alternative dependent variable.
Comparing predicted probabilities for targeted and non-targeted respondents with and without
family in the US (See Tables 6.33, 6.34 and 6.35), the following findings are worth emphasizing.
First, as in the simple models, the PRI is effective among both respondents with and without close
relatives in the US. Also, while for both types of respondents a PRI target means a decrease in
abstention across the different model specifications (i.e., controlling for past electoral behavior,
left-right ideology and redistribution preferences), changes in the predicted probabilities of voting
for the opposition parties varies depending on the control variables. Thus, it is not possible to
reach a clear conclusion with respect to the effect of PRI targets on opposition votes. However,
it is fair to say that a PRI target is effective among both migration and non-migration-exposed
voters and, most notably, that the relative effect is larger for migrant family members. And second,
when looking at the effect of a PAN target, the previous results of the PAN not being effective
among respondents without family in the US does not hold when controlling for relevant factors
(especially when controlling for last elections and left-right ideology). Moreover, it is interesting
to note that a PAN target is similarly effective (i.e., relative change is similar) among migration
and non-migration-exposed voters. And this is probably due to the fact that, for non-migration-
exposed, a PAN target increases the predicted probability of voting not only for the PAN but also
for the competitor PRD, and for migration-exposed voters, a PAN target increases the predicted
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probability of voting for the PAN as well as (slightly) for the competitor PRI. In sum, PRI targets
are relatively more effective among members of migrant families than non-members, while PAN
targets are similarly effective among both types of respondents.
In sum, electoral targeting is effective among both members and non-members of migrant fam-
ilies. Moreover, the PRI tends to be relatively more effective among migrant families than among
non-migrant ones but the opposition/PAN targeting is similarly effective among these two types
of respondents. As a result, PRI targets increase substantially the predicted probability of getting
votes from members of migrant families versus similar members of migrant families that are not
targets. In addition, this effective targeting means that the highest probability of i) abstaining cor-
responds to non-targeted voters (similar for migrant and non-migrant family members), ii) voting
for the PRI is for PRI targeted non-migrant family members, and iii) voting for the opposition/PAN
is for opposition/PAN targeted migrant family members. Consequently, electoral targeting rein-
forces the voting patterns described at the beginning of this section: the probability of voting for
the PRI is highest for non-members of migrant families (e.g., 0.29 vs. 0.27 when controlling for
past electoral behavior - see Table 6.24), and the probability of voting for the opposition/PAN is
highest for members of migrant families (e.g., 0.83 vs. 0.75 for opposition votes, and 0.69 and 0.59
for PAN votes, when controlling for past electoral behavior - see Tables 6.24 and 6.33). But in
any case, the differences in these predicted probabilities of making different electoral choices from
targeted and non-targeted migration and non-migration-exposed voters are not substantial.
6.3.2 2006 Presidential Elections
As in the case of the 2000 elections, I start by simply analyzing the predicted probabilities of
each vote choice and running a set of multinomial logistic regressions (abstention as the reference
category) with the migration factors - remittance recipients and family in the US - as the only
independent variables. In particular, Tables 6.36 and 6.37 show, respectively, the results of the
multinomial logistic regression and the corresponding predicted probabilities for remittance recip-
ients and non-recipients. As these tables show, being a remittance recipient is not a significant
predictor of the different electoral choices (i.e., abstain, vote incumbent PAN, or voted other),
which translates into both types of respondents choosing with quite equal probabilities the differ-
ent voting alternatives: abstain with 0.10 chances, vote for the incumbent PAN with about 0.35
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chances and cast other option with about 0.55 chances (See Table 6.37).
Similarly, Tables 6.38 and 6.39 show the results of the multinomial logistic regression and the
corresponding predicted probabilities for respondents with and without family in the US. Results
in Tables 6.38 indicate that having family in the US decreases the log odds of voting for the
incumbent PAN and the opposition as opposed to abstaining, although this relationship is not
statistically significant. In terms of predicted probabilities (Table 6.39), respondents with family
in the US have a higher predicted probability of voting for the incumbent PAN (0.38 versus 0.34),
while those without it have a higher predicted probability of voting for the opposition (0.54 versus
0.48, respectively). In any case, these differences are quite small. Additionally, when incorporating
variation in the opposition party of choice in Tables 6.40 and 6.41, results show again that the
migration variable is not statistically significant to predict voting behavior. Also, the corresponding
predicted probabilities in Table 6.41 indicate small differences between members and non-members
of migrant families, essentially: respondents with family in the US voted for the PAN with a 0.38
probability and this value is 0.34 for those respondents without it, while these probabilities are 0.26
and 0.30 in the case of voting for the PRD. The choices of abstention and voting PRI are pretty
much equal for both respondents.
Given this baseline behavior of migration and non-migration-exposed voters, it is now necessary
to incorporate the effect of electoral targeting on these vote choices.
Remittance Recipients
Table 6.42 takes a simple first look (i.e., no control variables) at the extent to which PAN and oppo-
sition targeting have an effect on voting behavior among remittance recipients and non-recipients.19
As these tables show, while PAN targeting is not a significant predictor of electoral choices, experi-
encing an opposition target increases the log odds of voting for both the PAN and the opposition as
opposed to staying home on election day. With respect to the remittance recipient variable, results
are not statistically significant.
Nonetheless, in order to get a better comparison of the effect of targeting on electoral choices
19 I run this section’s analysis using the weights from wave 3 given that the dependent variable is from wave 3.
Nonetheless conclusions/results of this simple analysis are the same when using alternatively weights from wave 1,
wave 2 or no weights at all. In addition, results are also the same with the targeting variable that incorporates all
respondents (See previous chapter), instead of when using only those respondents who participated in all the waves.
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among remittance recipients and non-recipients, I report predicted probabilities in Table 6.43.
Briefly, this Table 6.43 shows that PAN targeting is effective among remittance recipients and non-
recipients since for both types of respondents experiencing a PAN target increases the predicted
probability of voting for the PAN and decreases the one of voting for the opposition (or vote buying).
Further, this targeting has barely any effects on abstention (or turnout buying) for recipients as well
as non-recipients. Interestingly, when looking at the relative change in the predicted probability of
voting for the targeting party from a situation of not being a target to that of being one, remittance
recipients experience a larger marginal change than non-recipients. In the case of experiencing an
opposition target, results in the predicted probability show that opposition targeting is effective
among non-recipients and ineffective among remittance recipients. Essentially, opposition targeting
is ineffective among remittance recipients because even though the chances of abstention decrease,
opposition targeted recipients report a higher probability of voting for the PAN and a lower one
of voting for the targeting opposition (or rejection with change of vote choice). This suggests that
the opposition is mobilizing remittance recipients who end up voting for the incumbent PAN. On
the contrary, opposition targeting is effective among non-recipients. In short, PAN targets are
relatively more effective among remittance recipients while opposition targets are ineffective for
recipients and effective for non-recipients. Yet, the mostly lack of statistically significant results in
Table 6.42 translates into these changes of predicted probabilities from targeted and non-targeted
remittance recipients and non-recipients being quite not substantial.
Given these baseline results, I explore how controlling for relevant factors affects, if at all, the
relationships of interest. As explained in the previous section, I include those individual charac-
teristics that intervene in the selections process of who gets a target such as education, wealth
and political orientation, as well as those individual attitudes that affect the dependent variable
such as evaluations of the nation’s economy and democracy. Particularly, I incorporate political
orientation by looking at past electoral behavior (Table 6.44), left-right ideology (Table 6.45), and
income redistribution preferences (Table 6.46). In general, results in these tables are quite similar
to those of the simple models. That is, while an opposition target increases the log odds of voting
for both the incumbent PAN and the opposition as opposed to abstaining, a PAN target decreases
the log odds of voting for the opposition as opposed to staying home on election day (albeit in only
some of the models). In addition, the remittance recipient variables are mostly not statistically
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significant, although being a remittance recipients and an opposition targets marginally decreases
the log odds of voting for the opposition as opposed to abstaining.
Building on these analyses and analyzing predicted probabilities, results show some interesting
contrast with that of the simple models.20 Essentially, PAN targeting and opposition targeting are
not effective among remittance recipients but effective among non-recipients. That is, for remit-
tance recipients experiencing a PAN target or an opposition target do not increase the predicted
probabilities of voting for the respective targeting party. This happens when for controlling for ei-
ther past electoral behavior (Table 6.47), left-right ideology (Table 6.48) or redistributive attitudes
(Table 6.49). Moreover, this happens mostly because targeting not only increases the chances of
abstaining (or rejection with abstention) but also those of voting the competing party (or rejection
with change of vote choice, especially more votes for the PAN due to opposition targeting). Explor-
ing this result further by comparing those respondents who voted for the PAN in the past or PAN
supporters and those who did not or non-PAN supporters, the predicted probability of abstaining
in the former group goes from 0.03 when non-targeted to 0.08 when targeted, and from 0.02 when
non-targeted to 0.06 when targeted in the latter group. That means that abstention among remit-
tance recipients increases for both targeted PAN supporters and non-supporters. It is important
to notice however that the changes in the predicted probabilities from a situation of being a target
to that of not being a target are quite small. By contrast, in the case of non-recipients, both PAN
and opposition targets increase the predicted probabilities of voting for the targeting party mostly
through a decrease the chances of voting for the main electoral contender (or vote buying).
In sum, results suggest that electoral targeting is not effective among remittance recipients but
effective among non-recipients (especially when controlling for a full set of confounding factors).
Nonetheless, the corresponding changes in the predicted probabilities from a situation of being
a target to that of not being one are quite small. In addition, these findings translate into the
highest probability of i) abstaining corresponds to PAN-targeted remittance recipients, ii) voting
for the PAN is for opposition targeted remittance recipients, and iii) voting for the opposition is
for non-opposition targeted remittance recipients. Put differently, the highest probability of voting
for the PAN is 0.26 for opposition targeted remittance recipients and 0.25 for PAN targeted non-
20 I calculate these predicted probabilities using all variables at their means, with the exception of the categorial
variables for location and region, which take respectively the values of ‘mixed’ location and ‘center’ region.
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recipient (when controlling for last electoral behavior). And the highest probability of voting for the
opposition is 0.76 for non-opposition targeted remittance recipients and 0.75 opposition-targeted
non-recipients. In short, the effectiveness of targeting for non-recipients and the ineffectiveness for
recipients makes the predicted probabilities of the different electoral choices nearly equal for these
two types of respondents. But again, not significant changes in predicted probabilities happen when
comparing targeted and non-targeted remittance recipients and non-recipients.
Family Abroad
Following the same approach as for remittance recipients, Table 6.50 takes a simple first look (i.e.,
no control variables) at the extent to which PAN and opposition targeting have an effect on voting
behavior among respondents with and without family in the US.21 As this table shows, and as in
the case of remittance recipients, while PAN targeting is not a significant predictor of electoral
choices, experiencing an opposition target increases the log odds of voting for both the PAN and
the opposition as opposed to staying home on election day. With respect to the migration variable,
results are not statistically significant.
Additionally, in order to get a better comparison of the effect of targeting on electoral choices
among migration and non-migration-exposed voters, I report predicted probabilities in Table 6.51.
According to these results (table 6.51), PAN targeting is only effective among voters with family in
the US since for these respondents experiencing a PAN target increases the predicted probability
of voting for the PAN and decrease the probability of voting for the opposition (or vote buying).
In the case of respondents without family in the US, a PAN target decreases the chances of voting
for this party and increases the chances of voting for the opposition (or rejection with change of
vote choice). Also, this targeting has barely any effects on abstention (or turnout buying) for both
members and non-members of migrant families. In the case of experiencing an opposition target,
results in the predicted probability show that opposition targeting is effective among non-members
of migrant families and ineffective among members of migrant families. More precisely, opposition
targeting is ineffective among respondents with family in the US because even though the chances
21 As in the case of remittance recipients, I run this section’s analysis using the weights from wave 3 given that the
dependent variable is from wave 3. Nonetheless conclusions/results of this simple analysis are the same when using
alternatively weights from wave 1, wave 2 or no weights at all. In addition, results are also the same with the targeting
variable that incorporates all respondents (See previous chapter), instead of when using only those respondents who
participated in all the waves.
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of abstention decrease, opposition targeted migration-exposed voters report a higher probability
of voting for the PAN and no changes in the probability of voting for the targeting opposition.
This suggests that the opposition is mobilizing migration-exposed voters who end up voting for the
incumbent PAN. On the contrary, opposition targeting is effective among non-members of migrant
families through an increase in the predicted probability of voting for the targeting opposition and
decreases in both abstention and voting chances for the incumbent PAN. In short, PAN targets are
effective for members of migrant families and ineffective for non-members of migrant families, while
opposition targets are ineffective for the members of these families and effective for non-members
of migrant families.
I explore this simple analysis further in Tables 6.52, 6.53 and 6.54, and use the dependent vari-
able the breaks down the opposition parties into PRI and PRD.22 As these tables show, experiencing
a PRI target increases the log odds of voting for any of the parties as opposed to abstaining, but
none of the other targeting variables are statistically significant. And the same lack of statistically
significant results applies to the migration variables.
When looking at the corresponding predicted probabilities in Tables 6.55, some interesting
contrast for respondents with and without family in the US emerge. First, as before, the PAN
is only effective among members of migrant families. Essentially, PAN targeting increases the
predicted probability of getting votes from members of migrant family, mostly through a decrease
in votes for the PRI and PRD (or vote buying), while the opposite holds for respondents without
family in the US (i.e., PAN targeting increases the predicted probability of votes for the PRI
and the PRD). Second, the PRI is effective among both types of respondents albeit the relative
change is larger for non-migration-exposed than for migration-exposed voters. Most importantly,
this increase in the predicted probability of voting for the PRI after a PRI target happens through
a decrease in the predicted probability of voting for the PAN (or vote buying) for both types of
respondents but only through a decrease in abstention for non-migration-exposed voters (or turnout
buying). Interestingly, PRI targeting also increases the predicted probability of voting for the PRD
for both types migration and non-migration-exposed voters. And finally, the effect of PRD targeting
is pretty similar to that of PRI: the PRD is effective among both types of respondents albeit the
22 I do not follow this approach for remittance recipients because due to the lower number of these respondents in
the sample and the fact that this variable divides respondents into more electoral choices, the analysis would rely on
some very small cells and is therefore not quite appropriate nor a robust estimation.
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relative change is larger for non-migration-exposed than for migration-exposed voters. Moreover,
PRD targeting also increases the predicted probability of voting for the PAN for both migration
and non-migration-exposed voters but especially for the former group. In short, PAN targets are
only effective among migration-exposed voters, and PRI and PRD targets, while effective among
both types of respondents, are relatively more effective among non-migration-exposed voters.
As in the analysis for remittance recipients, I explore how controlling for relevant factors affects
these relationships of interest. As before, I incorporate political orientation by looking at past elec-
toral behavior (Table 6.56), left-right ideology (Table 6.57), and income redistribution preferences
(Table 6.58). In general, these results show that a PAN target tends to decrease the log odds of
voting for the opposition as opposed to abstaining (although this result is not consistent across
models), and an opposition target increases the log odds of voting for the opposition as opposed to
staying home on election day. Also, the migration variables are mostly not statistically significant;
although interestingly, Table 6.56 indicates that being a member of migrant and an opposition
targets decreases the log odds of voting for the opposition as opposed to abstaining. This last re-
sult conforms with the previous finding of opposition targets being less effective or even ineffective
among migrant families. But, in any case, these results suggest overall not big differences between
migration and non-migration-exposed voters.
Analyzing predicted probabilities, results are also similar to those of the simplest models, and
when controlling for either past electoral behavior (Table 6.59), left-right ideology (Table 6.60) or
redistributive attitudes (Table 6.61).23 In particular, PAN targeting tends to be effective among
members of migrant families but ineffective among non-members of migrant families (although this
does not hold when controlling for left-right political orientation24). The effectiveness happens
mostly through a decrease in the predicted probability of voting for the opposition, while the inef-
fectiveness means that PAN targeting leads non-members of migrant families to increase the chances
of voting for the opposition and to abstain more.25 On the flip side, opposition targeting is effective
among non-members of migrant families but ineffective among members of migrant families. This
23 I calculate these predicted probabilities using all variables at the means, with the exception of the categorial
variables for location and region, which take respectively the values of ‘mixed’ location and ‘center’ region.
24 This could be motivated by the lower number of observations included in this analysis, since a lot of respondents
respond ‘do not know’ to the question about their location on the left-right ideological scale.
25 Analyzing this abstention further into those who voted for the PAN in the previous elections or PAN supporters
and those who did not or PAN non-supporters, changes in abstention increases for both supporters and non-supporters.
Hence, there is no indication that the PAN is especially targeting non-supporters to stay home (or abstention buying).
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happens because opposition targeting leads members of migrant families to increase the chances
of voting for the incumbent PAN instead, while for non-members of migrant families opposition
targeting does increase the chances of voting for the opposition (and decrease the ones of voting for
the PAN - or vote buying). These results are consistent across the different model specifications. In
short, the incumbent PAN is only effective among migration-exposed voters, and the opposition is
only effective among non-migration-exposed voters. Nonetheless, the corresponding changes in the
predicted probabilities from a situation of being a target to that of not being one are quite small.
In addition, I also expand this analysis by using the dependent variable that breaks down the
opposition parties into PRI and PRD. As before, I incorporate political orientation by looking at
past electoral behavior (Tables 6.62, 6.63, and 6.64), left-right ideology (Tables 6.66, 6.67 and 6.68),
and income redistribution preferences (Tables 6.70, 6.71 and 6.72). The most consistent result in
these tables is that PRI targeting increases the log odds of voting for the PRI and for the PRD
as opposed to staying home (similar to the finding in the simple model without control variables).
Results with respect to PAN and PRD targeting are not statistically significant. Interestingly,
and with respect to the migration variables, these tables show that having family in the US and
experiencing a PRI target decreases the log odds of voting for the PRI and the PRD as opposed
to abstaining. This last result suggests, as previous findings, that opposition targets - at least PRI
targets - are less effective or even ineffective among migrant families. Other than that the variable
that captures migration exposure is not statistically significant.
Comparing predicted probabilities for targeted and non-targeted respondents with and without
family in the US (See Tables 6.65, 6.69 and 6.73), the following findings are worth emphasizing.
First, and as before, PAN targeting tends to be effective among members of migrant families but
ineffective among non-members of migrant families (with the exception of when controlling for left-
right political orientation). Nonetheless, it is important to notice that PAN targeting also leads
some migrant families to vote for the PRD, which makes electoral targeting not that effective. Still,
the relative change due to PAN targeting is larger for the increase in PAN votes than the one for
PRD votes. Second, PRI targeting increases the predicted probability of getting more votes for
non-migration-exposed voters, but decreases the one of getting votes for migration-exposed ones.
Still, although this seems to indicate the PRI targeting is only effective among non-members of
migrant families, these PRI targeted voters also result in increasing the chances of voting for the
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PRD. And the relative increase in actually larger for PRD than for the targeting PRI party. As a
result, one can suggest that PRI is generally unsuccessful in ensuring electoral success among both
types of votes. Of course, the fact that this party had lower winning chances in these elections can
also explain this low targeting effectiveness. Finally, PRD targeting seems to mobilize members of
migrant families to vote for the PAN since the predicted probability to vote for the PAN increases
with PRD targeting but the one of voting for the PRD decreases. As for respondents without
family in the US, PRD targeting leads to an increase in the predicted probability to vote for the
PRD, but also increases votes for the PAN and the magnitude of this effect varies depending on
the model specification. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the PRD is not highly successful
among non-migration-exposed voters either. In short, results suggest that the PAN is only effective
among members of migrant families but ineffective among non-members of migrant families. On
the other hand, the opposition is ineffective among members of migrant families, while the results
were not very supportive of the opposition being effective among members of non-migrant families.
But again, not significant changes in predicted probabilities happen when comparing targeted and
non-targeted respondents with and without family in the US.
In sum, the most consistent finding is that the incumbent PAN is only effective among migration-
exposed voters, and the opposition parties - both PRI and PRD - are generally effective among non-
migration-exposed voters. Nonetheless, the corresponding changes in the predicted probabilities
from a situation of being a target to that of not being one are quite small. In addition, this
translates into the highest probability of i) abstaining is similar for targeted members of migrant
and non-migrant families, ii) voting for the PAN is for PAN targeted/PRD targeted migration-
exposed voters, and iii) voting for the opposition is for opposition targeted members of non-migrant
families; that is, PRI targeted members of non-migrant families in the case of votes for the PRI and
PRD. This last results suggest that some PRI targets ended up voting for the PRD or the contender
with better winning options. Put differently, the highest probability of voting for the PAN is 0.28
for PAN targeted migration-exposed voters (controlling for past electoral behavior) and 0.21 for a
non-migration-exposed voter in the same situation. And the highest probability of voting for the
opposition is 0.71 for non-opposition targeted remittance recipients and 0.79 opposition-targeted
members of non-migrant families, while members of migrant families in the same situation vote for
the opposition with a 0.68 probability (Table 6.59). Of course, these differences are not substantial.
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6.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter contributes to our understanding on the effectiveness of electoral targeting for migrant
and non-migrant families. Essentially, one point is clear: migration and non-migration-exposed
voters are not that different in their electoral choices, even after taking into account the effect of
electoral targeting. Nonetheless, a few additional points in connection with the Mexico’s 2000 and
2006 elections are worth emphasizing.
In the context of the 2000 presidential elections, this chapter finds that while PRI targeting
tends to be relatively more effective among migration-exposed voters (i.e., return migrants and
members of migrant families), opposition targeting is similarly effective among both migration and
non-migration-exposed ones. In addition, the highest probability of voting for the PRI corresponds
to non-migrant-families, but the opposite occurs when looking at the probability of voting for the
opposition; that is, migrant families have the highest probability of voting for the opposition. As
a result, the findings have the following implications: i) no weakening of electoral targeting due
to exposure to international migration, ii) members of migrant families favored the opposition and
supported the regime change these elections were mostly about (although again the differences with
non-migrant families are small), and iii) the mobilization of opposition supporters, which was so
key for Fox’s victory, included migration-exposed voters.
With respect to the Mexico’s 2006 presidential elections, this chapter shows that electoral
targeting tends to be ineffective among remittance recipients but effective among non-recipients.
Similarly, PAN targeting is only effective among respondents with family in the US, while opposi-
tion targeting suggests more effectiveness among members of non-migrant families. Interestingly,
this means the highest probability of voting for the PAN is for those remittance recipients who
are opposition targets, and the opposition gets more votes from remittance recipients when non-
opposition-targeted. Thus, this result indicates that targeting leads remittance recipients to reject
those strategies and vote for the contender instead. Most importantly, it signals that receiving
monetary help from abroad might be weakening some of these ‘questionable’ electoral practices. In
the case of the broader category of respondents with family in the US, the PAN targeting effective-
ness gets members of migrant families to be the ones with the highest probability of voting for this
party, while the contrary holds for opposition targeting effectiveness; i.e., opposition targeting gets
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members of non-migrant families to be the ones with the highest probability of voting for them.
Nonetheless, these findings rely on small differences when comparing targeted and non-targeted mi-
gration and non-migration-exposed voters, and therefore, these observations are not strong claims.
In a nutshell, these results suggest that Calderon’s victory was in part due by the PAN’s successful
mobilization of respondents with family in the US as well as by the opposition targeting of remit-
tance recipients. Moreover, given the tied electoral result, one can wonder if the opposition could
have changed the outcome by focusing their efforts exclusively on non-migration-exposed voters.
6.5 Figures and Tables
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Table 6.3: Return Migrant and Vote Choice
Voted PRI Voted Other
Return Migrant −0.061 0.327
(0.401) (0.347)
Constant 0.503∗∗∗ 1.166∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.085)
Observations 1148
AIC 2,269.488
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 6.4: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrants vs. Non-Return Migrants
Abstained Voted PRI Voted Other
Return Migrant 0.14 0.22 0.63
Non-Return Migrant 0.17 0.28 0.54
Table 6.5: Family US and Vote Choice
Voted PRI Voted Other
Family US 0.035 0.287†
(0.183) (0.165)
Constant 0.493∗∗∗ 1.065∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.113)
Observations 1149
AIC 2,262.611
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 6.6: Predicted Probabilities - Family US vs. Non-Family US
Abstained Voted PRI Voted Other
Family US 0.15 0.25 0.58
Non-Family US 0.18 0.29 0.52
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Table 6.7: Family US and Vote Choice
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US 0.002 0.282† 0.172
(0.174) (0.161) (0.220)
Constant 0.330∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ −0.653∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.112) (0.154)
Observations 1149
AIC 2,975.929
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention/Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 6.8: Predicted Probabilities - Family US vs. Non-Family US
Abstained/Other Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US 0.18 0.25 0.44 0.11
Non-Family US 0.21 0.29 0.38 0.11
Table 6.9: Return Migrant and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets
Voted PRI Voted Other Voted PRI Voted Other
Return Migrant * PRI Target 0.641 −0.625
(0.920) (0.861)
Return Migrant * Opposition Target −0.612 0.113
(1.397) (1.151)
Return Migrant −0.430 0.452 0.027 0.329
(0.521) (0.390) (0.421) (0.369)
PRI Target 0.984∗∗∗ 0.372†
(0.228) (0.217)
Opposition Target 0.576∗ 0.779∗∗
(0.277) (0.254)
Constant 0.244∗ 1.090∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 1.042∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.094) (0.101) (0.091)
AIC 2,242.993 2,265.094
Observations 1148 1148
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 6.10: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice
Abstained PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Return Migrant 0.11 0.15 0.08 0.15
Non-Return Migrant 0.11 0.19 0.10 0.18
Voted PRI PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Return Migrant 0.47 0.12 0.12 0.24
Non-Return Migrant 0.39 0.24 0.27 0.28
Voted Opposition PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Return Migrant 0.41 0.71 0.79 0.60
Non-Return Migrant 0.49 0.56 0.62 0.52
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Table 6.11: Return Migrant and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets
Voted PRI Voted Other Voted PRI Voted Other
Return Migrant * PRI Target −0.032 −0.739
(1.092) (0.945)
Return Migrant * Opposition Target −0.519 0.075
(1.726) (1.233)
Return Migrant −0.719 0.470 −0.385 0.343
(0.688) (0.487) (0.525) (0.465)
PRI Target 1.056∗∗∗ 0.399
(0.304) (0.270)
PRI Ads −0.079 −0.013
(0.254) (0.212)
Opposition Target 0.260 0.696∗
(0.336) (0.299)
Opposition Ads −0.259 −0.429†
(0.255) (0.227)
PRI Last Elections 2.311∗∗∗ −0.311
(0.283) (0.246)
Opposition Last Elections −1.974∗∗∗ 1.309∗∗∗
(0.441) (0.257)
Education 0.321∗ 0.231∗ 0.242† 0.197†
(0.136) (0.110) (0.129) (0.113)
Age 0.006 0.023∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Women −0.284 −0.109 −0.246 −0.061
(0.250) (0.207) (0.239) (0.212)
Wealth 0.226∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.203∗ 0.285∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.084) (0.093) (0.084)
Church Attendance 0.251∗ 0.099 0.328∗∗ 0.066
(0.112) (0.091) (0.107) (0.094)
Risk Acceptant −1.263∗∗∗ 0.536∗ −1.346∗∗∗ 0.519∗
(0.257) (0.227) (0.244) (0.234)
Interest Politics 0.367∗ 0.274∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.274∗
(0.146) (0.122) (0.141) (0.127)
National Economic Situation 0.041 −0.115 0.174 −0.120
(0.167) (0.142) (0.159) (0.144)
Democracy 0.106 −0.096 0.113 −0.048
(0.254) (0.207) (0.242) (0.213)
Rural Location 0.032 −0.018 −0.026 −0.157
(0.464) (0.397) (0.434) (0.405)
Urban Location 0.010 −0.097 0.074 −0.043
(0.430) (0.371) (0.403) (0.378)
Region Dummies Y Y Y Y
Constant −2.864∗∗∗ −1.799∗∗ −2.551∗∗∗ −1.618∗
(0.788) (0.663) (0.746) (0.679)
AIC 1,467.299 1,500.435
Observations 988 988
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.12: Return Migrant and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets
Voted PRI Voted Other Voted PRI Voted Other
Return Migrant * PRI Target 0.458 −0.933
(1.113) (0.942)
Return Migrant * Opposition Target −0.659 −0.335
(1.734) (1.210)
Return Migrant −1.333† 0.322 −0.907† 0.206
(0.696) (0.469) (0.544) (0.439)
PRI Target 1.273∗∗∗ 0.684∗
(0.343) (0.320)
PRI Ads 0.006 −0.006
(0.270) (0.231)
Opposition Target 0.594 0.740∗
(0.384) (0.339)
Opposition Ads −0.303 −0.125
(0.279) (0.239)
Right ID 0.082∗ −0.031 0.085∗ −0.025
(0.040) (0.033) (0.040) (0.033)
Education 0.105 0.076 0.107 0.099
(0.138) (0.118) (0.136) (0.118)
Age 0.042∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Women −0.253 0.056 −0.257 0.060
(0.262) (0.225) (0.259) (0.224)
Wealth 0.251∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.248∗ 0.321∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.093) (0.107) (0.092)
Church Attendance 0.419∗∗∗ 0.076 0.420∗∗∗ 0.069
(0.118) (0.099) (0.117) (0.100)
Risk Acceptant −1.257∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗ −1.272∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗
(0.277) (0.256) (0.273) (0.256)
Interest Politics 0.574∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗
(0.153) (0.133) (0.155) (0.136)
National Economic Situation 0.121 −0.141 0.119 −0.173
(0.179) (0.155) (0.177) (0.155)
Democracy 0.252 −0.185 0.197 −0.150
(0.267) (0.226) (0.264) (0.226)
Rural Location 0.219 0.013 0.124 0.014
(0.526) (0.462) (0.517) (0.461)
Urban Location 0.084 −0.135 0.093 −0.089
(0.481) (0.424) (0.474) (0.424)
Region Dummies Y Y Y Y
Constant −4.433∗∗∗ −2.165∗∗ −4.212∗∗∗ −2.156∗∗
(0.883) (0.755) (0.866) (0.755)
AIC 1,371.589 1,388.229
Observations 866 866
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.13: Return Migrant and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets
Voted PRI Voted Other Voted PRI Voted Other
Return Migrant * PRI Target 0.262 −0.840
(1.003) (0.921)
Return Migrant * Opposition Target −0.529 0.016
(1.669) (1.196)
Return Migrant −0.786 0.364 −0.498 0.192
(0.613) (0.453) (0.493) (0.428)
PRI Target 1.162∗∗∗ 0.531∗
(0.281) (0.264)
PRI Ads −0.126 −0.083
(0.233) (0.204)
Opposition Target 0.463 0.699∗
(0.328) (0.291)
Opposition Ads −0.520∗ −0.397†
(0.242) (0.211)
Less Redistribution 0.009 −0.017 0.005 −0.015
(0.035) (0.031) (0.035) (0.031)
Education 0.163 0.177 0.140 0.183†
(0.124) (0.108) (0.123) (0.108)
Age 0.029∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Women −0.372 −0.196 −0.330 −0.187
(0.231) (0.202) (0.230) (0.202)
Wealth 0.180† 0.332∗∗∗ 0.177† 0.322∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.082) (0.091) (0.081)
Church Attendance 0.278∗∗ 0.095 0.282∗∗ 0.080
(0.105) (0.090) (0.104) (0.090)
Risk Acceptant −1.337∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗ −1.362∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗
(0.236) (0.223) (0.234) (0.225)
Interest Politics 0.471∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗
(0.133) (0.119) (0.136) (0.122)
National Economic Situation 0.165 −0.141 0.177 −0.162
(0.154) (0.137) (0.153) (0.137)
Democracy 0.189 −0.186 0.128 −0.174
(0.230) (0.200) (0.230) (0.202)
Rural Location 0.158 0.038 0.062 0.008
(0.435) (0.392) (0.430) (0.392)
Urban Location 0.083 −0.110 0.094 −0.083
(0.399) (0.360) (0.395) (0.360)
Region Dummies Y Y Y Y
Constant −2.523∗∗∗ −1.971∗∗ −2.232∗∗ −1.848∗∗
(0.743) (0.665) (0.730) (0.662)
AIC 1,710.424 1,726.265
Observations 1029 1029
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.14: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: past electoral behavior)
Abstained PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Return Migrant 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.11
Non-Return Migrant 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.14
Voted PRI PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Return Migrant 0.19 0.06 0.03 0.09
Non-Return Migrant 0.28 0.16 0.13 0.17
Voted Opposition PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Return Migrant 0.67 0.82 0.89 0.78
Non-Return Migrant 0.62 0.68 0.78 0.68
Table 6.15: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: Left-Right ID)
Abstained PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Return Migrant 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.13
Non-Return Migrant 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.13
Voted PRI PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Return Migrant 0.25 0.04 0.05 0.08
Non-Return Migrant 0.31 0.19 0.21 0.22
Voted Opposition PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Return Migrant 0.62 0.82 0.84 0.77
Non-Return Migrant 0.61 0.66 0.71 0.64
Table 6.16: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: redistribution preferences)
Abstained PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Return Migrant 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.13
Non-Return Migrant 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.13
Voted PRI PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Return Migrant 0.33 0.08 0.07 0.14
Non-Return Migrant 0.35 0.21 0.21 0.24
Voted Opposition PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Return Migrant 0.55 0.79 0.84 0.72
Non-Return Migrant 0.56 0.64 0.70 0.61
193
Table 6.17: Family US and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets
Voted PRI Voted Other Voted PRI Voted Other
Family US * PRI Target 0.188 0.266
(0.445) (0.425)
Family US * Opposition Target −0.295 −0.0002
(0.547) (0.502)
Family US −0.065 0.220 0.054 0.237
(0.215) (0.184) (0.198) (0.178)
PRI Target 0.958∗∗ 0.178
(0.308) (0.300)
Opposition Target 0.668† 0.730†
(0.402) (0.376)
Constant 0.256† 1.033∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.125) (0.132) (0.120)
AIC 2,237.132 2,259.828
Observations 1149 1149
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 6.18: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and Electoral Targeting
Abstained PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.09 0.17 0.09 0.16
Non-Family US 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.19
Voted PRI PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.37 0.21 0.22 0.26
Non-Family US 0.43 0.25 0.31 0.29
Voted Opposition PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.53 0.61 0.67 0.56
Non-Family US 0.43 0.55 0.58 0.51
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Table 6.19: Family US and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US * PRI Target 0.474 0.867∗ 0.001
(0.408) (0.406) (0.546)
Family US * PAN Target −0.233 0.190 −0.717
(0.626) (0.599) (0.753)
Family US −0.152 0.094 0.175 0.001 0.228 0.231
(0.206) (0.181) (0.247) (0.183) (0.169) (0.232)
PRI Target 0.699∗ −0.274 0.102
(0.275) (0.287) (0.374)
PAN Target 0.749 0.542 0.966†
(0.469) (0.464) (0.545)
Constant 0.141 0.635∗∗∗ −0.675∗∗∗ 0.272∗ 0.547∗∗∗ −0.737∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.125) (0.174) (0.123) (0.116) (0.163)
AIC 2,949.966 2,979.235
Observations 1149 1149
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention/Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 6.20: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and Electoral Targeting
Abstained/Other PRI Target No PRI Target PAN Target No PAN Target
Family US 0.11 0.21 0.11 0.19
Non- Family US 0.18 0.21 0.12 0.22
Voted PRI PRI Target No PRI Target PAN Target No PAN Target
Family US 0.37 0.21 0.25 0.25
Non- Family US 0.43 0.25 0.34 0.29
Voted PAN PRI Target No PRI Target PAN Target No PAN Target
Family US 0.43 0.44 0.53 0.42
Non- Family US 0.26 0.41 0.37 0.38
Voted PRD PRI Target No PRI Target PAN Target No PAN Target
Family US 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.11
Non- Family US 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.10
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Table 6.21: Family US and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets
Voted PRI Voted Other Voted PRI Voted Other
Family US * PRI Target 0.204 −0.262
(0.565) (0.507)
Family US * Opposition Target −0.174 0.084
(0.636) (0.567)
Family US −0.349 0.168 −0.277 0.097
(0.287) (0.226) (0.255) (0.226)
PRI Target 0.951∗ 0.474
(0.425) (0.388)
PRI Ads 0.003 0.001
(0.256) (0.213)
Opposition Target 0.318 0.634
(0.486) (0.441)
Opposition Ads −0.242 −0.418†
(0.258) (0.228)
PRI Last Elections 2.307∗∗∗ −0.341
(0.285) (0.246)
Opposition Last Elections −2.194∗∗∗ 1.290∗∗∗
(0.469) (0.258)
Education 0.322∗ 0.196† 0.247† 0.159
(0.137) (0.111) (0.130) (0.113)
Age 0.005 0.022∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.011
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Women −0.248 −0.161 −0.210 −0.119
(0.250) (0.207) (0.239) (0.211)
Wealth 0.248∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.224∗ 0.296∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.085) (0.094) (0.084)
Church Attendance 0.248∗ 0.084 0.323∗∗ 0.043
(0.113) (0.092) (0.108) (0.095)
Risk Acceptant −1.310∗∗∗ 0.570∗ −1.370∗∗∗ 0.556∗
(0.258) (0.227) (0.245) (0.234)
Interest Politics 0.369∗ 0.268∗ 0.456∗∗ 0.268∗
(0.146) (0.122) (0.142) (0.127)
National Economic Situation 0.053 −0.134 0.190 −0.142
(0.168) (0.142) (0.160) (0.145)
Democracy 0.073 −0.041 0.092 −0.0001
(0.254) (0.207) (0.243) (0.213)
Rural Location −0.038 −0.022 −0.091 −0.184
(0.468) (0.397) (0.437) (0.405)
Urban Location −0.001 −0.110 0.061 −0.054
(0.433) (0.370) (0.403) (0.377)
Region Dummies Y Y Y Y
Constant −2.807∗∗∗ −1.776∗∗ −2.536∗∗∗ −1.514∗
(0.794) (0.665) (0.751) (0.682)
AIC 1,459.123 1,487.550
Observations 989 989
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.22: Family US and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets
Voted PRI Voted Other Voted PRI Voted Other
Family US * PRI Target 0.376 −0.233
(0.649) (0.606)
Family US * Opposition Target −1.218 −1.178
(0.837) (0.766)
Family US −0.578† 0.181 −0.231 0.257
(0.299) (0.245) (0.280) (0.242)
PRI Target 1.155∗ 0.741
(0.499) (0.473)
PRI Ads 0.106 0.058
(0.272) (0.233)
Opposition Target 1.391† 1.482∗
(0.722) (0.674)
Opposition Ads −0.251 −0.062
(0.282) (0.241)
Right ID 0.087∗ −0.029 0.083∗ −0.029
(0.040) (0.033) (0.040) (0.034)
Education 0.137 0.058 0.140 0.077
(0.139) (0.120) (0.138) (0.119)
Age 0.042∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Women −0.155 0.031 −0.160 0.033
(0.263) (0.226) (0.260) (0.225)
Wealth 0.269∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.262∗ 0.320∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.094) (0.109) (0.094)
Church Attendance 0.418∗∗∗ 0.056 0.424∗∗∗ 0.058
(0.119) (0.101) (0.119) (0.102)
Risk Acceptant −1.330∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗ −1.332∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗
(0.280) (0.256) (0.275) (0.257)
Interest Politics 0.590∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗
(0.154) (0.134) (0.155) (0.137)
National Economic Situation 0.134 −0.171 0.114 −0.217
(0.180) (0.157) (0.179) (0.157)
Democracy 0.208 −0.151 0.188 −0.096
(0.267) (0.227) (0.266) (0.228)
Rural Location 0.214 0.033 0.152 −0.007
(0.527) (0.461) (0.515) (0.461)
Urban Location 0.197 −0.119 0.179 −0.108
(0.481) (0.422) (0.469) (0.420)
Region Dummies Y Y Y Y
Constant −4.552∗∗∗ −2.201∗∗ −4.341∗∗∗ −2.133∗∗
(0.889) (0.758) (0.868) (0.758)
AIC 1,358.389 1,375.928
Observations 866 866
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.23: Family US and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets
Voted PRI Voted Other Voted PRI Voted Other
Family US * PRI Target 0.020 −0.193
(0.522) (0.494)
Family US * Opposition Target −0.165 0.017
(0.619) (0.553)
Family US −0.206 0.263 −0.106 0.196
(0.264) (0.220) (0.243) (0.215)
PRI Target 1.202∗∗ 0.573
(0.383) (0.368)
PRI Ads −0.082 −0.064
(0.235) (0.206)
Opposition Target 0.512 0.640
(0.475) (0.429)
Opposition Ads −0.500∗ −0.368†
(0.243) (0.212)
Less Redistribution 0.013 −0.015 0.007 −0.013
(0.035) (0.031) (0.035) (0.031)
Education 0.177 0.158 0.158 0.164
(0.125) (0.109) (0.124) (0.109)
Age 0.029∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Women −0.324 −0.241 −0.283 −0.233
(0.231) (0.201) (0.229) (0.201)
Wealth 0.188∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.178† 0.317∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.083) (0.092) (0.082)
Church Attendance 0.270∗ 0.078 0.275∗∗ 0.062
(0.105) (0.091) (0.105) (0.091)
Risk Acceptant −1.359∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗ −1.381∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗
(0.237) (0.224) (0.234) (0.225)
Interest Politics 0.481∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗
(0.134) (0.119) (0.136) (0.122)
National Economic Situation 0.153 −0.178 0.169 −0.192
(0.154) (0.137) (0.153) (0.137)
Democracy 0.171 −0.146 0.108 −0.148
(0.230) (0.201) (0.230) (0.203)
Rural Location 0.144 0.050 0.066 0.001
(0.434) (0.392) (0.429) (0.392)
Urban Location 0.134 −0.101 0.149 −0.077
(0.397) (0.359) (0.392) (0.359)
Region Dummies Y Y Y Y
Constant −2.585∗∗∗ −1.975∗∗ −2.294∗∗ −1.804∗∗
(0.745) (0.669) (0.729) (0.663)
AIC 1,701.780 1,719.103
Observations 1030 1030
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.24: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: past electoral behavior)
Abstained PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.14
Non- Family US 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.14
Voted PRI PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.27 0.12 0.09 0.13
Non- Family US 0.29 0.19 0.15 0.18
Voted Opposition PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.62 0.73 0.83 0.71
Non- Family US 0.62 0.66 0.75 0.66
Table 6.25: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: Left-Right ID)
Abstained PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.12
Non- Family US 0.06 0.14 0.03 0.14
Voted PRI PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.28 0.11 0.15 0.16
Non- Family US 0.32 0.22 0.24 0.23
Voted Opposition PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.63 0.74 0.74 0.70
Non- Family US 0.61 0.63 0.71 0.62
Table 6.26: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: redistributive preferences)
Abstained PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.13
Non- Family US 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.14
Voted PRI PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.32 0.16 0.17 0.20
Non- Family US 0.38 0.23 0.24 0.25
Voted Opposition PRI Target No PRI Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.59 0.70 0.75 0.66
Non- Family US 0.54 0.61 0.66 0.60
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Table 6.27: Family US and Vote Choice: PRI Targets
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US * PRI Target 0.590 0.420 −0.879
(0.517) (0.470) (0.694)
Family US −0.413 0.056 0.309
(0.278) (0.221) (0.302)
PRI Target 0.605 −0.071 0.319
(0.376) (0.353) (0.486)
PRI Ads 0.040 0.058 0.236
(0.243) (0.205) (0.289)
PRI Last Elections 2.365∗∗∗ −0.125 −1.565∗∗∗
(0.273) (0.240) (0.431)
Education 0.254† 0.092 0.189
(0.129) (0.105) (0.146)
Age −0.0002 0.013† 0.034∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Women −0.263 −0.186 −0.192
(0.238) (0.200) (0.282)
Wealth 0.248∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.088
(0.096) (0.083) (0.116)
Church Attendance 0.277∗ 0.141 0.074
(0.109) (0.090) (0.122)
Risk Acceptant −1.249∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗ 0.536
(0.245) (0.227) (0.332)
Interest Politics 0.301∗ 0.191 0.176
(0.138) (0.116) (0.158)
National Economic Situation 0.142 0.039 −0.407∗
(0.160) (0.137) (0.198)
Democracy 0.194 0.216 −0.376
(0.242) (0.200) (0.276)
Rural Location 0.007 0.017 0.201
(0.454) (0.399) (0.515)
Urban Location −0.045 −0.130 −0.488
(0.416) (0.368) (0.491)
Region Dummies Y Y Y
Constant −2.706∗∗∗ −2.277∗∗∗ −2.387∗∗
(0.758) (0.649) (0.865)
AIC 1,996.705
Observations 989
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.28: Family US and Vote Choice: PAN Targets
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US * PAN Target −0.076 −0.283 −1.830†
(0.733) (0.694) (0.943)
Family US −0.245 0.156 0.297
(0.232) (0.210) (0.287)
PAN Target 0.470 0.823 1.227†
(0.584) (0.569) (0.653)
PAN Ads 0.057 −0.103 0.076
(0.250) (0.226) (0.305)
PAN Last Elections −2.068∗∗∗ 1.312∗∗∗ −1.159†
(0.563) (0.305) (0.614)
Education 0.169 0.053 0.282†
(0.120) (0.107) (0.146)
Age 0.030∗∗∗ 0.006 0.029∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Women −0.207 −0.199 −0.224
(0.225) (0.203) (0.280)
Wealth 0.209∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.103
(0.089) (0.083) (0.111)
Church Attendance 0.369∗∗∗ 0.106 0.077
(0.101) (0.092) (0.123)
Risk Acceptant −1.348∗∗∗ 0.767∗∗∗ 0.679∗
(0.229) (0.233) (0.331)
Interest Politics 0.338∗∗ 0.163 0.183
(0.129) (0.119) (0.159)
National Economic Situation 0.270† 0.014 −0.488∗
(0.149) (0.138) (0.196)
Democracy 0.280 0.204 −0.427
(0.225) (0.204) (0.276)
Rural Location 0.019 −0.206 0.236
(0.416) (0.405) (0.511)
Urban Location 0.036 −0.235 −0.473
(0.381) (0.371) (0.480)
Region Dummies Y Y Y
Constant −2.602∗∗∗ −1.844∗∗ −2.748∗∗
(0.701) (0.659) (0.874)
AIC 2,083.767
Observations 989
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.29: Family US and Vote Choice: PRI Targets
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US * PRI Target 0.721 0.309 −0.392
(0.587) (0.553) (0.730)
Family US −0.587∗ 0.126 0.364
(0.285) (0.236) (0.317)
PRI Target 0.890∗ 0.430 0.413
(0.435) (0.419) (0.547)
PRI Ads 0.066 −0.035 0.290
(0.257) (0.223) (0.300)
Right ID 0.098∗ 0.014 −0.137∗∗
(0.038) (0.032) (0.043)
Education 0.099 −0.012 0.083
(0.131) (0.113) (0.147)
Age 0.032∗∗∗ 0.015† 0.030∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
Women −0.258 −0.123 0.017
(0.249) (0.217) (0.292)
Wealth 0.229∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.098
(0.104) (0.092) (0.119)
Church Attendance 0.475∗∗∗ 0.153 0.067
(0.113) (0.097) (0.128)
Risk Acceptant −1.356∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗ 0.540
(0.265) (0.256) (0.349)
Interest Politics 0.522∗∗∗ 0.313∗ 0.333∗
(0.144) (0.127) (0.166)
National Economic Situation 0.141 −0.111 −0.449∗
(0.169) (0.149) (0.205)
Democracy 0.262 0.020 −0.562†
(0.253) (0.218) (0.287)
Rural Location 0.296 0.170 0.040
(0.502) (0.459) (0.550)
Urban Location 0.216 0.016 −0.535
(0.455) (0.416) (0.506)
Region Dummies Y Y Y
Constant −4.194∗∗∗ −2.623∗∗∗ −1.959∗
(0.841) (0.738) (0.939)
AIC 1,881.953
Observations 866
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.30: Family US and Vote Choice: PAN Targets
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US * PAN Target −1.462 −1.644 −2.656∗
(1.280) (1.228) (1.352)
Family US −0.312 0.222 0.448
(0.256) (0.223) (0.302)
PAN Target 2.120† 2.142† 2.578∗
(1.187) (1.151) (1.224)
PAN Ads 0.044 0.136 0.020
(0.274) (0.237) (0.315)
Right ID 0.094∗ 0.012 −0.136∗∗
(0.038) (0.033) (0.043)
Education 0.115 0.012 0.109
(0.129) (0.113) (0.147)
Age 0.032∗∗∗ 0.015† 0.031∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
Women −0.240 −0.097 0.022
(0.246) (0.216) (0.291)
Wealth 0.212∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.099
(0.102) (0.091) (0.119)
Church Attendance 0.476∗∗∗ 0.154 0.070
(0.113) (0.098) (0.129)
Risk Acceptant −1.391∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗ 0.530
(0.261) (0.256) (0.351)
Interest Politics 0.531∗∗∗ 0.298∗ 0.345∗
(0.144) (0.128) (0.168)
National Economic Situation 0.137 −0.138 −0.490∗
(0.168) (0.149) (0.205)
Democracy 0.233 0.052 −0.549†
(0.251) (0.219) (0.289)
Rural Location 0.254 0.155 −0.0004
(0.490) (0.458) (0.552)
Urban Location 0.224 0.039 −0.541
(0.443) (0.414) (0.508)
Region Dummies Y Y Y
Constant −4.016∗∗∗ −2.606∗∗∗ −2.004∗
(0.819) (0.735) (0.935)
AIC 1,899.069
Observations 866
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.31: Family US and Vote Choice: PRI Targets
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US * PRI Target 0.326 0.416 −0.684
(0.474) (0.461) (0.635)
Family US −0.242 0.141 0.625∗
(0.253) (0.215) (0.299)
PRI Target 0.890∗∗∗ 0.050 0.585
(0.339) (0.341) (0.463)
PRI Ads −0.023 −0.003 0.142
(0.222) (0.199) (0.275)
Less Redistribution 0.031 0.019 −0.036
(0.034) (0.031) (0.045)
Education 0.119 0.066 0.185
(0.117) (0.103) (0.142)
Age 0.024∗∗ 0.012† 0.026∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Women −0.352 −0.287 −0.350
(0.219) (0.194) (0.270)
Wealth 0.160† 0.349∗∗∗ 0.126
(0.089) (0.081) (0.111)
Church Attendance 0.312∗∗ 0.139 0.161
(0.100) (0.088) (0.120)
Risk Acceptant −1.332∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗ 0.858∗
(0.223) (0.223) (0.337)
Interest Politics 0.393∗∗∗ 0.277∗ 0.255†
(0.125) (0.113) (0.153)
National Economic Situation 0.221 0.003 −0.561∗∗
(0.145) (0.132) (0.193)
Democracy 0.260 0.070 −0.473†
(0.217) (0.194) (0.265)
Rural Location 0.174 0.112 0.090
(0.418) (0.392) (0.506)
Urban Location 0.068 −0.144 −0.442
(0.379) (0.356) (0.459)
Region Dummies Y Y Y
Constant −2.434∗∗∗ −2.403∗∗∗ −2.949∗∗∗
(0.703) (0.649) (0.881)
AIC 2,287.936
Observations 1030
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.32: Family US and Vote Choice: PAN Targets
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US * PAN Target −0.306 −0.260 −1.545†
(0.724) (0.681) (0.859)
Family US −0.103 0.222 0.635∗
(0.223) (0.201) (0.282)
PAN Target 0.753 0.670 1.514∗
(0.577) (0.558) (0.665)
PAN Ads −0.104 0.046 −0.082
(0.235) (0.210) (0.292)
Less Redistribution 0.022 0.017 −0.042
(0.034) (0.031) (0.045)
Education 0.107 0.073 0.197
(0.116) (0.103) (0.141)
Age 0.023∗∗ 0.012† 0.026∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Women −0.311 −0.272 −0.337
(0.216) (0.194) (0.269)
Wealth 0.143 0.340∗∗∗ 0.118
(0.087) (0.080) (0.110)
Church Attendance 0.318∗∗ 0.135 0.150
(0.099) (0.088) (0.121)
Risk Acceptant −1.360∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗ 0.859∗
(0.221) (0.223) (0.338)
Interest Politics 0.411∗∗∗ 0.271∗ 0.270†
(0.125) (0.114) (0.154)
National Economic Situation 0.233 −0.018 −0.597∗∗
(0.144) (0.132) (0.193)
Democracy 0.233 0.084 −0.454†
(0.216) (0.195) (0.267)
Rural Location 0.120 0.089 0.053
(0.412) (0.391) (0.507)
Urban Location 0.081 −0.139 −0.439
(0.373) (0.355) (0.461)
Region Dummies Y Y Y
Constant −2.206∗∗ −2.360∗∗∗ −2.873∗∗
(0.687) (0.644) (0.876)
AIC 2,309.275
Observations 1030
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.33: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: past electoral behavior)
Abstained/Other PRI Target No PRI Target PAN Target No PAN Target
Family US 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.14
Non- Family US 0.14 0.16 0.07 0.15
Voted PRI PRI Target No PRI Target PAN Target No PAN Target
Family US 0.29 0.12 0.16 0.15
Non- Family US 0.30 0.19 0.17 0.21
Voted PAN PRI Target No PRI Target PAN Target No PAN Target
Family US 0.54 0.56 0.69 0.58
Non- Family US 0.42 0.53 0.59 0.53
Voted PRD PRI Target No PRI Target PAN Target No PAN Target
Family US 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.11
Non- Family US 0.11 0.09 0.15 0.08
Table 6.34: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: Left-Right ID)
Abstained/Other PRI Target No PRI Target PAN Target No PAN Target
Family US 0.09 0.19 0.11 0.17
Non- Family US 0.11 0.19 0.02 0.19
Voted PRI PRI Target No PRI Target PAN Target No PAN Target
Family US 0.30 0.12 0.21 0.15
Non- Family US 0.33 0.22 0.26 0.24
Voted PAN PRI Target No PRI Target PAN Target No PAN Target
Family US 0.50 0.49 0.55 0.49
Non- Family US 0.41 0.44 0.49 0.43
Voted PRD PRI Target No PRI Target PAN Target No PAN Target
Family US 0.09 0.19 0.11 0.17
Non- Family US 0.12 0.13 0.21 0.12
Table 6.35: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: redistributive preferences)
Abstained/Other PRI Target No PRI Target PAN Target No PAN Target
Family US 0.09 0.15 0.10 0.14
Non- Family US 0.12 0.17 0.08 0.17
Voted PRI PRI Target No PRI Target PAN Target No PAN Target
Family US 0.33 0.16 0.23 0.20
Non- Family US 0.40 0.23 0.26 0.26
Voted PAN PRI Target No PRI Target PAN Target No PAN Target
Family US 0.47 0.50 0.55 0.49
Non- Family US 0.35 0.48 0.44 0.46
Voted PRD PRI Target No PRI Target PAN Target No PAN Target
Family US 0.08 0.16 0.10 0.14
Non- Family US 0.12 0.09 0.20 0.09
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Table 6.36: Remittance Recipients and Vote Choice
Voted PAN Voted Other
Remittances w2 −0.064 −0.018
(0.299) (0.288)
Constant 1.262∗∗∗ 1.632∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.104)
AIC 2,286.773
Observations 1265
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 6.37: Predicted Probabilities - Remittance Recipients vs. Non-Recipients
Abstained Voted PAN Voted Other
Recipients 0.10 0.35 0.53
Non-Recipients 0.10 0.36 0.53
Table 6.38: Family US and Vote Choice
Voted PAN Voted Other
Family US −0.011 −0.216
(0.176) (0.170)
Constant 1.147∗∗∗ 1.583∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.127)
AIC 2,826.906
Observations 1472
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 6.39: Predicted Probabilities - Family US vs. Non-Family US
Abstained Voted PAN Voted Other
Family US 0.12 0.38 0.48
Non-Family US 0.11 0.34 0.54
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Table 6.40: Family US and Vote Choice
Voted PAN Voted PRI Voted PRD
Family US 0.079 0.143 −0.098
(0.178) (0.153) (0.159)
Constant −0.046 0.677∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.113) (0.116)
AIC 3,915.093
Observations 1472
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention/Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 6.41: Predicted Probabilities - Family US vs. Non-Family US
Abstained/Other Voted PAN Voted PRI Voted PRD
Family US 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.26
Non-Family US 0.17 0.34 0.16 0.30
Table 6.42: Remittances and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets
Voted PAN Voted Other Voted PAN Voted Other
Remittances w2 * PAN Target −0.009 −0.249
(0.696) (0.679)
Remittances w2 * Opposition Target −0.101 −0.810
(0.747) (0.736)
Remittances w2 −0.069 0.035 −0.098 0.129
(0.353) (0.337) (0.344) (0.325)
PAN Target −0.016 −0.140
(0.292) (0.283)
Opposition Target 0.754∗ 0.909∗∗
(0.305) (0.296)
Constant 1.273∗∗∗ 1.671∗∗∗ 1.125∗∗∗ 1.462∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.116) (0.120) (0.116)
AIC 2,248.198 2,236.300
Observations 1265 1265
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 6.43: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice
Abstained PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Recipient 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.11
Non-Recipient 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.11
Voted PAN PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Recipient 0.40 0.33 0.45 0.32
Non-Recipient 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.36
Voted Opposition PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Recipient 0.46 0.55 0.46 0.56
Non-Recipient 0.50 0.53 0.58 0.51
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Table 6.44: Remittances and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets
Voted PAN Voted Other Voted PAN Voted Other
Remittances w2 * PAN Target −0.888 −0.727
(0.850) (0.814)
Remittances w2 * Opposition Target −1.197 −1.640†
(0.872) (0.873)
Remittances w2 0.606 0.546 0.552 0.784
(0.520) (0.499) (0.489) (0.478)
PAN Target −0.138 −0.236
(0.368) (0.354)
Opposition Target 0.779∗ 0.896∗
(0.380) (0.373)
PAN Last Elections 1.297∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.287) (0.282)
Opposition Last Elections 0.556 2.000∗∗∗
(0.370) (0.352)
Education 0.116 0.048 0.153∗ 0.079
(0.076) (0.073) (0.077) (0.077)
Age 0.009 0.017† 0.014 0.008
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Women 0.876∗∗ 0.412 0.816∗∗ 0.320
(0.278) (0.265) (0.275) (0.272)
Wealth 0.218∗ 0.219∗∗ 0.251∗∗ 0.245∗∗
(0.086) (0.082) (0.086) (0.085)
Church Attendance 0.041 0.079 0.069 0.109
(0.122) (0.116) (0.122) (0.121)
Interest Politics 0.352∗ 0.408∗∗ 0.402∗∗ 0.386∗∗
(0.152) (0.146) (0.150) (0.149)
Presidential Approval 0.637∗∗∗ −0.234 0.876∗∗∗ 0.048
(0.178) (0.155) (0.185) (0.167)
Democracy 0.586∗ 0.025 0.593∗ −0.081
(0.293) (0.272) (0.291) (0.281)
Rural Location −0.457 −0.785 −0.620 −1.129†
(0.634) (0.603) (0.634) (0.621)
Urban Location −0.751 −1.378∗ −0.762 −1.442∗
(0.611) (0.585) (0.601) (0.589)
Region Dummies Y Y Y Y
Constant −3.594∗∗∗ −0.405 −4.216∗∗∗ −1.217
(1.090) (1.025) (1.081) (1.049)
AIC 1,461.803 1,437.576
Observations 943 943
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.45: Remittances and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets
Voted PAN Voted Other Voted PAN Voted Other
Remittances w2 * PAN Target 0.092 0.826
(1.561) (1.523)
Remittances w2 * Opposition Target −0.344 −1.156
(1.561) (1.543)
Remittances w2 0.867 1.040 0.930 1.425†
(0.756) (0.740) (0.762) (0.739)
PAN Target −0.231 −0.851∗
(0.433) (0.426)
Opposition Target 0.908† 0.753
(0.475) (0.462)
Right ID 0.044 −0.125 0.033 −0.128
(0.096) (0.094) (0.098) (0.095)
Education 0.144 0.140 0.140 0.134
(0.100) (0.098) (0.100) (0.098)
Age 0.029∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.027† 0.039∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Women 1.042∗∗ 0.614† 0.959∗∗ 0.549
(0.360) (0.351) (0.361) (0.350)
Wealth 0.314∗∗ 0.263∗ 0.302∗∗ 0.250∗
(0.107) (0.104) (0.107) (0.104)
Church Attendance 0.035 −0.055 0.013 −0.075
(0.154) (0.150) (0.155) (0.150)
Interest Politics 0.440∗ 0.503∗∗ 0.370∗ 0.415∗
(0.192) (0.187) (0.188) (0.182)
Presidential Approval 0.880∗∗∗ −0.004 0.955∗∗ 0.075
(0.217) (0.197) (0.220) (0.197)
Democracy 0.400 0.045 0.422 0.074
(0.381) (0.361) (0.383) (0.362)
Rural Location −0.785 −0.309 −0.849 −0.333
(0.804) (0.772) (0.807) (0.772)
Urban Location −0.902 −1.205† −0.987 −1.267†
(0.754) (0.732) (0.747) (0.720)
Region Dummies Y Y Y Y
Constant −4.406∗∗ −1.759 −4.187∗∗ −1.635
(1.390) (1.333) (1.375) (1.313)
AIC 1,069.750 1,070.338
Observations 716 716
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.46: Remittances and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets
Voted PAN Voted Other Voted PAN Voted Other
Remittances w2 * PAN Target −1.096 −0.927
(0.853) (0.832)
Remittances w2 * Opposition Target −0.854 −1.506†
(0.870) (0.854)
Remittances w2 0.562 0.499 0.373 0.528
(0.524) (0.511) (0.485) (0.470)
PAN Target −0.020 −0.092
(0.392) (0.385)
Opposition Target 0.539 0.770∗
(0.383) (0.372)
Less Social Insurance −0.167 −0.269∗ −0.164 −0.267†
(0.140) (0.136) (0.140) (0.136)
Education 0.134† 0.065 0.130† 0.062
(0.077) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076)
Age 0.018† 0.020† 0.017† 0.019†
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Women 1.059∗∗∗ 0.640∗ 0.997∗∗∗ 0.574∗
(0.283) (0.274) (0.281) (0.273)
Wealth 0.277∗∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.269∗∗ 0.263∗∗
(0.088) (0.085) (0.088) (0.085)
Church Attendance 0.125 0.061 0.127 0.064
(0.121) (0.118) (0.121) (0.118)
Interest Politics 0.463∗∗ 0.488∗∗ 0.444∗∗ 0.460∗∗
(0.156) (0.152) (0.154) (0.150)
Presidential Approval 0.672∗∗∗ −0.192 0.689∗∗∗ −0.163
(0.174) (0.157) (0.175) (0.158)
Democracy 0.400 −0.108 0.383 −0.125
(0.296) (0.281) (0.297) (0.283)
Rural Location −0.554 −0.547 −0.556 −0.554
(0.627) (0.603) (0.627) (0.603)
Urban Location −0.643 −1.228∗ −0.696 −1.298∗
(0.600) (0.581) (0.595) (0.576)
Constant −3.538∗∗ −0.424 −3.412∗∗ −0.334
(1.116) (1.069) (1.117) (1.071)
AIC 1,574.202 1,569.847
Observations 969 969
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.47: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: past electoral behavior)
Abstained PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Recipients 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.02
Non-Recipients 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04
Voted PAN PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Recipients 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.20
Non-Recipients 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.24
Voted Opposition PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Recipients 0.69 0.71 0.69 0.76
Non-Recipients 0.68 0.71 0.75 0.70
Table 6.48: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: Left-Right ID)
Abstained PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Recipients 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Non-Recipients 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.04
Voted PAN PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Recipients 0.31 0.33 0.51 0.29
Non-Recipients 0.50 0.36 0.43 0.39
Voted Opposition PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Recipients 0.67 0.64 0.46 0.69
Non-Recipients 0.43 0.59 0.54 0.56
Table 6.49: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: redistribution preferences)
Abstained PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Recipients 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.03
Non-Recipients 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04
Voted PAN PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Recipients 0.28 0.31 0.36 0.28
Non-Recipients 0.31 0.30 0.26 0.30
Voted Opposition PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Recipients 0.64 0.65 0.58 0.68
Non-Recipients 0.63 0.65 0.70 0.64
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Table 6.50: Family US and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets
Voted PAN Voted Other Voted PAN Voted Other
Family US * PAN Target 0.317 −0.146
(0.553) (0.530)
Family US * Opposition Target −0.533 −0.863
(0.612) (0.596)
Family US −0.218 −0.404† −0.125 −0.305
(0.230) (0.221) (0.228) (0.219)
PAN Target −0.270 −0.111
(0.452) (0.426)
Opposition Target 1.049∗ 1.326∗∗
(0.519) (0.505)
Constant 1.391∗∗∗ 1.891∗∗∗ 1.188∗∗∗ 1.637∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.169) (0.174) (0.166)
AIC 2,247.579 2,237.695
Observations 1269 1269
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 6.51: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and Electoral Targeting
Abstained PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.13
Non-Family US 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.10
Voted PAN PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.43 0.37 0.40 0.37
Non-Family US 0.30 0.34 0.31 0.34
Voted Opposition PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.43 0.51 0.50 0.49
Non-Family US 0.59 0.56 0.65 0.54
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Table 6.52: Family US and Vote Choice: PAN Targets
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US * PAN Target −0.819 −0.086 −0.598
(0.562) (0.493) (0.503)
Family US 0.024 0.070 −0.129
(0.217) (0.192) (0.198)
PAN Target 0.321 0.097 0.356
(0.438) (0.406) (0.399)
Constant 0.155 0.783∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.141) (0.143)
AIC 3,190.066
Observations 1269
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention/Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 6.53: Family US and Vote Choice: PRI Targets
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US * PRI Target −1.041† −0.798 −0.844
(0.577) (0.538) (0.542)
Family US 0.039 0.159 −0.119
(0.218) (0.189) (0.197)
PRI Target 1.153∗ 0.744† 0.979∗
(0.459) (0.441) (0.437)
Constant 0.030 0.705∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.140) (0.142)
AIC 3,186.132
Observations 1269
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention/Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
Table 6.54: Family US and Vote Choice: PRD Targets
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US * PRD Target 0.628 0.418 0.246
(0.659) (0.551) (0.561)
Family US −0.175 −0.0002 −0.262
(0.211) (0.187) (0.193)
PRD Target −0.331 0.188 0.315
(0.509) (0.417) (0.415)
Constant 0.229 0.773∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.140) (0.142)
AIC 3,188.561
Observations 1269
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention/Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.56: Family US and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets
Voted PAN Voted Other Voted PAN Voted Other
Family US * PAN Target 0.212 −0.271
(0.678) (0.642)
Family US * Opposition Target −0.772 −1.499∗
(0.766) (0.754)
Family US −0.450 −0.402 −0.293 −0.084
(0.317) (0.302) (0.311) (0.309)
PAN Target −0.438 −0.218
(0.560) (0.524)
Opposition Target 1.074 1.576∗
(0.663) (0.652)
PAN Last Elections 1.252∗∗∗ −0.046
(0.284) (0.278)
Opposition Last Elections 0.528 1.966∗∗∗
(0.367) (0.349)
Education 0.136† 0.075 0.167∗ 0.100
(0.075) (0.073) (0.077) (0.077)
Age 0.011 0.019∗ 0.016† 0.011
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Women 0.856∗∗ 0.409 0.798∗∗ 0.327
(0.276) (0.263) (0.274) (0.271)
Wealth 0.225∗∗ 0.231∗∗ 0.263∗∗ 0.269∗∗
(0.085) (0.081) (0.086) (0.085)
Church 0.027 0.076 0.067 0.106
(0.122) (0.116) (0.121) (0.120)
Interest Politics 0.380∗ 0.415∗∗ 0.424∗∗ 0.390∗∗
(0.151) (0.145) (0.148) (0.147)
Presidential Approval 0.661∗∗∗ −0.202 0.862∗∗∗ 0.034
(0.175) (0.152) (0.182) (0.164)
Democracy 0.522† −0.003 0.529† −0.151
(0.292) (0.271) (0.290) (0.280)
Rural Location −0.407 −0.675 −0.546 −0.969
(0.633) (0.602) (0.631) (0.618)
Urban Location −0.834 −1.421∗ −0.794 −1.422∗
(0.612) (0.586) (0.603) (0.591)
Region Dummies Y Y
Constant −3.467∗∗∗ −0.460 −4.187∗∗∗ −1.424
(1.098) (1.035) (1.076) (1.045)
AIC 1,468.168 1,440.767
Observations 947 947
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.57: Family US and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets
Voted PAN Voted Other Voted PAN Voted Other
Family US * PAN Target 0.710 0.657
(0.818) (0.788)
Family US * Opposition Target −0.466 −1.175
(0.915) (0.889)
Family US −0.013 −0.203 0.205 0.170
(0.394) (0.379) (0.390) (0.374)
PAN Target −0.659 −1.114†
(0.625) (0.592)
Opposition Target 1.078 1.244†
(0.747) (0.719)
Right ID 0.061 −0.109 0.057 −0.105
(0.096) (0.093) (0.097) (0.094)
Education 0.150 0.146 0.155 0.154
(0.100) (0.097) (0.099) (0.097)
Age 0.030∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.028∗ 0.040∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Women 1.038∗∗ 0.577† 0.975∗∗ 0.561
(0.357) (0.348) (0.356) (0.346)
Wealth 0.307∗∗ 0.259∗ 0.291∗∗ 0.252∗
(0.108) (0.104) (0.108) (0.104)
Church Attendance 0.040 −0.046 0.033 −0.054
(0.154) (0.148) (0.153) (0.148)
Interest Politics 0.428∗ 0.489∗∗ 0.391∗ 0.437∗
(0.190) (0.184) (0.186) (0.180)
Presidential Approval 0.903∗∗∗ 0.028 0.971∗∗∗ 0.073
(0.214) (0.193) (0.218) (0.196)
Democracy 0.335 −0.006 0.336 0.002
(0.378) (0.357) (0.380) (0.358)
Rural Location −0.739 −0.214 −0.730 −0.124
(0.805) (0.773) (0.803) (0.767)
Urban Location −0.904 −1.230∗ −0.934 −1.217∗
(0.756) (0.734) (0.748) (0.722)
Region Dummies Y Y Y Y
Constant −4.432∗∗ −1.673 −4.504∗∗∗ −1.970
(1.394) (1.327) (1.366) (1.297)
AIC 1,073.258 1,071.974
Observations 717 717
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.58: Family US and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets
Voted PAN Voted Other Voted PAN Voted Other
Family US * PAN Target 0.503 0.147
(0.687) (0.661)
Family US * Opposition Target −0.140 −0.934
(0.704) (0.682)
Family US −0.356 −0.426 −0.250 −0.168
(0.319) (0.309) (0.317) (0.308)
PAN Target −0.582 −0.399
(0.555) (0.528)
Opposition Target 0.427 1.043†
(0.584) (0.564)
Less Social Insurance −0.144 −0.246† −0.137 −0.232†
(0.139) (0.135) (0.139) (0.135)
Education 0.149† 0.088 0.149† 0.089
(0.077) (0.075) (0.077) (0.076)
Age 0.021∗ 0.022∗ 0.020† 0.021†
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Women 1.062∗∗∗ 0.642∗ 1.022∗∗∗ 0.602∗
(0.281) (0.273) (0.280) (0.272)
Wealth 0.279∗∗ 0.279∗∗ 0.268∗∗ 0.273∗∗
(0.088) (0.085) (0.087) (0.085)
Church Attendance 0.120 0.066 0.125 0.068
(0.122) (0.119) (0.122) (0.118)
Interest Politics 0.483∗∗ 0.493∗∗ 0.466∗∗ 0.472∗∗
(0.155) (0.151) (0.153) (0.149)
Presidential Approval 0.696∗∗∗ −0.168 0.718∗∗∗ −0.147
(0.171) (0.154) (0.173) (0.155)
Democracy 0.349 −0.144 0.352 −0.174
(0.295) (0.280) (0.296) (0.281)
Rural Location −0.543 −0.515 −0.538 −0.505
(0.627) (0.602) (0.625) (0.601)
Urban Location −0.714 −1.317∗ −0.740 −1.347∗
(0.603) (0.583) (0.599) (0.580)
Region Dummies Y Y Y Y
Constant −3.486∗∗ −0.400 −3.542∗∗ −0.583
(1.129) (1.078) (1.119) (1.070)
AIC 1,575.441 1,568.479
Observations 971 971
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.59: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: past electoral behavior)
Abstained PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.05
Non- Family US 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.04
Voted PAN PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.28 0.24 0.27 0.23
Non- Family US 0.21 0.25 0.19 0.27
Voted Opposition PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.62 0.69 0.68 0.71
Non- Family US 0.73 0.70 0.79 0.68
Table 6.60: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: Left-Right ID)
Abstained PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04
Non- Family US 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.04
Voted PAN PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.50 0.39 0.52 0.39
Non- Family US 0.43 0.34 0.35 0.37
Voted Opposition PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.44 0.57 0.44 0.56
Non- Family US 0.48 0.61 0.63 0.57
Table 6.61: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: redistributive preferences)
Abstained PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
Non- Family US 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.04
Voted PAN PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.34 0.30 0.33 0.29
Non- Family US 0.25 0.29 0.20 0.31
Voted Opposition PAN Target No PAN Target Opposition Target No Opp. Target
Family US 0.59 0.64 0.61 0.65
Non- Family US 0.69 0.66 0.77 0.63
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Table 6.62: Family US and Vote Choice: PAN Targets
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US * PAN Target −0.864 0.091 −0.183
(0.679) (0.612) (0.620)
Family US −0.115 −0.162 −0.028
(0.294) (0.268) (0.270)
PAN Target 0.199 −0.124 0.120
(0.522) (0.502) (0.500)
PAN Last Elections −0.697∗ 1.244∗∗∗ 0.288
(0.296) (0.246) (0.255)
Education 0.053 0.137∗ 0.093
(0.073) (0.065) (0.066)
Age 0.023∗ 0.009 0.017†
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Women 0.165 0.578∗ 0.028
(0.266) (0.240) (0.243)
Wealth 0.142† 0.153∗ 0.174∗
(0.081) (0.074) (0.075)
Church Attendance 0.084 0.009 0.060
(0.116) (0.107) (0.107)
Interest Politics 0.162 0.123 0.101
(0.140) (0.126) (0.127)
Presidential Approval −0.291† 0.675∗∗∗ −0.159
(0.152) (0.156) (0.140)
Democracy 0.151 0.508∗ −0.121
(0.274) (0.255) (0.248)
Rural Location −0.329 −0.158 −0.554
(0.541) (0.533) (0.524)
Urban Location −1.233∗ −0.589 −1.295∗∗∗
(0.516) (0.503) (0.495)
Region Dummies Y Y Y
Constant −1.106 −3.072∗∗ −0.575
(1.003) (0.938) (0.919)
AIC 2,114.361
Observations 947
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.63: Family US and Vote Choice: PRI Targets
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US * PRI Target −1.721∗ −0.827 −1.217†
(0.719) (0.660) (0.663)
Family US 0.259 −0.042 0.144
(0.311) (0.261) (0.271)
PRI Target 1.277∗ 0.661 1.373∗
(0.575) (0.545) (0.544)
PRI Last Elections 1.987∗∗∗ −0.243 −0.185
(0.311) (0.303) (0.316)
Education 0.082 0.164∗ 0.097
(0.076) (0.065) (0.067)
Age 0.012 0.019∗ 0.019∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Women 0.019 0.576∗ 0.022
(0.278) (0.236) (0.244)
Wealth 0.167∗ 0.194∗∗ 0.199∗∗
(0.085) (0.073) (0.076)
Church Attendance 0.089 0.053 0.064
(0.122) (0.105) (0.108)
Interest Politics 0.102 0.177 0.120
(0.145) (0.123) (0.126)
Presidential Approval −0.193 0.769∗∗∗ −0.141
(0.158) (0.155) (0.142)
Democracy −0.100 0.570∗ −0.120
(0.287) (0.252) (0.251)
Rural Location −0.595 −0.138 −0.593
(0.557) (0.526) (0.525)
Urban Location −1.398∗∗∗ −0.558 −1.394∗∗∗
(0.524) (0.495) (0.494)
Region Dummies Y Y Y
Constant −1.665 −3.658∗∗∗ −0.840
(1.039) (0.916) (0.913)
AIC 2,076.838
Observations 947
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.64: Family US and Vote Choice: PRD Targets
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US * PRD Target 0.453 0.765 0.273
(0.790) (0.704) (0.729)
Family US −0.292 −0.261 −0.209
(0.287) (0.256) (0.270)
PRD Target −0.061 0.116 0.088
(0.594) (0.520) (0.532)
PRD Last Elections −1.151 −0.006 1.934∗∗∗
(0.804) (0.605) (0.521)
Education 0.045 0.150∗ 0.095
(0.073) (0.064) (0.068)
Age 0.020∗ 0.017∗ 0.016†
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Women 0.173 0.529∗ −0.008
(0.264) (0.237) (0.248)
Wealth 0.136† 0.189∗∗ 0.192∗
(0.080) (0.073) (0.077)
Church Attendance 0.071 0.069 0.078
(0.116) (0.104) (0.110)
Interest Politics 0.130 0.177 0.083
(0.139) (0.124) (0.130)
Presidential Approval −0.400∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ −0.039
(0.150) (0.155) (0.143)
Democracy 0.173 0.590∗ −0.063
(0.273) (0.251) (0.254)
Rural Location −0.302 −0.258 −0.694
(0.536) (0.524) (0.530)
Urban Location −1.378∗∗ −0.548 −1.248∗
(0.503) (0.491) (0.493)
Region Dummies Y Y Y
Constant −0.774 −3.496∗∗∗ −0.774
(0.977) (0.915) (0.923)
AIC 2,121.442
Observations 947
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.66: Family US and Vote Choice: PAN Targets
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US * PAN Target 0.445 0.768 1.016
(0.852) (0.729) (0.747)
Family US 0.082 0.198 −0.027
(0.337) (0.309) (0.312)
PAN Target −0.795 −0.188 −0.558
(0.623) (0.542) (0.552)
Right ID 0.154† 0.093 −0.233∗∗
(0.088) (0.079) (0.080)
Education 0.062 0.098 0.110
(0.086) (0.078) (0.079)
Age 0.009 0.007 0.020†
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Women 0.462 0.718∗ 0.036
(0.319) (0.290) (0.297)
Wealth 0.085 0.184∗ 0.173†
(0.094) (0.087) (0.089)
Church Attendance −0.047 0.041 −0.044
(0.137) (0.126) (0.128)
Interest Politics 0.174 0.098 0.091
(0.160) (0.145) (0.146)
Presidential Approval −0.278 0.744∗∗∗ −0.084
(0.177) (0.178) (0.163)
Democracy 0.036 0.306 −0.099
(0.336) (0.310) (0.302)
Rural Location −0.586 −0.953 −0.457
(0.667) (0.664) (0.660)
Urban Location −1.157† −0.781 −1.167†
(0.627) (0.617) (0.618)
Region Dummies Y Y Y
Constant −0.956 −2.465∗ 0.201
(1.190) (1.117) (1.101)
AIC 1,594.921
Observations 717
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.67: Family US and Vote Choice: PRI Targets
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US * PRI Target −1.301 −0.485 −0.840
(0.849) (0.795) (0.800)
Family US 0.403 0.418 0.285
(0.343) (0.309) (0.313)
PRI Target 1.160† 0.830 1.181†
(0.643) (0.617) (0.614)
Right ID 0.150† 0.091 −0.235∗∗
(0.088) (0.079) (0.081)
Education 0.070 0.100 0.111
(0.086) (0.078) (0.079)
Age 0.009 0.007 0.019†
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Women 0.473 0.703∗ 0.039
(0.319) (0.288) (0.297)
Wealth 0.091 0.185∗ 0.181∗
(0.095) (0.088) (0.090)
Church Attendance −0.061 0.038 −0.050
(0.137) (0.126) (0.128)
Interest Politics 0.149 0.108 0.082
(0.158) (0.143) (0.145)
Presidential Approval −0.284 0.750∗∗∗ −0.083
(0.180) (0.181) (0.165)
Democracy 0.067 0.285 −0.117
(0.337) (0.311) (0.303)
Rural Location −0.506 −0.933 −0.387
(0.665) (0.663) (0.659)
Urban Location −1.164† −0.808 −1.176†
(0.625) (0.615) (0.616)
Region Dummies Y Y Y
Constant −1.202 −2.536∗ 0.025
(1.174) (1.097) (1.086)
AIC 1,595.609
Observations 717
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.68: Family US and Vote Choice: PRD Targets
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US * PRD Target 0.672 0.579 0.201
(0.966) (0.820) (0.811)
Family US 0.109 0.254 0.118
(0.333) (0.303) (0.308)
PRD Target −0.548 0.243 0.141
(0.739) (0.597) (0.576)
Right ID 0.148† 0.089 −0.235∗∗
(0.087) (0.079) (0.080)
Education 0.059 0.097 0.109
(0.085) (0.078) (0.079)
Age 0.009 0.006 0.019†
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Women 0.481 0.687∗ 0.031
(0.318) (0.289) (0.297)
Wealth 0.081 0.179∗ 0.170†
(0.094) (0.087) (0.089)
Church Attendance −0.042 0.054 −0.031
(0.137) (0.125) (0.128)
Interest Politics 0.167 0.120 0.100
(0.158) (0.144) (0.145)
Presidential Approval −0.267 0.774∗∗∗ −0.063
(0.178) (0.179) (0.163)
Democracy 0.085 0.333 −0.108
(0.337) (0.312) (0.302)
Rural Location −0.558 −0.967 −0.406
(0.664) (0.662) (0.658)
Urban Location −1.132† −0.787 −1.138†
(0.623) (0.615) (0.615)
Region Dummies Y Y Y
Constant −1.032 −2.500∗ 0.087
(1.178) (1.106) (1.094)
AIC 1,597.077
Observations 717
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.70: Family US and Vote Choice: PAN Targets
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US * PAN Target −0.490 0.118 −0.262
(0.671) (0.598) (0.614)
Family US −0.034 0.014 0.041
(0.287) (0.255) (0.263)
PAN Target 0.092 −0.104 0.224
(0.526) (0.486) (0.488)
Less Social Insurance −0.199 −0.057 −0.130
(0.129) (0.115) (0.120)
Education −0.011 0.094 0.045
(0.071) (0.062) (0.065)
Age 0.011 0.012 0.014
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Women 0.417 0.706∗∗ 0.147
(0.260) (0.230) (0.238)
Wealth 0.176∗ 0.191∗∗ 0.212∗∗
(0.081) (0.072) (0.075)
Church Attendance 0.084 0.106 0.040
(0.115) (0.102) (0.105)
Interest Politics 0.203 0.198† 0.164
(0.137) (0.120) (0.123)
Presidential Approval −0.405∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗ −0.220
(0.148) (0.147) (0.136)
Democracy 0.131 0.432† −0.159
(0.271) (0.244) (0.243)
Rural Location −0.268 −0.441 −0.577
(0.532) (0.517) (0.517)
Urban Location −1.194∗ −0.552 −1.257∗
(0.508) (0.489) (0.490)
Region Dummies Y Y Y
Constant −0.397 −2.686∗∗ −0.158
(1.001) (0.918) (0.918)
AIC 2,292.284
Observations 971
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.71: Family US and Vote Choice: PRI Targets
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US * PRI Target −1.346∗ −0.701 −1.297∗
(0.686) (0.643) (0.643)
Family US 0.122 0.124 0.226
(0.289) (0.252) (0.264)
PRI Target 1.115∗ 0.414 1.391∗∗
(0.549) (0.528) (0.521)
Less Social Insurance −0.189 −0.057 −0.112
(0.129) (0.115) (0.121)
Education −0.004 0.099 0.048
(0.071) (0.062) (0.065)
Age 0.011 0.012 0.014
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Women 0.395 0.698∗∗ 0.129
(0.261) (0.230) (0.239)
Wealth 0.178∗ 0.193∗∗ 0.218∗∗
(0.081) (0.072) (0.075)
Church Attendance 0.081 0.114 0.038
(0.115) (0.101) (0.105)
Interest Politics 0.190 0.197† 0.156
(0.136) (0.119) (0.123)
Presidential Approval −0.408∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ −0.224
(0.149) (0.149) (0.138)
Democracy 0.111 0.437† −0.199
(0.272) (0.245) (0.245)
Rural Location −0.276 −0.422 −0.594
(0.531) (0.517) (0.517)
Urban Location −1.242∗ −0.560 −1.319∗∗
(0.509) (0.489) (0.491)
Region Dummies Y Y Y
Constant −0.507 −2.782∗∗ −0.289
(0.994) (0.910) (0.913)
AIC 2,279.891
Observations 971
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Table 6.72: Family US and Vote Choice: PRD Targets
Voted PRI Voted PAN Voted PRD
Family US * PRD Target 0.503 0.950 0.309
(0.792) (0.703) (0.704)
Family US −0.163 −0.075 −0.024
(0.279) (0.247) (0.256)
PRD Target −0.089 −0.117 0.137
(0.586) (0.513) (0.501)
Less Social Insurance −0.193 −0.056 −0.130
(0.129) (0.115) (0.120)
Education −0.009 0.091 0.044
(0.071) (0.062) (0.065)
Age 0.011 0.011 0.013
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Women 0.414 0.685∗∗ 0.133
(0.260) (0.231) (0.238)
Wealth 0.168∗ 0.184∗ 0.209∗∗
(0.080) (0.072) (0.074)
Church Attendance 0.080 0.109 0.040
(0.114) (0.101) (0.105)
Interest Politics 0.188 0.192 0.161
(0.136) (0.120) (0.122)
Presidential Approval −0.394∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ −0.209
(0.148) (0.148) (0.136)
Democracy 0.144 0.466† −0.165
(0.271) (0.245) (0.243)
Rural Location −0.317 −0.466 −0.616
(0.530) (0.516) (0.516)
Urban Location −1.227∗ −0.558 −1.274∗∗
(0.506) (0.488) (0.488)
Region Dummies Y Y Y
Constant −0.289 −2.603∗∗ −0.075
(0.994) (0.914) (0.915)
AIC 2,290.236
Observations 971
S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, (†) p < 0.1
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
International migration is a worldwide phenomenon that touches the lives of millions of people
across the developing world. In particular, not only does migration affect those families whose
members are miles apart from each other, but also those communities that lose numerous neighbors
and receive substantial remittances in return. In this dissertation, I have addressed the implications
of this movement of people across borders on the electoral dynamics of the sending countries. By
looking at political parties’ electoral strategies as well as voters’ ballot decisions, this project shows
that international migration shapes political parties’ electoral targeting and this targeting then
affects voters’ behavior.
My theory draws on the idea that citizens’ involvement in migration has an effect on their politi-
cal lives. While this exposure might happen because of direct (i.e., being a migrant) or indirect (i.e.,
having close relatives abroad, being a remittance recipient individual or household) participation
in migration, it creates a distinction between migrant and non-migrant families. Migrant families
are therefore those whose members exercise the ‘exit’ option and move to another country in the
search of better opportunities, plan to join relatives already abroad, and/or receive monetary help
from a different country (i.e., remittances). These conditions make them both less dependent on
governments’ actions and less politically engaged in domestic politics.
Building on this logic, this dissertation has argued that international migration helps political
parties to decide who to target during elections. Because exposure to migration fosters political
disengagement from domestic politics and makes migrant families’ more inclined to stay home on
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election day, these migration-exposed voters are more likely to be targets of electoral strategies
than similar non-migration-exposed ones. That is, as developed in Chapter 3, migrant families’
lower dependency on governments’ actions, lower motivation to get politically involved, and lower
attachment to political parties explain why political contenders attempt to win these voters during
elections. Additionally, I have also defended that, due to political parties’ capacity to adapt to the
needs of voters and to use varied electoral tactics, these electoral strategies are successful in getting
migrant and non-migrant families’ votes on election day.
This dissertation’s findings support the intuition that political parties respond to the presence
of migration-exposed voters in their electorate. In particular, Chapter 4 shows that both incum-
bent and opposition parties approach these migration-exposed voters in order to win elections.
During the 2000 electoral campaign, the incumbent PRI used non-programmatic (clientelism and
home visits) targeting to participate in the mobilization or turnout buying of migration-exposed
supporters, especially return migrants and those respondents with family in the US. In addition,
the PRI also aimed to persuade or buy the votes of those respondents with family in the US who
favored the PAN in the 1994 presidential elections. Importantly, the PAN was a key contender in
2000 and mobilized migrant families as well that were PAN supporters through non-programmatic
targeting. With respect to non-migration-exposed voters, the PAN also targeted those who were
PAN sympathizes but used instead programmatic tactics (PAN advertising and promotion materi-
als). As for the PRD, Chapter 4 finds that this party relied mostly on sending advertising materials
- or programmatic targeting - to those who electorally favor the PRD in the previous elections,
especially if they had family members living in the US.
Similarly, in Chapter 5 and during the 2006 electoral campaign, the incumbent PAN used
non-programmatic targeting to mobilize migration-exposed voters, both remittance recipients and
respondents with family in the US, that were sympathizers and tried to win the vote of migration-
exposed voters that were non-supporters, especially remittance recipients that voted for the PRD
in the 2000 elections. Moreover, the opposing PRD also participated in the turnout buying of
remittance recipients who were supporters. This last finding about PRD’s behavior also explains
why the PAN attempted to persuade remittance recipients that favored the contestant PRD. In
particular, the PRD candidate was a plausible winner in 2006, and so these PRD mobilized remit-
tance recipients could jeopardize PAN’s winning chances. Thus, the PAN had incentives to target
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these mobilized remittance recipients and convince them to vote for the PAN instead of the PRD.
With respect to PRI’s behavior, Chapter 5 has not found any strong relationship between the
PRI electoral targeting and the distinction between migration and non-migration exposed voters
in 2006.
In short, results in Chapter 4 and 5 indicate that migration-exposed voters tend to be electoral
targets. This dissertation’s argument that exposure to international migration promotes political
disengagement from national politics and fosters intentions to stay home on election day is essential
to understanding why. Put differently, due to the effects of international migration on migrant
families’ political lives, political parties have incentives to mobilize and persuade these voters in
order to win elections. And while the incumbent is one of the key participants in this targeting of
migration-exposed voters, opposition contenders also engage in the targeting of these voters.
This project has also addressed whether political parties’ electoral strategies are successful and
deliver the intended outcome. Interestingly, results from the 2000 elections indicate that electoral
targeting was generally effective among both migration (return migrants and respondents with
family in the US) and non-migration-exposed voters. In other words, PAN and Fox’s victory was
possible in part because of the successful mobilization of non-PRI supporters, which included mem-
bers of migrant families. On the other hand, results from the 2006 elections offer some differences
for migration and non-migration-exposed voters. Particularly, electoral targeting (both incumbent
and opposition targeting) was mostly ineffective among remittance recipients but effective among
non-remittances-recipients. Similarly, PAN targeting was only effective among respondents with
family in the US, while opposition targeting reported more effectiveness among members of non-
migrant families. Consequently, PAN reelection and Calderon’s victory were to an extent due to
the PAN’s successful mobilization of respondents with family in the US. Nonetheless, these findings
rely on small differences when comparing targeted and non-targeted voters, and therefore, these
assertions about electoral effectiveness/ineffectiveness are not strong claims. Moreover, results in
Chapter 6 indicate that, in general, migrant and non-migrant families are not that different in their
electoral choices, even after taking into account the effect of electoral targeting.
These findings have numerous implications. First, the results provide new perspectives on
how international migration affects domestic politics back home. That is, while existing work had
focused mostly on the demand side of elections - or migrant families and migrant-rich communities’
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behavior - this project helps us to understand the relationship between migration and political
parties’ electoral strategies - or the supply-side of elections. Simply put, international migration and
the distinction that emerges between migrant and non-migrant families (e.g., differences in political
engagement) assist political parties in identifying their electoral targets. Second, these strategies
tend to be effective in delivering the intended electoral outcome. Thus, these findings indicate that
besides socioeconomic status, which is commonly mentioned in the literature on electoral targeting;
political parties rely on other characteristics of voters to identify their targets and design electoral
strategies that maximize their winning chances. Both contributions are essential to connecting
international migration with political parties’ strategies and voters’ decisions. Moreover, this work
improves our understanding on not only how political parties respond to the presence of migrant
families in the electorate, but also on why, given political parties’ actions, migrant and non-migrant
families vote in a particular way.
Relatedly, and despite previous arguments (e.g., Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Weingast, 2003;
Pfutze, 2012), this project does not find much evidence for the association between international
migration and the weakening of electoral targeting, at least at the individual level. That is, this
analysis shows that migration-exposed voters still respond by and large to the electoral strategies of
political parties. This holds especially when looking at the 2000 elections and mostly for the 2006
ones as well. The only notable exception is that electoral targeting does not increase the chances
of getting votes from remittance recipients. Yet, as above mentioned, the changes in behavior
from targeted and non-targeted remittance recipients are overall not significant enough to make a
substantial claim about this ineffectiveness.
This dissertation’s findings also connect with the broader literature on democratic accountability
and political development. Essentially, if international migration helps political parties to employ
certain strategies effectively, political contenders have incentives to keep using them in future
electoral contests. Yet, conditioning the vote on the exchange of goods/favors and on coercion
mechanisms as opposed to performance in office and policy programs has widely recognized negative
consequences for the workings of democracy and the quality of political institutions (e.g., Stokes,
2005; Adsera, Boix and Payne, 2003; Kitschelt et al., 2010). Most importantly, if migration fosters
politicians’ behavior that hinders sound developmental policies, it is quite likely that instead of
bringing positive benefits back home and eventually ending the need to leave, this international
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phenomenon just means more ‘politics-as-usual’ and further migration.
In addition, this negative outcome has important policy implications for both destination and
origin countries. That is, if international migration fosters electoral practices that impede develop-
ment back home, looking for economic opportunities abroad will remain as the obvious option for
many people. High levels of migration are, however, not only detrimental for the economic pros-
perity of the sending countries, but also cause significant security issues in certain regions of world
(e.g., Central America, North Africa). Thus, designing migration policies and regional collabora-
tions that ensure the electoral engagement of migrant households and prevent the encouragement
of questionable electoral tactics can bring significant benefits across the world.
Needless to say, this research offers opportunities for future research. In particular, an ideal
next step will be to address some the weaknesses of the data used in this dissertation: first, the
fact that a national sample does not include that many return migrants and remittance recipients,
which makes the existing findings rely on a small number of observations, and second, the use
of direct survey questions to inquire about clientelism. As mentioned in previous chapters, due
to the dishonest nature of clientelism, direct questions about this activity can lead respondents
to lie about (i.e., under-report) being approached by political parties. This is why this project
has not used these direct questions about clientelism alone for the data analysis, but instead has
combined them with answers about home visits (i.e., direct questions about home visits are less
subject to bias because there is no reference to exchanged goods or favors and possibly capture
some unreported clientelism since they mean interaction with political parties during electoral
campaigns) (see Chapters 4 and 5 for additional details on data coding decisions). As a way to
deal with both limitations, conducting a survey in a migrant-rich locality or region would help
maximizing the number of, for instance, return migrants. In addition, using list experiments to
deal with social desirability bias (see Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012 for an example) could be highly
useful to capture more accurately the clientelistic targeting of migration and non-migration-exposed
respondents. More precisely, this survey list experiment would randomly split the sample into a
control and a treatment group, and only the later group will be asked about being clientelistic
practices (i.e., receiving gifts and favors from political parties). Given that respondents only have
to report the total number of electoral practices they have experienced as opposed to detail which
ones, anonymity about clientelism is ensured and social desirability pressures are reduced. Then, it
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would be possible to compare the results for treatment and control group as well as for migration
and non-migration-exposed voters.
This project also raises a number of additional questions (or, put differently, leaves some ques-
tions unanswered) about political parties’ behavior. One is whether or not political parties use
certain political strategies with particular types of voters, for instance, home visits are chosen over
clientelism to target migrant families, or vice versa. Therefore, using the above mentioned survey
list experiment should provide a good starting point to test if political parties choose clientelism or
home visits when targeting migration and non-migration-exposed voters. A related query is where
political parties decide to concentrate their electoral targeting efforts. That is, if international mi-
gration leads migrant-rich municipalities to improve their economic situation (i.e., due to monetary
remittances) or to lose their most educated voters (i.e., brain drain mechanism), this can affect the
extent to which political parties focus their efforts on these or other localities.
Additionally, this project would also benefit from in-depths interviews with representatives
of political parties. These interviews would help to provide evidence on why political parties
target members of migrant families. While I have argued that these families experience political
disengagement and are at risk of staying home on election day, obtaining the same reasons from
political parties would be an ideal complement to the existing data analysis. Moreover, these
interviews could also address the extent to which political contenders offer tailor goods to migration-
exposed voters. As previously mentioned, this is one of potential reasons explaining electoral
effectiveness among migrant families.
Finally, this analysis of the Mexican case also raises the questions of how international migration
affects political parties’ strategies in other countries with similar or different political party systems
and migration profiles; as well as how migration-exposed voters respond to these practices in other
parts of the world. In other words, expanding this study to other countries and political contexts
is also an exciting next step. Given the magnitude of international migration across the world,
understanding its implications on the electoral dynamics of the sending countries more broadly
remains as an inspiring area for future research.
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Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive Statistics: 2000 Post-Electoral Sample
Vote Choice Abstention Incumbent Opposition
Respondents 182 311 661
Vote Choice Abstention/Other PRI PAN PRD
Respondents 220 311 492 131
Type of Place Mixed Rural Urban
Respondents - Type of Place 119 257 823
Region Center West Center District North South
Respondents - Region 319 153 307 252 168
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Target 1199 0.34 0.47 0 1
PRI Target 1199 0.25 0.43 0 1
Opposition Target 1199 0.18 0.39 0 1
PAN Target 1199 0.11 0.32 0 1
PRD Target 1199 0.02 0.16 0 1
Advert 1199 0.58 0.49 0 1
PRI Advert 1199 0.48 0.49 0 1
Opposition Advert 1199 0.38 0.48 0 1
PAN Advert 1199 0.31 0.46 0 1
PRD Advert 1199 0.22 0.41 0 1
Return Migrant 1193 0.06 0.25 0 1
Family US 1193 0.51 0.5 0 1
PRI ID 1171 0.28 0.44 0 1
PAN ID 1171 0.33 0.47 0 1
PRD ID 1171 0.10 0.30 0 1
PRI last elections 1088 0.34 0.47 0 1
PAN last elections 1088 0.17 0.37 0 1
PRD last elections 1088 0.12 0.32 0 1
Opposition last elections 1088 0.30 0.45 0 1
National Economic Situation 1155 0.92 0.73 0 2
Right ID 950 5.59 3.25 0 10
Less Redistribution 1145 3.79 3.03 1 10
Women 1199 0.49 0.5 0 1
Age 1194 37.45 15.43 18 90
Education 1194 2.04 1.18 0 4
Wealth 1199 3.83 1.43 0 6
Risk Acceptant 1140 0.71 0.45 0 1
Employed 1163 0.46 0.49 0 1
Church Attendance 1184 2.19 1.11 0 4
Talk Politics 1191 2.59 0.82 1 4
Interest in Politics 1186 2.38 0.90 1 4
Democracy 1199 0.59 0.49 0 1
Clean Elections 1145 3.25 0.85 1 4
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Descriptive Statistics: 2006 Panel Sample
Vote Choice Abstention Incumbent Opposition
Respondents wave 3 209 580 1048
Vote Choice Abstention/Other PAN PRD PRI
Respondents wave 3 327 580 617 313
Type of Place Mixed Rural Urban
Respondents - Type of Place, wave 1 160 620 1620
Region Center West Center District North South
Respondents - Region 380 320 880 320 500
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Targeting - Participants all Waves
Target wave 1- wave 3 1377 0.33 0.47 0 1
PRI Target w1-3 1377 0.17 0.37 0 1
PAN Target w1-3 1377 0.16 0.36 0 1
PRD Target w1-3 1377 0.15 0.36 0 1
Targeting - Participants Any Wave
Target wave 1- wave 3 2400 0.25 0.43 0 1
PRI Target w1-3 2400 0.12 0.33 0 1
PAN Target w1-3 2400 0.11 0.32 0 1
PRD Target w1-3 2400 0.12 0.32 0 1
Remittance Recipients w2 1758 0.11 0.32 0 1
Family US w1 2393 0.51 0.49 0 1
PRI last elections w1 2123 0.20 0.40 0 1
PAN last elections w1 2123 0.38 0.48 0 1
PRD last elections w1 2123 0.11 0.31 0 1
PRI ID w1 2317 0.25 0.43 0 1
PAN ID w1 2317 0.22 0.41 0 1
PRD ID w1 2317 0.22 0.41 0 1
Right ID w1 1522 3.91 1.77 1 7
Less Redistribution w1 2151 2.18 0.96 1 3
Presidential Approval w1 2272 1.36 0.89 0 2
Women w1 2400 0.51 0.49 0 1
Age w1 2397 40.36 16.07 17 92
Education w1 2393 4.92 2.54 1 9
Wealth w1 2400 5.03 2.07 0 8
Church Attendance w1 2368 2.14 1.16 0 4
Talk Politics w1 2372 2.37 0.88 1 4
Interest Politics w1 2349 2.17 0.99 1 4
Democracy w1 2115 0.65 0.47 0 1
Democracy w3 1455 0.66 0.47 0 1
Clean Elections w3 1530 2.66 1.01 1 4
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